



THE
ANDOVER REVIEW

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THE
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A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XVI.—AUGUST, 1891.—No. XCII.

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY.

"The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken; not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable; not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialized itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything. . . . Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea, the idea is the fact. . . . More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry." — MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"NOT a creed unshaken," "not a dogma unquestioned, every tradition threatening to dissolve," — this is Matthew Arnold's counterphrase to Carlyle's "Our relations all an inquiry and a doubt." In a world of disintegrated intelligence and a broken authority, Arnold sees men more and more turning to poetry for consolation, for stay, for interpretation. There is absence of any coherent social faith and order; there is doubt whether any theory of life at once valuable and verifiable, true to intelligence and worthy to the emotion, is any longer possible, and yet there is also demand for authority and for instruction. We may say science is verifiable, but it lacks sympathy, consolation, humanity; it does not afford instruction where instruction is most wanted, — in the ordering of life. What once afforded all this, says Mr. Arnold, has lost its hold as truth; it no longer appeals verifiably to us. This is the difficulty of the situation: the true does not inspire, does not aid; that which once gave stay and interpretation is no longer true. In poetry men find a wide interpretation of life,

noble ideas about life, and also a kind sympathy with all its colored moods, with all phases of its movement. Keen feeling, wide sympathy, noble ideas, serious emotion, are found there. What more do we want? What more natural than, in the difficulty of our times, men turning to poetry for guidance? We may well believe that poetry is more and more becoming our religion and our philosophy. Here, let us also add, there is no need to ask if this or that be scientifically true. "For poetry the idea is everything; all else is illusion. For poetry the idea is the fact."

We have the thought of Matthew Arnold before us. What shall we say of it? Shall we make bold to criticise the position? Spite of the clear insight of this great critic, shall we venture to say that his insight was essentially limited in range? that he saw but a small part of the forces really at work in modern thought?

We need not be detained by what our critic says regarding the existing disintegration of intellectual authority in matters of belief. Making allowance for overstatement, all will admit readily that there is enough of unrest, enough of doubt in modern thought, to make it worth while to raise this question, Where shall we find authority, the instruction which our natures demand? Shall we cease to find it in philosophy, or in science, and shall we find it in poetry?

I think none desire that poetry shall not be more and more the vehicle of serious thought and ennobling emotion, that it shall not more and more convey genuine and helpful interpretation of life. *Absit omen.* We have fallen too much on days of trivial subjects, ornate treatment, cheap sentiment, and artificial imagery not to sympathize with all that Mr. Arnold says about the high calling of poetry. We cannot too often return to the idea that its purpose is to deepen the sense of what is worthy, of what is permanent in life. The question only presses the more earnestly: How is poetry to interpret valuable meanings of life, how to animate to the execution of them; how is it to be kept from the evils that threaten it, from the frivolous, the sensual, the artificial? Can it do all this, if it is not backed and sustained by something which commends itself to the intelligence? Call this something what you will, theology, philosophy, or theory of life, how can poetry preserve its genuineness and its sustaining force, if it cut loose from all verifiable account of the universe? Who shall keep the keeper? I know of but one answer. Truth, and truth alone, can do this. And I confess I do not understand

how that can be true for the imagination, for the emotions, which is not also true for intelligence.

It is easy to disparage science, it is easy to laugh at philosophy, with its "reasoning about causation and finite and infinite being." Both are remote enough from our immediate spiritual and ethical interests. Face to face with the supreme question concerning the right ordering of life they seem ludicrously insufficient. But, after all, science means only knowledge, — philosophy, only love of wisdom, only the essay at reaching the meaning of this experience of ours. I cannot believe that the attempt to know truth, to grasp the meaning of experience, is remote from conduct, from the ideals and aspirations of life. In the words of Carlyle, I verify my own conviction: "Belief, indeed, is the beginning and first condition of all spiritual force whatsoever; only so far as imagination is *believed* can there be any use or even any enjoyment of it." The imagination rests upon belief; it is from belief that it gets its cue to stay, to interpret, its consolation. If there is belief in the high and serious values of the universe, with what glory shall not the imagination portray and inspire life, what consolations shall not issue from it! But let intelligence lose this belief in the meaning and worthiness of experience, and poetry is but the tricking out of illusions, the devising of artifices. I can well comprehend that poetry may deliver truth with a personal and a passionate force which is beyond the reach of theory painting in gray on gray. Indeed, it is the emotional kindling of reality which is the true province of poetry.

Astronomers tell us that meteors are cold rock, cold as the frozen emptiness of space, molten by contact with our earthly atmosphere, and thence glowing like the stars. Thus do I conceive of poetry. The graceless, rigid, dark facts of science, of philosophy, pass through the atmosphere of personality, of the hopes and fears of a human soul, and issue illumined and to illuminate. Without the basis of fact, of fact verifiable by science, our light is a will-o'-the-wisp, a wandering flame generated in the stagnant marshes of sentiment. In a word, there must be the possibility of science and philosophy to criticise, to verify. Poets are indeed seers and makers; but if what they make has matter, has weight, if what they see is more than shadow, the poets must reveal, they must round out to high completeness, the meaning of the life that is about them. Poets cannot be freed from the conditions which attach to the intelligence of man everywhere. The poet and the ploughman gaze at the same scene, only the

eyes of one are holden. If the life which the poet presents to us as throbbing, as pregnant, ever new from God, is other than the genuine revelation of the ordinary day-by-day life of man, it is but dainty foolery or clumsy masquerading. If life is, indeed, dull and blank and unappealing, poetry will be depressing, mechanical, merely decorative. If life is abundant, promising, endless, poetry will be spontaneous, buoyant, passionate; it will have enjoyment. If life carries meaning with it, fulfills purpose, makes exactions which are opportunities, poetry will be high-minded, a power to stay and to console.

Nor is this all. What life is found to be depends in large measure upon the prevailing theory of life, upon the interpretation of it which commends itself to the intelligence. Life is not a raw, unworked material to which the poet may directly apply himself. As it comes to the poet, life is already a universe of meanings, of interpretations, which indeed the poet may fill out, but not dispense with. For good or for ill, centuries of reflective thought have been interpreting life, and their interpretations remain the basis and furnish the instrument for all the poet may do; he may simply use the assimilated results of the labors of scientific men and philosophers. Let the philosophy of a time be materialistic, mechanical, and the poetry of that time is artificial and unworthy. If the poet succeeds in rising above the thought that has taken possession of contemporary life, it is because by instinct or by desire he falls back on the larger and freer ideas of an earlier day. If the ideas of a time breathe the solemn atmosphere of a divine order, if they find reality surcharged with meaning, we can imagine the poetry that results. It is the poetry of Homer, of Dante, of Shakespeare. If the philosophy of a time is agnostic, if it utters a scorn of life as it seems to be, that philosophy will also sound its note in the poetry of its day.

Thus are we brought again to our starting-point. If we are correct in our judgment that a poet must draw his sustenance from the intelligence of his time, the poetry of to-day must feel the touch of what we call our agnosticism, and the poets of to-day must be somewhat moved by this trait of contemporary life.

Are they thus moved? What is their attitude toward the agnosticism, the doubt, the pessimism, of the present day?

I wish now to speak in this relation of two poets who have recently passed from us. One of them is Mr. Arnold himself, poet as well as critic; the other is Mr. Robert Browning. How do these, both serious and high-minded poets, stand affected by the

popular philosophy? How do they affect us who go to them to learn of life?

Nothing in Arnold the poet strikes us more than the teaching of Arnold the critic. Translated from the impersonal narrative of prose into the warmth of poetry, it is the same lesson. Compare the passage standing as our text with this:—

“Wandering between two worlds, one dead
The other powerless to be born,
With nowhere yet to lay my head,
Like them, on earth I wait forlorn.”

Or with this:—

“The sea of faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled:
But now I only hear
Its melancholy long withdrawing roar.”

Indeed, Arnold's distinguishing sign among modern poets is the melancholy beauty with which he has voiced the sense of loss; his sad backward glance at the departure of old faiths and ideals; the brooding memories of joys whose spring has fallen away; the shapeless, hopeless hope for the dawn of a new joy, new faith.

I should say that the source of regret which expires from Arnold's lines is his consciousness of a twofold isolation of man—his isolation from nature, his isolation from fellow-man. No longer, he seems to say, may man believe in his oneness with the dear nature about him: the sense of a common spirit binding them together has vanished; the sense of a common purpose outworking in both has fled. Nature, in ceasing to be divine, has ceased to be human. The faith that one idea, one fulfillment, unites in cherished bonds man to nature, is no more; in its stead, the consciousness of isolation. There is still, indeed, grateful companionship with nature, but below this companionship is the knowledge of an impassable gulf:—

“Thou hast been, shalt be, art alone:
Or, if not quite alone, yet they
Who touch thee are unmating things,—
Ocean and clouds, and night and day,
Lorn autumns and triumphant springs.”

The companionship is not at bottom real: it is only on man's side; Nature lacks the element of purpose which alone could give joyful response to man's needs. Man solaces and strengthens his spirit by recourse to Nature, but Nature goes her own way and man must return to his; strengthened and solaced, indeed,

but only that he may live self-poised like Nature, careless, unheeding of all beyond self. Companionship no longer is rooted in the heart of things; it is no longer the outcome of a single life.

Man, repulsed from the intimacy of communion with Nature, may turn to man for fellowship; but here, too, is found isolation: —

“Like drift-wood spars which meet and pass
Upon the boundless ocean plain,
So on the sea of life, alas!
Man meets man, meets and parts again.”

No reader of Arnold can fail to notice how spontaneously he takes his most characteristic metaphor from the sea and the matters of the sea. The verses I am about to quote have the same inspiration and tell the same story. As the islands of the sea are separated by that sea which is common to them all, so men are separated by that very life in which all share. Between them is

“The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea.”

“Yes, on the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
We mortal millions live alone.”

I am aware, however, of no passage of Arnold's which comes to us so laden with the gospel of the isolation of life as that poem which gives us his reading of history, “Obermann once More.” The sad tone reaches its highest note in the description of the loss of Christian faith. From the land whence once came the words of humanity's life, —

“Ah, from that silent, sacred land
Of sun and arid stone,
And crumbling wall and sultry sand,
Comes now *one* word alone!
From David's lips that word did roll,
'T is true and living yet:
No man can save his brother's soul,
Nor pay his brother's debt.
Alone, self-poised, henceforward man
Must labor.”

Not from him who identified himself with the woe and the joy of all men's lives, but from David, sounds the final word of Palestine. The life of common brotherhood, struggle and destiny of Christianity has given way to the old isolated struggle of the individual.

“No man can save his brother's soul
Nor pay his brother's debt.”

That is, I take it, the last word of Arnold's poetic message, his last interpretation of life. Perhaps I should rather say this is the keynote of it all. To say it is the last is to say his last message is one of weakness and despair. Contrary to this, the philosophy which Mr. Arnold leaves us is one of endeavor, of strenuous, almost buoyant, endeavor, in spite of the fact that this endeavor must spring from sadness. If man is isolated, in that isolation he may find himself, and, finding himself, living his own life, lose all his misery. Although man may not commune with Nature, he may yet follow and repeat her. If the works of Nature go on,

"Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God's other works may be,"

man should emulate this self-sufficient energy. Isolation is translated into self-dependence. Separation throws man farther into himself, deepens his consciousness of his own destiny and of his own law. The verses which close the poem called "*Youth of Man*," while far from the most poetical of his lines, sum up, I think, his interpretation of life:—

"Sink, O youth, in thy soul !
Yearn to the greatness of nature ;
Rally the good in the depths of thyself."

This is the outcome of the loneliness of life. Regret and melancholy are not the final fruit. Obey nature, go thy way, heeding nothing less than the concerns of men. As a consolation for thy loneliness, yearn to the greatness of nature. Is man helpless to save another's soul? Then all the more let him rally the good in the depths of himself!

How does this message stand related to the dictum of Arnold that poetry is to take the place of philosophy, of theology? How does it stand related to our dictum that the interpretation of life which poetry gives us must be parallel to the demonstrations of philosophy? I do not know how any one can apprehend the message uttered by Arnold and not feel its heart and substance to be that reflective and philosophic interpretation of life given by one school of the world's great moralists, — by the Stoics. As surely as Arnold's style, his deftness, his delicacy, his simplicity testify to the influence of Virgil, of Æschylus, of Homer, so surely do his ideas and their substance testify to Marcus Aurelius and to Epictetus and to Kant. I do not mean by this that Arnold has put the "*Meditations*" or the "*Critique of Practical Reason*" into

verse. I do not even imagine that Arnold had much acquaintance with Kant, or was attracted by such as he had. Speaking broadly, however, the ideas of the Stoics, of Kant, and of Matthew Arnold, grow out of the same soil. There is in all three the conception of the individual as shut off from real communion with nature and with fellow-man, and yet as bearing in himself a universal principle.

"And thou, thou lonely heart,
Which never yet, without remorse,
Even for a moment didst depart
From thy remote and spherèd course
To haunt the place where passions dwell,
Back to thy solitude again."

This is precisely in the sense of Epictetus, precisely in the vein of Kant. I would not, however, insist upon detailed likeness in special points. What is alike in all is the underlying spirit, the attitude towards life. The individual flung back from the world and from society upon himself, and within himself finding the secret of a new strength, the source of a new consolation,—this is the interpretation of life common to all. How can such an interpretation have use, have enjoyment, be a consolation, be a stay in poetry, and yet have no legitimacy in theory? What alembic does the poet possess that he may apply ideas to life with the assurance that in poetry the ideas are the fact, while the same ideas in the hands of the philosopher are unverifiable, discredited dogmas, shaken creeds, or failing traditions? I cannot rid myself of the conviction that the weight and the humanity of the message of the poet are proportionate to the weighty and human ideas which he develops; that these ideas must be capable of verification to the intelligence,—must be true in that system of knowledge which is science, in that discussion of the meaning of experience which is philosophy.

But what if Mr. Arnold's interpretation of life be partial? What if a completer account of experience, a deeper and more adventurous love of wisdom, should find community below all isolation? Would not the philosophy of life which revealed this limitation of Mr. Arnold's interpretation, reveal also the limitation of his poetry? This is the question that comes to me when I put Mr. Arnold's poetry, with all its nobility, beside the poetry of Robert Browning.

What a change from a serene yet cold air of one to the genial, glowing atmosphere of the other, which envelops and embraces

everything in this world of ours as if in fear that something might escape its loving touch. What a change from the pallid colors in which one paints life to the varied warmth of the other! What a change from the almost remote and academic sympathies of the one to the passionate human sympathies of the other! Where Arnold finds food for pensive regret, a rendering of triumphant hope is borne to us from Browning. When the world tells a story of softened melancholy to Arnold, Browning reads a tale of keen and delicious joy. If Arnold sings of calm, self-poised resignation and endeavor, the trumpet peal of an abounding life bursts from Browning. Arnold stands upon the sandy, barren shore of that vast ocean where is seen only "the turbid ebb and flow of human misery," whence comes only the melancholy sounds of a withdrawing faith. Browning takes his place on this homely, every-day earth of ours: —

"Do I stoop? I pluck a posey.
Do I stand and stare? All's blue."

Strenuous, abounding, triumphant optimism, — that is the note of Browning: —

"How good is man's life, the men living! how fit to employ
All the heart and the soul and the senses forever in joy!"

Buoyant faith, that is the attitude of Browning: —

"God's in his heaven!
All's right with the world!"

What is the source of this note of Browning, what the authority for his attitude? It is only when we go to his ideas, the ideas which he applies to life, by which he criticises and interprets life, that we get the secret of his superior passion, of his superior joy, of his superior sympathy. An adequate rendering of Browning's conception of the meaning of life does not come within the scope of this article. The most inadequate rendering cannot fail to note that Browning knows and tells of no isolation of man from nature, of man from man. No account, however brief, can fail to record the abundance, the intensity, the vibrating fullness, the impassioned sanity of his verse, basing themselves upon Browning's realization that the world was made for man, and that man was made for man: —

"This world's no blot for us,
No blank. It means intensely and means good."

This is the uniform utterance of Browning.

"Such a soul,
Such a body, and then such an earth,
For ensphering the whole !"

"The earth's first stuff
Was neither more nor less, enough
To house man's soul, man's need fulfill."

"How the world is made for each of us !
All we perceive and know in it
Tends to some moment's product thus
When the soul declares itself."

In these verses we have the epitome of Browning's interpretation of life: the subordination of earth to man, to a common self. Just that which was conspicuously absent in Arnold is conspicuously present in Browning, — the sense of a common idea, a common purpose, in nature and in man. Thus it is man need not simply look to nature for encouragement in bearing the burden of the world, for strength to be like her, self-poised, self-dependent. Man may rejoice in her every pulse of life, having the conviction that in her life he, too, lives; knowing that her every event furthers some deed of his, knowing that her beauty is the response to some aspiration of his. Let one know, as Browning sings in "Rabbi Ben Ezra," that nature, that the earthly life, and all "this dance of plastic circumstance," are but the machinery to shape the soul, to form the spirit; are but the potter's wheel that moulds the clay to "heaven's consummate cup;" let him know that the meaning of life, the "uses of the cup," are

"The festal board, lamp's flash, and trumpet's peal,
The new wine's foaming flow,
The master's lips aglow !" —

let him know all this, and he will understand why the song of Browning is one of joy and victory.

Add to this Browning's conception of the relation of man to man. Consider how he finds in the contacts of life, not isolation, but companionship, service, love, — the first and the last word.

To relate how he finds, in the minglings of life and life, the secret and the key to our experience, would be to summarize, one by one, his poems. Even a casual acquaintance with Browning suffices to show that love, as he conceives it, is no accident and no mere occurrence of the life-journey, but at once its path and its goal. Everything

"Of power and beauty in the world
The mightiness of love is curled
Inextricably round about.
Love lies within it and without."

We are led again to our old question. The greater vigor and sensuousness of Browning, his wider range, his more human touch, all spring from the ideas through which he sees and interprets life. But are the ideas true? Are they verifiable? Are they sporadic outbursts of a fancy which has no root in the nature of things, or are they the revelations of an imagination which is but another name for insight? If the ideas which give both substance and shape to Browning's poetry are only artificial make-ups of his individual fancy, what claim have they even for serious attention, to say nothing of power to stay by and to uphold? If these ideas are not ideas of soberness and of truth, as well as of fancy and passion, they are no more to us (the harsh word must be said) than freaks of a madman's brain.

If Mr. Arnold's message has weight and penetration with us, it is because that message conveys something of the reality of things. If there are messages, in comparison with which Mr. Arnold's seems pallid and academic, it is only because these other messages bring us word from a more abiding, a more human world than Mr. Arnold has known. The great power of poetry to stay and to console — a power which neither Arnold nor any other critic can exaggerate one whit — is just because of the truth, the rendering of the reality of affairs, which poetry gives us. The importance and the endurance of poetry, as of all art, are in its hold upon reality. We hear much, on this side and that, of realism. Well, we may let realism go, but we cannot let go reality. Here, too, we may turn to Robert Browning himself: —

"Truth, truth, that's the gold. And all the good
I find in fancy is, it serves to set
Gold's inmost glint free."

It is because, amid the conventionalities and make-believes of our ordinary life, poetry flashes home to us some of the gold which is at the very heart and core of our every-day existence, that poetry has its power to sustain us, its sympathy to enhearten us. Now science and philosophy, I repeat, however technical and remote in form and method, are the workings of the one selfsame spirit in its communing with this same world. There are, indeed, diversities of operation. And if the advantage in directness and universality of appeal, in wealth and passionateness of garb, is upon the side of poetry, let us remember that, after all, the advantage upon the side of method and standard are with the side of science and philosophy.

Indeed, this present separation of science and art, this division

of life into prose and poetry, is an unnatural divorce of the spirit. It exists and endures, not because of a glow to life which philosophy cannot catch, nor because of a verifiable truth which poetry cannot detect and convey. It exists because in the last few centuries the onward movement of life, of experience, has been so rapid, its diversification of regions and methods so wide, that it has outrun the slower step of reflective thought. Philosophy has not as yet caught the rhythmic swing of this onward movement, and written it down in a score of black and white which all may read. Or if in some degree philosophy has laid hold of the secret of this movement, it has not yet been able to tell it in straightforward, simple syllables to the common consciousness. In its own theory, this common consciousness tells by rote a doctrine of an earlier and outworn world. But this movement, which has so escaped the surer yet heavier tread of critical thought, has in manifold ways danced itself into the poetic measures of our century. The deeper and wider spiritual life which makes this movement has found an expression in Wordsworth and Shelley, in Browning and in Mr. Arnold himself, which has, as yet, been denied to it in English philosophy. That which seemed to Mr. Arnold a flight from philosophy into poetry was in reality but a flight from a hard and partial philosophy to a fuller and freer one. It is not because poetry is divorced from science that it gave Mr. Arnold's nature such satisfaction, but because his philosophic instinct was so deep and real that he revolted from the professional philosophy of the day as he found it in Great Britain, and sought refuge in the unnamed, unprofessed philosophy of the great poets of England and of all time.

Here, indeed, is just our problem. We must bridge this gap of poetry from science. We must heal this unnatural wound. We must, in the cold, reflective way of critical system, justify and organize the truth which poetry, with its quick, naïve contacts, has already felt and reported. The same movement of the spirit, bringing man and man, man and nature, into wider and closer unity, which has found expression by anticipation in poetry, must find expression by retrospection in philosophy. Thus will be hastened the day in which our sons and our daughters shall prophesy, our young men shall see visions, and our old men dream dreams.

John Dewey.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
ANN ARBOR, MICH.

ALEXANDRE VINET, 1797-1847.¹

Einer der edelsten Charactere, von dem Ströme lebendigen Wassers ausgegangen Sind und noch ausgehen, ist Vinet ganz gewiss. — ARNOLD RUEGG.

I.

DURING the last year or two, the attention of the French and Swiss reading public has been called anew, by various publications and articles, to the claims of Vinet as a writer and a thinker. The appearance of a volume of his poems and of Moline's "*Étude sur A. Vinet*" would alone have raised more or less discussion about his works. But more or less extended criticisms by Brunetière, Faguet, de Pressencé, on these volumes and on Vinet's place in literature have largely added to the interest of this discussion. I have thought, therefore, that it might not be uninteresting to the readers of this "Review" to go over it with me. Vinet would have welcomed such a publication as the "Andover Review," and rejoiced in its influence and success, for it endeavors to promote what was exceedingly dear to him, — independence and honesty in Christian thought and expression, — and what was supremely important, in his opinion, — the coördinating of all Christian systems, methods, and efforts around the person of the Christ.

Of the purely theological work of Vinet, I am not competent to write. I feel certain, however, that the estimate put upon it by the author of the very inadequate biographical notice in the "*Encyclopædia Britannica*" is altogether erroneous. Vinet would be remembered still, and his influence would still be powerful, though he had not left us his various writings on French literature. He was not a system-builder either in philosophy or theology; not even a system-defender; but he had a wonderful power of penetrating to the core of things, and a fearless confidence in the expediency as well as in the rightfulness of uttering the truth, which won for him while he lived, and have retained for him to this day, a peculiar and prominent position among the suggestors and guides of thought and life in Protestant France and Switzerland.

¹ E. Rambert, *Alexandre Vinet*. 3d ed. Lausanne, 1876.

L. Molines, *Étude sur A. Vinet*. Paris, 1890.

E. de Pressensé, *A. Vinet d'après sa correspondance avec H. Lutteroth*. Paris, 1891.

P. Godet, *Histoire littéraire de la Suisse Française*. Paris, 1890.

J. F. Astié, *Esprit d'A. Vinet*. (English translation.) London, 1865.

A. Vinet, *Poésies — recueillies par ses amis*. Lausanne, 1890.

Seven years after Vinet's death a writer in the "North British Review" began an article on his life and writings in these words: "Vinet is the most illustrious ornament of modern French Protestantism." At that time Adolphe Monod, Guizot, the elder Coquerel, Merle d'Aubigné, Scherer, were living, and in the full maturity of their powers. Certainly, if the rank then assigned to Vinet was justly his, nothing has occurred since then to deprive him of it. Indeed, in an article that has appeared since I began to put together materials for this sketch, Gabriel Monod, writing for English readers ("Contemporary Review," December, 1890), says: "Alexandre Vinet is the leading figure of French Protestantism in the nineteenth century. Others may have had a more potent or dazzling eloquence, a purer style, a more precise or ample erudition; but nowhere among French-speaking Protestant authors do we find one who can be ranked as his equal in force, and wealth, and originality of thought. Not one among them has exerted such an influence over his contemporaries; not one among them has so perfectly represented the Protestant spirit in its best estate."

Vinet was born at Ouchy, near Lausanne, in 1797. His father, of Huguenot descent, had, from very humble beginnings, worked his way up to a responsible position under the cantonal government. He was a man of unblemished reputation, honest, industrious, intelligent, thoughtful, devout in a somewhat formal way, concealing under a severe, almost stern manner a large fund of tender affection. In short, a Swiss of the good old stock. He had set his hopes upon his son Henry, younger than Alexandre, who died while yet a lad. He was not blind, however, to the sterling and remarkable gifts of his elder boy, and directed and encouraged his studies with clear insight and broad sympathy. He gave him the best opportunities the canton then offered. The "Collège Cantonal" and the "Académie" of Lausanne were at that time far less completely equipped than they are now. Still, they counted some able and earnest instructors, and Vinet, in after life, was ever ready to acknowledge his indebtedness to them. The volume of Vinet's poems published last year in Lausanne proves conclusively that his student years, though laborious, were full of zest and gayety. Vinet was never an ascetic, never a puritan, in the narrower and restrictive sense of the term. His life, though one of severe toil, and much of the time of real poverty and of severe pain, was yet a rounded, symmetrical one.

The act that first brought him into public notice was the funeral

address that, in the name of his fellow-students, he delivered at the grave of a beloved instructor, Professor Durand. He did it spontaneously, to the surprise of all: with the students the surprise was full of pleasure; not so with the authorities, and the adventurous young orator barely escaped severe official censure.

Recommended by the faculty as the fittest of their students to assume the charge of instruction in French at the Basle Gymnasium, Vinet accepted gladly and gratefully the post offered him, and for twenty years he discharged its modest functions in such a manner that not the Gymnasium alone, but the whole city and canton, soon learned to respect him and to be proud of him. The "*Chrestomathie Française*" (3 vols. in 8vo), which he prepared for the use of his pupils, is still, all in all, the best compend of French literature for the use of schools. The selections are excellently made; the biographical sketches, though generally quite brief, give all the salient points and facts, and leave a clear, strong, accurate, abiding impression in the mind of the reader; the brief survey of French literature which introduces the third volume remains unequalled in the lucidity of its exposition, and the almost unassailable justness of its criticisms and estimates. Sainte-Beuve found scarcely anything to blame in its earliest form. In the later shape which Vinet, profiting by the suggestions of this and other critics, as well as by his own enlarged experience, gave the work, it may challenge comparison with any similar one in any literature.

In Basle, Vinet supplemented the somewhat narrow course of the Lausanne Academy by solid and extensive reading. Quite naturally, German literature, German philosophy, and German theology attracted and interested him. Greek, which he had learned very imperfectly, he now studied hard and to good purpose. In these pursuits he was helped and cheered by his wife, who throughout his life proved a loving and efficient helpmeet. On the whole, these years in Basle must be considered as the happiest in his experience. Unfortunately a severe accident, from which he never wholly recovered and which necessitated several painful operations, laid, in a constitution that had never been very vigorous, the seeds of a disease that was to carry him off in his fifty-first year.

It was some nine years after his removal to Basle, in 1826, that Vinet published his first important work, "*Mémoires en faveur de la liberté des cultes.*" A former French Minister of Justice, Count de Lambrechto, had left the sum of 2,000 francs

as a prize for the best work on "freedom of worship" that should be written within two years after his death. Vinet, as he himself tells us, "felt a call to undertake a contest to which he was urged by the most profound conviction of his mind and the most invincible sentiments of his heart." Twenty-nine manuscripts were sent in. The committee chosen to award the prize contained some of the most eminent Frenchmen of the day, among them Guizot, de Barante, de Rémusat, de Broglie, de Kératry, and Stapfer. Guizot as chairman reported that the unanimous choice of the judges had settled on the essay bearing the motto "*Là où est l'esprit du Seigneur, là est la liberté*" (2 Cor. iii. 17). It was Vinet's.

The conclusions reached by him in this "*Mémoire*" were the following:—

1. Members of a religious society should be, as to civil and political rights, on the same footing as other citizens.
2. The religious society governs itself in perfect independence.
3. The religious character of certain civil acts, such as marriage and baptism, is entirely distinct from their civil validity and character.
4. The government should cease to educate, pay, or oversee ministers.
5. Worship should be public, so that it may not become dangerous for social morality or for the state.

Though this essay was, on the whole, the most important of the works Vinet wrote during his stay in Basle, it was by no means the only one. We have already mentioned the "*Chrestomathie*." In the list appended to the last edition of Rambert's "*Life of Vinet*," we find that during those years he published no less than twenty-five pamphlets, besides some fifty articles, many of them of great importance, in various periodicals of Switzerland, France, and Germany. Most of this time he was teaching from twenty to thirty hours a week; he preached not infrequently; he was an active member of the Bible Society, and, as we have seen, he was hard at work on Greek and theology. In 1835 he was appointed Professor of French in the University, but continued his lessons in the gymnasium.

This incessant activity bore fruit not only in heightening the consideration he enjoyed in the city of his adoption, but in extending his reputation far beyond the boundaries of the Canton and of Switzerland itself. He was urged to apply for a position in the faculty of Montauban; invited to Paris, to Frankfort, to

Geneva, where he was offered a chair in the Theological School of the Evangelical Society. He refused all these offers and remained in Basle.

But he had ceased to be a local celebrity; his fame was becoming European. His articles in the excellent Paris Protestant publication, "*Le Semeur*," were attracting more and more attention. His criticisms on books by Sainte-Beuve, Souvestre, Béranger, Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Hugo, so different in spirit and method from the ordinary work of the time, drew to him the attention and won the respect of many of the foremost writers of the day. Had we space at our command, we could fill pages with quotations to prove this. We can give only two. Souvestre writes to him: "I cannot tell you how much good your approbation has done me. I do not mean literary approbation. I did wish for that once; I still appreciate it now, but much less than the approbation you give my tendency, your moral encouragement. It is pleasant to meet from time to time a grave countenance approving you and a pure voice saying, 'It is well.'" Sainte-Beuve says of Vinet's criticism: "*Le but élevé final ne manque jamais, et l'on arrive à la dernière page regardant en haut.*"

In 1837 Vinet was called to Lausanne to fill the chair of Practical Theology vacated by Laresche. The call reached him in a state of profound discouragement. He was just passing through one of the crises, so frequent in his experience, in which the greatest temptation in his path seems to have been an exaggerated sense of his unworthiness. Vinet's modesty was extreme, his self-distrust excessive, and had it not been accompanied by the strongest sense of duty and by a deep and most genuine faith in the aid of the Holy Spirit, it would probably have led him to abandon the fields of activity in which even his immediate success was so pronounced.

He waited more than three months before giving his final answer. He was strongly attached to Basle. He writes to a friend: "There is not a stone in the pavements of the city that has not become dear to me. My heart breaks at the thought of leaving a spot in which I have *lived* so much, and in which I expected to die. And what shall I say of my children, who know only Basle?" Still he felt intensely the need of a change. After a sojourn in St. Gall, which his physicians had recommended to him, he returned to Basle, not much improved in health, and soon after decided to go to Lausanne.

His first weeks there were far from happy. Beautiful as were

the surroundings, they could not keep his mind and heart from longing for what he had left in the city on the Rhine. As usual he sought respite from sadness in hard work, and not in vain. He entered upon his work at the Academy the first of November, 1837. At the same time Sainte-Beuve was installed there as lecturer. He had come, on invitation, to the Canton de Vaud to work in quiet at his great "*History of Port Royal*," and was to lecture on the subject to the students of the Academy. He had previously, in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," published a careful and thoughtful article on Vinet. The relations between the two men were from the first very friendly, and they were maintained after Sainte-Beuve's return to Paris. It is not to be doubted that they were mutually profitable. The brilliant Frenchman found in the high-minded and pure-hearted Swiss a mentor and a judge, always charitable, as Sainte-Beuve himself says, but always sincere and intentionally just. We may say here that in his relations with other writers, many of them much better known than himself, Vinet is the one to "give the tone;" his is the directing mind, though all the time, it may be, he is insisting on his friend's superiority.

Of Vinet's work as Professor of Practical Theology it is somewhat difficult to give an adequate idea. The printed results of his courses are comparatively meagre, and in most cases are from imperfect notes taken by his hearers. The impression his teaching left on the minds and hearts of the students, and of others who had the good fortune to hear him, was profound, lasting, and in very many cases decisive. It is doubtful whether any other instructor of this century, with the possible exception of Arnold of Rugby, has had so great, so divine a gift of moulding character by implanting in the heart the conviction that the best life attainable is the only right life. In his case, lovable as was the man and wholly devoted as he was to the interests of his pupils, this power manifested itself and wrought almost exclusively through the spoken word. The state of his health prevented his doing much in the way of social intercourse with the students. But in his lessons he poured out the treasures of his intelligence and of his heart, and they fed on the rich bounty so liberally and lovingly bestowed.

The ten years that Vinet spent in Lausanne were of inestimable value to the church of God in Switzerland and in France, — nay, in the world at large. The writer of this article was born too late to be one of Vinet's hearers, but early in his student

years he met those who had been ; he has met many since, and he can without hesitancy declare that they all considered the privilege of having sat at his feet among the most precious in their lives.

But other and less agreeable cares occupied Vinet's mind and absorbed much of his time during the last half of his stay in Lausanne. He had, as we saw, early considered and settled for himself the question of the relations of the church to the state. Further reflection had but confirmed his views ; still he had never wished to become a separatist, preferring to work within the church, and on this vantage ground prepare the way for a better state of things. More than one of his friends wondered at this. Some of the leaders in the *Réveil* did more than wonder ; they criticised his course with considerable sharpness. Vinet did not at first quite understand the better spirit of the Revival movement. The excesses and absurdities that sometimes disfigured it hid from him in part its admirable features. The theology of its leaders seemed to him narrow, and in some degree to savor of obscurantism. On the other hand, their earnestness strongly appealed to him, and he denounced, not from principle only, but because with him resistance to all kinds of oppression was an instinct, the popular and legal persecutions of which they were the objects.

When, after the Revolution of 1845, the new Vaudois government ordered the pastors to read from their pulpits a long proclamation, the purport of which was largely political, many of them refused ; some even went so far as to forbid its being read at all in their churches. A struggle then began which, after various episodes, resulted in the resignation of over a hundred ministers and the founding of a Free Church in the canton. Vinet had already resigned his pastoral office in 1839, and his professorship of theology in 1845. He was at this time Professor of French Literature, but soon after these events, in 1846, was deprived of his post, on the ground that "he frequented religious gatherings outside of the National Church," a practice which by law debarred him from employment as a public teacher.

The government accepted the situation, and filled as fast and as well as it could the pastorates left empty. The writer remembers well, though he was still a child at the time, the coming of the new pastor, a former schoolmaster, to take charge of the large church of his native town. The division of views among the people was very marked, but an immense majority sided with the

government, not understanding how an employee, for such they held the pastor to be, should refuse to obey orders.

The *démissionnaires*, as the ministers who had resigned were called, continued to be the spiritual guides of such of their former hearers as chose to remain attached to them. They and their parishioners were for a while exposed to more or less brutal persecution at the hands of the populace. The government at first forbade all religious gatherings held elsewhere than in the National churches, but this attempt at legal persecution had its usual effect: it strengthened the faith of the dissenters, and bound them more closely together.

Measured by numbers, this contest was of far less magnitude than the corresponding one in Scotland, yet its consequences were and are perhaps no less important. The continental position of Switzerland, the close intellectual and religious relations between it and Germany and France, partly explain this, but the share Vinet took in the struggle, and the value of his contributions to the literature of it, had unquestionably much to do with this result.

The loss of his professorship was one of the penalties he had to pay for his activity in maintaining the cause of freedom of worship and the independence of the church. His chair was taken from him, but the students remained faithful to their beloved instructor, and he continued to lecture to them as long as his strength allowed him. It was but a short time. He died May 4, 1847. His last words were, "I can no longer think," to his wife, who was asking him a question, and "God have mercy on me!" which he repeated several times. His friends inscribed on the monument they erected over his grave a passage from Daniel xii. 3: "They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." His widow, remembering the modesty and humility that had been so marked traits of his character, caused these words to be added: "Your life is hid with Christ in God."

II.

Nearly half a century has elapsed since Vinet's death. Of how many theological writers and critics who have been in their graves so long can it be said that they still live? that they are still by our side, in our thoughts, guiding and moulding us every day? It is not too much to affirm that Vinet is one of the number. In the article already referred to, Mr. Monod says: "The most con-

vincing testimony to the value of his work is the slow but steady progress of his fame. . . . The most notable men of the younger generation — Messrs. Brunetière, Faguet, Desjardins, Chantavoine — speak of him as a master, and a master who teaches how to live as well as how to think. The exclusively Swiss or Protestant reputation he once enjoyed has grown into a reputation as wide as France. And it will not stop there; for the value of Vinet's works depends on no accident of form or charm of style. It rests rather on their profundity of thought and truth of feeling, and especially on the intimate union between the world and the man, between the teaching and the life."

This is well said, but more might be claimed. Vinet's reputation outside of France is not to be made; it is already made. In our own country many a pastor has drawn from his works some of his truest counsel and inspiration. The estimate Germany makes of him is evidenced by this fact among others: the article devoted to him in Herzog and Plitt's *Real-Encyc. f. Prot. Theol.*, by Arnold Rüegg, fills nearly eighteen pages, and the term "great man" is more than once used in reference to the Swiss professor. Rüegg naturally dwells mainly on Vinet's theological work, and we would refer to his article and to G. Monod's (*Contemporary Review*, November, 1890) all who wish to read a detailed account of Vinet's religious views and teachings. We have not the competence to treat of them. Yet even a layman may speak of the peculiar unction of Vinet's writings, — an unction as different as possible from the ordinary pathos of the rhetorical preacher. The impression his works at once and permanently produce is that he is endeavoring, not to establish or defend a theory, not to adapt a certain fact or state of mind to an accepted system of philosophy or theology, but to discover and proclaim the truth. One may not always agree with his opinions, but one must admire and love his spirit. He was not an extremist in anything, unless it be in his absolute faith in the triumph of righteousness. In the earlier period of his life, writing to a young friend who had questioned the rightfulness of reticence, he says: "Vous êtes franc, je me pique de l'être aussi, mais nous n'entendons pas la franchise tout à fait de même. Vous la faites consister à dire tout ce que vous pensez; pour moi, je borne mon ambition à ne rien dire que je ne pense."

If we were called upon to describe in a few words the work of Vinet as preacher and theological professor, we should say: He laid an extreme but not excessive emphasis on the oneness of

faith and life. For him, to believe is to live, to live is to believe. He defended and upheld the freedom of the church, none the less earnestly and efficiently because he chose to remain a member of the establishment as long as his conscience permitted him. He lifted truth above dogma, the word of God above human speculations, the gospel above the catechism, not defiantly, but with a quiet, calm assurance that won his hearers without startling them. He made Christ the Saviour appear also the Friend, the Counselor, the Guide, the ever-present Helper, and this without in any degree lowering or belittling the divine and august character of Jesus. All this he did, and much besides; and it is altogether impossible for the church to which he originally belonged, or for that which he helped establish, to forget his example and his teaching. The world is distinctly and permanently the better for the life of this excellent man.

But for the writer of this very inadequate notice it is Vinet's work in literature that is most interesting and professionally most important. To the value of Vinet's work as a critic it were easy to give a mass of testimony from his contemporaries and his rivals, if we can apply this term to fellow-workers in the department of literature he had selected as his own. Sainte-Beuve, St. René-Taillandier, Souvestre, Chateaubriand, Hugo, have expressed their admiration of his talent, and most of them, also, their great obligations to him. And in our own day Mr. Brunetière, in an article published in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*" (March 1, 1890), thus speaks of him: "When I recall my earliest impressions and scrutinize my conscience, I find no other historian of literature from whom I have learned more, not even Sainte-Beuve or Désiré Nisard; I am happy to have an opportunity of saying this. But, on the other hand, as for fifteen or twenty years I have ceased reading him, — indeed carefully abstain from reading him, *because I discovered that, if perchance I had an idea, Vinet always had had it before me*, — I fear I am not able to speak of him with as much precision as I would." Certainly the warmest friends of Vinet can wish for no stronger testimony to the value of his work than this, and the limitations that Mr. Brunetière makes later on — some of them we acknowledge quite well taken, others we think quite unjustifiable — do not seriously detract from the claims of Vinet to one of the highest places among the foremost French historians of literature.

In this field, which in France is hardly inferior to any other in importance, and in which such writers as Boileau, Voltaire, Diderot,

Laharpe, Madame de Staël, Villemain, Nisard, Sainte-Beuve, have labored, Vinet occupies a place distinctly his own. His work, though most of it was not given by him a final revision, will be read, I think, as long and as profitably as that of any of his contemporaries. He is preëminently the Christian critic. We do not mean by this that he considers literature exclusively as a vehicle for moral or religious instruction, or that he was at all narrow in his tastes or unduly severe in his judgments. He accepted, as all reasonable men must accept, the fact of modern civilization, with all its wonderful complexities and perplexities. But he read and criticised everything from the standpoint of its bearing upon life, — and with him life was Christian. He was largely liberal — sometimes even, his friends thought, too much so — in his appreciation of writers whom it is the custom severely to condemn and to remand among the harmful and dangerous. He saw, and tried to help others see, the good there is in them and the good that can be obtained from them. His gentle though searching analysis separated the chaff from the wheat, brought out their noble and unselfish ideas and ideals, and, whilst the final decision left no doubt as to the opinion of the critic concerning the low and base, it directed the attention of the reader mainly to the better qualities of the work.

In his lectures on the French literature in the eighteenth century, Vinet devotes one volume almost wholly to Voltaire and Rousseau. He concludes his study of Voltaire in the following words: "Le sentiment qui demeure après tout ceci est un sentiment triste; il en faut exclure la haine et ne conserver que la pitié. Personne n'a mieux servi la cause du prince des ténèbres que Voltaire; mais si nous rentrons dans l'intérieur de son être, disons-le encore, Messieurs, nous n'y trouvons qu'un homme semblable à beaucoup d'autres hommes."¹

Of Rousseau he sums up thus: "Rousseau fut donc l'écrivain le plus puissant de son école. En un point cependant cette puissance trouva ses limites. Il entreprit de donner une religion à la France; il prétendit substituer au déisme sec de Voltaire un déisme séduisant, rehaussé d'imagination et de sentiment; mais il n'aboutit qu'à prouver l'insuffisance du déisme pour la consolation

¹ The feeling that abides after all this is one of sadness; let us exclude from it all hate and retain only pity. No one ever served better than Voltaire the cause of the Prince of Darkness; but if we penetrate within his inner being, we find there only a man like many other men.

et le soutien de l'humanité. Ou le monde deviendra chrétien, ou et deviendra quelque chose qu'il me répugne d'exprimer."¹

The masterpiece of Vinet's criticism is generally conceded to be his "Essays on Pascal." They were composed at different periods. The first given in the volume, entitled "Études sur Blaise Pascal," a volume brought out by Vinet's friends several years after his death, is only a fragment of a lesson given at Basle in 1833; the ninth, a brief sketch of Pascal's "Abrégé de la vie de Jésus Christ," was dictated by Vinet in 1847, when he was on his death-bed.

Vinet was unusually well qualified and prepared to understand Pascal. The two men had much in common. "Vinet," says de Pressensé, "has really been the Pascal of the Reformed Churches. This name belongs to him whether we consider the breadth of his religious conception, or dwell on the character of the writer, his absolute sincerity, the note of sadness (*le trait douloureux*) which characterizes all great Christians. Let us add that Vinet, like Pascal, whose most faithful interpreter he has been, was placed at the hard school of disease; that it was by subduing a body broken by an implacable illness that he accomplished his immense intellectual task. His thought, his soul, his very style, are constantly retempered in the burning crucible of pain. Only, Vinet is a son of the Reformation, and not a timorous disciple of Port Royal. His pinions have not the sweep of Pascal's, but his horizon is more vast, his spirit is more free. . . . Vinet is one of the greatest and truest liberals of our time, and religious freedom carried to its last consequences has no more convinced, no more potent defender than he. . . . These significant words were found in the note-book in which he jotted down his most secret thoughts: 'Love of glory is the dangerous neighbor of real love; the one loses all that the other gains.' Vinet loved truth, not glory. Hence his noble disdain for all that might have brought him into prominence."

True to his method of seeking the man in the written book, and in the man the Christian, if cause there be, Vinet has endeavored to penetrate into the real personality of Pascal. At the time his first essays were published, the improved texts of Pascal's

¹ Rousseau was the most powerful writer of his (own) school. Yet on one point this power found its limits. He undertook to give a religion to France; he tried to substitute for the barren deism of Voltaire a seductive deism, adorned by imagination and sentiment; but his efforts ended in proving anew the inability of deism to comfort and uphold humanity. Either the world will become Christian, or it will become something I am loth to express.

works, especially of the "*Pensées*," were not yet known. Whilst acknowledging that the friends of the great moralist, out of regard for the feelings of good men of their day and for his own reputation, had in all probability modified, by prunings and alterations, the exact form of Pascal's work, Vinet claimed that diligent and unprejudiced study of the text as published by them would lead to a sufficiently clear apprehension of the thought (*pensée*) of Pascal, of the drift of his argument, of his real position on the various matters he discusses.

The French eclectic philosopher, Cousin, had in 1843 published on the "*Pensées*" a book in which he maintained the view that Pascal was really a great skeptic, a Pyrrhonian. Vinet concedes that certain passages in the "*Pensées*" admit of such an interpretation, but maintains that they much more readily admit of a different one, more in keeping with the whole drift of Pascal's thinking, and therefore the more probable of the two. The argument of Vinet is remarkable for its moderation as well as for its strength, and leaves, it seems to us, no reasonable ground for Cousin's contention. Certainly the world at large accepts or retains Vinet's view. It was of these articles of Vinet's that Sainte-Beuve wrote: "*Si l'on réunissait dans un petit volume les articles de M. Vinet sur Pascal, on aurait, selon moi; les conclusions les plus exactes auxquelles on puisse atteindre sur cette grande nature si controversée.*"

Some thirty years ago M. Astié published two volumes of extracts from Vinet's works under the title of "*L'Esprit de Vinet.*" These have been translated into English, and appear as "*Outlines of Theology,*" and "*Outlines of Philosophy and Literature.*" We refer our readers to them, reminding them, at the same time, of the loss that the form, and not infrequently the spirit, the very life of a saying, often suffer by translation. For, although in Vinet the thinker is greater than the artist, yet the form is generally worthy of the matter, and often is exceedingly fine. On the whole, however, we agree with M. Brunetière, who refuses to place Vinet among the great masters of style. He lacked, it seems to us, the supreme sense of harmonious proportion that characterizes nearly all the great French prose-writers; his sentences are too full, often too subtle; the artist in them is subordinate to the *penseur*; the object he aims at is the adequate and just presentation of the truth, rather than the impressive and effective statement of it. But, after conceding all this, we are almost ready to join M. Astié when he says that Vinet was "the writer who

doubtless gave the world more original and true thoughts than any other man of his age."

We add a few extracts from Vinet's writings, choosing passages that throw special light on his opinions and his character.

Pour être convaincu, il faut avoir été vaincu.¹ (One of his favorite sayings.)

Le vrai bien de l'homme, le vrai mal de l'homme, sa destinée, c'est lui-même. Son âme est maîtresse de son sort ; heureux s'il était maître de son âme.²

J'ai écrit ceci sur mes tablettes : "Ne parle jamais de Dieu sans parler à Dieu. En des sujets religieux, la meilleure méditation c'est la prière. Avoir prié c'est avoir pensé."³

Tout ce qui est vrai le Christianisme l'adopte ou plutôt le réclame.⁴

Je suis protestant, il est vrai, mais dans un sens si général, si peu historique, que je ne me sens étranger dans aucune enceinte, lorsque j'y retrouve cette foi en la charité divine, ce recours au mystère de l'incarnation et cette bonne volonté du repentir, qui sont la consolation, la couronne et l'humble triomphe de notre existence foudroyée.⁵ (Letter to Chateaubriand.)

Ceux qui sont protestants pour tout nier se font catholiques pour tout lier.⁶

On beaucoup trop conclu des succès de quelques écrivains sceptiques ou indifférents. Le doute est un état de l'âme, un fait humain et vrai, dont l'expression est intéressante à certaines conditions, et il a été

¹ To be convinced, one must have been conquered.

² The true weal of man, the true woe of man, his destiny, is himself. His soul is mistress of his fate ; happy if he were master of his soul.

³ I have written this on my tablets : "Never speak of God without having talked with God. On religious subjects the best meditation is prayer. He who has prayed has thought."

⁴ Christianity adopts, or rather claims, as her own everything that is true.

⁵ I am a Protestant, it is true, but in so general, in so unhistorical a sense, that I do not feel estranged in any circle if I find in it that faith in divine charity, that resort to the mystery of the Incarnation, and that willingness to repent, which are the consolation, the crown, and the humble triumph of our shattered existence.

⁶ Some that are Protestants to deny everything, turn Catholics in order to bind everything.

donné à certains génies indifférentistes de s'identifier avec le vrai par l'intelligence. *En thèse générale il faut partir de la vérité pour faire quelque durée.*¹

L'homme tout matière est méprisable; l'homme tout esprit est effrayant. Je veux l'homme maître de lui-même, afin qu'il soit mieux le serviteur de tous.²

Dans chacune des âmes qui la reçoivent, la vérité redevient nouvelle.³

L'Evangile serait bien moins parfait s'il était plus complet, bien moins éloquent s'il avait tout dit, bien moins puissant s'il était plus scientifique dans sa méthode et plus rigoureux dans son langage. Nous nous acharnons à le prendre sur le pied, d'un livre ou d'un traité; mais ce n'est pas un livre, ni un traité, ni un code. Qu'est-ce donc? C'est l'Evangile.⁴

1 Sous ton voile d'ignominie,
Sous ta couronne de douleur,
N'attends pas que je te renie,
Chef auguste de mon Sauveur.
Mon œil, sous le sanglant nuage
Qui me dérobe ta beauté,
A retrouvé de ton visage
L'ineffaçable majesté.

6 L'amour est la grandeur suprême,
L'amour est la gloire du ciel,
L'amour est le vrai diadème
Du très-Haut et d'Emmanuel.
Loin de moi, vision grossière,
De grandeur et de dignité!

¹ Much too great stress has been laid upon the success of some skeptical writers. Doubt is a state of the soul, a true, human fact, the expression of which is interesting on certain conditions, and to certain unbelieving geniuses it has been given to identify themselves with the truth through their intelligence. *But, generally speaking, you must start from the truth to do durable work.*

² The man who is all matter is despicable; the man who is all intellect is frightful. I want man master of himself in order the better to serve all.

³ For each one of the souls that receive it, truth becomes young (new) again.

⁴ The gospel would be much less perfect if it were more complete, much less eloquent if it said everything, much less potent if it were more scientific in its method and more vigorous in its language. We insist upon understanding it as a book or a treatise; but it is not a book, or a treatise, or a code. What is it, then? It is the gospel.

Comme au ciel, il n'est sur la terre
Rien de grand que la charité.¹

(Two stanzas of "Jésus à Golgotha.")

Il n'y a que la littérature qui cultive.²

Parmi les auteurs réputés classiques, il n'en est pas un qui ne donne à penser, et qui n'apprenne à penser.³

L'arbre est vigoureux et beau, mais il est taillé.⁴ (On the French literature of the seventeenth century.)

La poésie est dans l'homme et c'est lui qui la donne aux choses.⁵

Il n'y a pas deux méthodes ; une méthode qui ne serait pas l'analyse est fausse et ne mène à rien. La synthèse n'est qu'un jeu de notions si elle n'est précédée de l'analyse.⁶

Le tort de l'esprit français, c'est de prendre l'esprit pour le talent, quelquefois même pour l'éloquence.⁷

¹ 1 Under thy veil of ignominy,
Under thy crown of sorrow,
Do not fear that I deny Thee,
August head of my Saviour.
My eye, under the bloody cloud
That hides thy beauty from me,
Can retrace of thy face
The ineffaceable majesty.

6 Love is the highest greatness,
Love is the glory of heaven,
Love is the true diadem.
Of the Most High and of Emmanuel.
Away, coarse vision
Of grandeurs and of dignities !
As in heaven, so upon earth,
Nothing is great but charity.

² Letters alone give true culture.

³ Among the so-called classic authors, there is not one who does not suggest thought, not one who does not teach us to think.

⁴ The tree is vigorous and fine, but it is clipped.

⁵ Poetry is within man ; it is he that bestows it upon things.

⁶ There are not two methods ; a method that were not analytical must be false and lead to nothing. Synthesis is but a game of notions if it be not preceded by analysis.

⁷ The bent of the French mind is to mistake wit for talent, sometimes even for eloquence.

Toute étude où l'esprit reste inactif et ne rend pas à mesure qu'il reçoit, en un mot, qui ne produit pas, n'est pas plus une étude que voir n'est regarder. Notre siècle est malade de trop lire et de lire mal. *Lisez*, mais pensez ; et ne lisez pas si vous ne voulez pas penser en lisant, et penser après avoir lu.¹

Il faut, surtout quand on blâme, tâcher d'être vrai ; car, envers les morts comme envers les vivants, le premier des égards est la vérité ; et l'exagération n'est pas la vérité.²

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WHAT VALUE HAS GOETHE'S THOUGHT OF GOD FOR US ?³

A REVIEW of the two "Knickerbocker Nuggets" containing the first eleven books of Goethe's Autobiography compares the edition to one of the beautiful iridescent vials which Colonel di Cesnola dug up in Cyprus. "Nobody," concludes the reviewer, "can tell what the delicious Cyprian vases held, — poison or cosmetic, philter or filth. In the talking vial from which the silvery streams of Goethe's soul pour forth in self-confession, there is a similar doubt as to the ultimate contents." This doubt, with its long and lengthening chain of pros and cons, it is not the purpose of the present paper to try in any way to solve. To avoid misunderstanding, however, a few words may be necessary before we take up our main theme. Genius can never hallow vice, rabid and shallow enthusiasts to the contrary notwithstanding. Genius as well as mediocrity must come to judg-

¹ Every study in which the mind remains inactive, and does not give out in measure as it receives, in short any study which does not *produce*, is no more study than seeing is observing. Our age is sick of reading too much and reading badly. Read, but think ; do not read if you do not wish to think as you read and after you have read.

² One should, especially when blaming, endeavor to be true ; for, toward the dead as toward the living, the first of duties is truth, and exaggeration is not truth.

³ Oosterzee's *Goethe's Stellung zum Christenthum*.

Goethe's *Wahrheit und Dichtung*.

Lewes's *Life of Goethe*.

Dünzter's *Life of Goethe*. (Translated by T. W. Lyster.)

Taylor's *Goethe's Faust*.

Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe*.

ment, and in both cases the definition of a sinner is the same. The Scylla and Charybdis theory, which claims the justification of genius in swallowing up whatever of ordinary humanity may serve to feed its hungry maw, belongs to a heathen and a defunct mythology. It is beyond belief that the enlightenment of the present can ever return to it, whatever signs of atavism may occasionally appear. On the other hand, is it not the part of narrowness to refuse to listen to great and noble utterances from a man whose character we believe to be darkened by serious blemishes? The lasting power is with the man whose word is vitalized by his life. Such a word was that of the great Nazarene. It was not spoken before Him. It has not been spoken since. Failing the absolute test, we speak of trend of character, and this must always measure the *force* of any teaching. The *truth* of a teaching is not always to be so measured, as ordinary observation compels us to admit. The divine breath passes through the passive organ-pipe into music, as well as through the voluntary co-operating human voice. Even a Byron can hymn the infinity and omnipotence of Ocean so that the world must stop to hear. Even the unwilling lips of a Balaam must utter blessings for curses, and must tell perforce of the vision of the Almighty which he beheld though it was not nigh him.

Goethe confesses that he finds both heaven and hell within, but he does not regard himself as peculiar in this respect. The main difficulty has been that the particular murkiness of which Goethe has been suspected lies in that part of hell which we regard — and rightly regard — as farthest from heaven. But I submit that, whatever may have been the degree of darkness in him, it cannot justify us in denying or overlooking whatever light there was in him also. His enemies themselves, at any rate those who know anything about the subject, do not deny his strict business integrity, his almost painful conscientiousness in the discharge of his smallest and most irksome duties, his genial generosity, his passionate desire to know the truth as it is.

So much by way of introduction.

I have tried to indicate my purpose in this paper by its title. The effort will be made, not so much to offer a complete compendium of Goethe's religious views (a comparatively unimportant matter) as to bring out a few points in which he can give us personal help and inspiration. This will cause us to pass by, as rapidly as may be, what Goethe did not see, and will lead us to ask rather what he did see. His insights, not his oversights, are to us

the important thing concerning him. At the same time, the first step toward understanding what we may expect from Goethe is a clearly cut idea as to what we may not expect from him. It is for the sake of this positive result that we shall consider the more negative and least valuable aspect of Goethe's religious belief, which I take to be his attitude toward historical Christianity.

During Goethe's youth and early manhood, two tendencies are distinctly traceable in his religious thinking. Through the influence of his mother and Fräulein von Klettenberg, — the latter of whom he had in mind when writing the "Confessions of a Beautiful Soul" in "Wilhelm Meister," — the boy was brought under Christian influences to which the young soul responded. The deep impression made upon his childish mind he describes in "Faust," where Easter songs, celebrating the risen Christ, bring back to the man, grown old in unbelief and despair, the days of boyhood, when the tones of the church-bells rang out full of meaning, when prayer was ecstasy, and, in the Sabbath stillness, heavenly love poured caressingly down upon him. At nineteen or thereabouts, he describes himself as loving and valuing the Bible, for almost to it alone does he owe his moral culture. At twenty-one (1770) he writes to his friend Trapp that prayer is profitable, and that "a single uplifting of the heart in the name of Him we call Lord, until we call Him *Our* Lord," will load us with countless benefits. To Fräulein von Klettenberg, in the same year, he writes that he has attended the Christian communion to commemorate the sufferings and death of the Lord.

But with this pietistic and orthodox phase which dominates Goethe's early development, another tendency shows itself. The boy of twelve, prepared for confirmation by a "good old infirm clergyman," found his religious aspirations "paralyzed" by the dry formalism of his teacher. At thirteen, when he began to learn Hebrew, he was full of doubts and questionings about the Old Testament, but could get nothing out of his instructor save now and then a shaking laugh and the exclamation, "The mad fellow! the mad boy!"¹ At sixteen, when at the University of Leipzig, he withheld himself for a time from all church connections. It is not, therefore, surprising to find at twenty-three that this undercurrent has come to the surface. "He goes," writes Kestner, "neither to church nor to the Lord's Supper, and rarely prays; for, he says, 'I am not hypocrite enough for that.' . . . He reveres the Christian religion, but not in the form in which

¹ *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Viertes Buch.

our theologians present it." From this time till he takes his Italian journey in 1786, fourteen years later, his indifference to Christianity increases, and his opposition becomes more pronounced. In 1776 his enthusiastic friendship for Lavater begins to cool, and he refuses to be impaled on either horn of the dilemma — "Christian or Atheist" — which Lavater, with ill-advised persistence, held out to him. In 1779 Goethe suggests to Lavater that it would be well to leave their particular religions unmolested each to the other. A thousand books, old and new, he finds as beautiful as the Bible. Christ has become an unhistorical ideal of divine humanity, which is realized, not in one individual, but more or less in every man. "I am no anti-Christ, no un-Christian, yet I am decidedly not a Christian," he writes. The next period in Goethe's life is distinguished by what he himself calls a "truly Julian hatred" towards Christianity. It was with this feeling that he returned from Rome, and the time is characterized by expressions that are malignant in the aversion they express. In 1792 this extreme animosity has, however, begun to abate. An assured Christianity he has come to consider the summit of humanity, but is not yet able to adapt Jacobi's Christianity to himself, and still prefers his own heathenism. In 1808 he writes to Jacobi in regard to the Christian dramatist Werner: "It is altogether surprising to me, an old heathen, to see the cross planted on my own ground, and to hear the blood and wounds of Christ poetically preached without its being offensive to me. We owe this to the higher standpoint to which philosophy has raised us. We have learned to value the ideal, even though it may show itself in the most marvelous forms." During the last twenty-seven years of his life (1805-1832), Goethe continued to remain outside of any church communion. He claims to be a Protestant in the sense that he protests against any particular religion in order to develop himself religiously; and his success in this respect is signalized by the fact that "Faust," especially in the last part, is claimed by Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Pantheists alike.

Nevertheless, he seems to have advanced beyond the position that Christianity is the "noblest of illusions." "I consider," he says to Eckermann, "all four of the Evangelists as genuine, for there is in them the reflection of a majesty which proceeds from the person of Christ, and is of so divine a sort as to emanate only from the Divine. If any one asks me whether it pertains to me to show Him adoring veneration, I reply: Certainly; as to the divine

manifestation of the highest morality. If I am asked whether it is my nature to venerate the sun, I again say: Certainly; for he is likewise a manifestation of the highest Being."¹ But there is no evidence that Goethe ever regarded Christ as divine in any unique sense. To the poet all humanity continued to be divine, and although, as we have seen, he finally came to consider Christ as representing the highest possible moral development of the race, the difference between Him and other men was only one of degree. However interesting and important the expressions in the latter part of Goethe's life may be as showing the development and growing catholicity of the man, they are comparatively unimportant to us. And this remains true even though we add that, in the final scene of "Faust," the necessity not only of self-salvation, but of the "freely bestowed grace of God," is acknowledged. In these days of Christo-centric thinking, it would be like substituting a firefly lamp for the steady brilliancy of the electric arc, to turn back to the fitful and reluctant concessions of Goethe for enlightenment as to the nature and office of the Divine Redeemer.

Has he nothing, then, to offer us? Was he, indeed, a man

"holding no form of creed,

But contemplating all?"

Goethe was no atheist. The boy, erecting a sacrificial pile in his room to the God of Nature, the Creator and Preserver of Heaven and Earth, and lighting a fragrant flame on its summit through a burning-glass by the first rays of the rising sun,² was father of the man to whom the snow-mantled summit of the terrible Brocken becomes a temple of sweetest praise. It is impossible to deny the spirit of reverent adoration that characterizes his thinking. But while we recognize an erected altar in the teachings of Goethe, it is another and a more difficult question as to what is the inscription upon it. Was his worship Nature-worship? If this means that Goethe's God was nothing more than the cosmos of matter and motion, we find a decisive answer to the question in his abhorrence of French materialism. Of the "Système de la Nature" and its effect upon him as a young man, he writes: "We did not understand how such a book could be dangerous; it appeared to us so gray, so Cimmerian, so death-like. . . . All was to be of necessity, and therefore there was no God. But could there not be a God of necessity also? we asked."³ "He who speaks of

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, iii. den 11, März, 1832.

² *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, Erstes Buch.

³ *Ibid.*, Elfte Buch.

Nature must presuppose Spirit," so reads one of the *Sprüche*. "I believed," he said to Eckermann, "in God and Nature;"¹ though it is to be noted that he thought of Nature as so instinct with Deity that he used the terms God and Nature synonymously. By "Father of love" — an expression that occurs in the "Harzreise im Winter" — he explains that he means the being who is the *fons et origo* of all other love in the universe.² "I ask not," again he says to Eckermann, "whether the highest being has reason and understanding. I feel that it is understanding itself and reason itself."³ Nature, he held with Spinoza, works after eternal, necessary, divine laws, which God himself cannot alter. It is for the poet's intuition to pierce through the perishable and discordant appearance of things to these, their essential forms. So doing, the universe will be revealed as one vast harmony. It is this thought that inspires the archangel's song of praise. For myself, I should feel under life-long obligation to Goethe, if I had read nothing he had written save this introduction to the "Prologue in Heaven." It is the same thought that causes Faust to exclaim: —

"How each the Whole its substance gives!
Each in the other works and lives.
Like heavenly forces rising and descending,
Their golden urns reciprocally lending
With wings that winnow blessing
From Heaven through Earth I see them pressing,
Filling the all with harmony unceasing."

I dwell on this because it is one of the main enthusiasms of Goethe's religious belief, and also because I regard it as largely explaining his lack of enthusiasm in relation to the Christian faith. "A voice from heaven," he says, "would not convince me that water burns and fire quenches, that a maid brings to birth, and a daughter rises from the dead. Rather I hold it as a blasphemy against the great God and his revelation in Nature." "Faith's dearest child is Miracle," cries Faust, and finds, for himself, that belief is lacking. To regard miracles as violations of inviolable law is to-day an inexcusable anachronism. But Goethe belonged to the eighteenth rather than to the nineteenth century, and holding, at least through the early part of his life, that the revelations in Scripture and Nature were hopelessly opposed, he

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, iii. den 4, Januar, 1824.

² "Unter Vater der Liebe das Wesen gemeint, welchem alle übrigen die wechselseitige Neigung zu danken."

³ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den Februar, 1831.

accepted the text which he could read, and the truth of which appealed to his inmost soul. The universe, to Goethe, is the expression of the Eternal Reason; more than this, it is the expression of the Eternal Love. "If certain phenomena of nature," he says, "looked at from a moral standpoint, force us to assume the existence of a primitive Evil, so, on the other hand, many phenomena force us to assume a primitive Good." Goethe's study of Mephistopheles has saved him from the theological inanity of imputing sin to God as its creator. What, then, is the relation between the evil and the good? Evil is described in "Faust" as the power that always "wills the bad and always works the good;" as striving with furious but impotent energy of destruction against the infinite germinating activity of beneficence that hourly fills earth and sea with myriad forms of life. Recall, also, the passage where he says: "I worship Him who has filled the world with such a productive energy that, if only the millionth part became embodied in living existences, the globe would so swarm with them that War, Pestilence, Flood, and Fire would be powerless to diminish them. That is my God!"¹

In the second part of "Faust," Goethe voices his own belief in the words of Pater Profundus: as by a mighty impulse from within, the tree reaches ever upward, so almighty love, ever striving upward, creates and cherishes all. The raging storm sends beneficent waters to the valley, the flaming thunderbolt cleaves the poison-laden atmosphere. All are messengers of love, and proclaim the power, eternally creating, that enfolds us. "The divine energy is everywhere diffused, and the eternal love is everywhere active."²

Such is his conclusion.

For those of us who have seen the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, this glad gospel is beyond the peradventure of a doubt. But how many, turning from that sure word of prophecy, can read with Goethe the same message in the confused hieroglyphics of Nature? If we had no other revelation, how many of us could go beyond, how many of us could go so far as Ten-nyson in his striving to "faintly trust the larger hope"? In Goethe we find a man who does not "faintly trust," but claims to see. "'I believe in God,' is a beautiful and praiseworthy phrase; but to recognize God in all his manifestations, — that is true holiness on earth." "Everything," he writes to Char-

¹ *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den 20, Februar, 1831.

² *Ibid.*, ii. den 29, Mai, 1831.

lotte von Stein in 1786, "forces its meaning on me. I no longer think a subject over; everything, everything comes to meet me, and the vast kingdom simplifies itself in my soul. . . . If I could only communicate to any one the prospect and the joy! but it is not possible." In the same connection he says that the plant world takes hold of him with passion; it rages within him. Many a time, in "Faust," he longs to know the secret germs of life, the hidden fountain of being.¹ Ever ready, as he expresses it in a letter to Lavater, to acknowledge that into no human head "can go the stupendous All," he yet speaks with Nature (I quote from "Faust") "as one spirit speaks with another," and is permitted to "look into her deep breast as into the bosom of a friend." So looking, a sudden rapture, a life-glow that is holy, and strong as youth, thrills his being; the better soul awakes within him; the love of Man returns, the love of God is revived. "And this," he says in one of his letters, "is no dream, no fantasy; it is the growing aware of the essential Form with which Nature but keeps playing ever as it were, and, playing thus, brings forth the manifold life." If we regard Goethe as lacking in esteem and reverence for the Biblical revelation, has he nothing to teach us in esteem and reverence for the revelation in nature? Nor does he depend entirely on poetic intuition. Capable of "toiling terribly," he held that "belief is not the beginning but the end of all knowledge" (*Sprüche*). His scientific studies he looked upon as the necessary complement of his art studies: "A work of art should be handled scientifically, a work of nature artistically,"² — such was his doctrine. He speaks of the Hellenic mind as the healthy mind, "when the hardly curable schism" between thought and feeling had "not yet taken place in the sound nature of man."³ The well-known creed in "Faust," which is usually regarded as a mere expression of the "Gefühlphilosophie," becomes of typical and permanent value as "Goethe's creed" only when it is read in the light of these other passages. Even in the creed we are told that to *head and heart* throngs the visible, invisible Force, — a statement which of itself precludes a too literal interpretation of *Gefühl ist alles*. With "great

¹ "Dass ich erkenne, was die Welt
In Innersten, zusammenhält,
Shau' alle Wirkenskraft und Samen,
Und thu' nicht mehr in Worten Kramen!"

² *Campaign in France*, October, 1792. Cf. Professor Edward Caird, art. "Goethe and Philosophy," *Contemporary Review*, vol. 1.

³ *Essay on Winckelmann*.

thoughts and a pure heart" truth was to be apprehended, according to Goethe, and, so striving to apprehend, life itself (*und kostet et mein leben*) is not too great a price to pay that he may win an insight into the mystery we call nature. And with a force of conviction that bursts like a trumpet-peal above this scientific, doubting, pessimistic age of ours, his words ring out: —

"Dass die welt, wie sie auch kreise,
Liebevoll und dankbei sei." ¹

Why should those to whom the Bible is still a closed book be forever turning the pages of a Schopenhauer and a Von Hartmann? Such testimony as this is, at least, equally free from orthodox prejudice. No modern can be uninfluenced by the potency of centuries of Christianity. But consciously and pre-eminently, Goethe read from the book of Nature, — the only book in which he found weighty matter on every page. Such exuberant and unerring penetration as his, where most men falter or err, fulfills in its measure Emerson's pregnant paraphrase of Scripture: —

"One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world hath never lost."

Eternal activity, eternal reason, eternal love, Goethe found revealed in the universe. Did he find a personal God there? that is, a being with whom he could hold personal communion? What reason and love can mean apart from personality, it would be hard to say. And in view of his express declaration to Jacobi, in 1813, that among the many modes in which he conceived of Deity, "a God for his personality as a moral human being is provided for also," the query cannot be answered in the negative. At the same time, it seems to me indubitable that his teaching on this point is shadowy, vague, unsatisfactory. He believed, as he said to Eckermann, that man is so interpenetrated with the divine that he can apprehend parts of the Highest; ² and yet, instead of regarding personality as the greatest possible perfection that can be discerned by humanity in the Deity, he was haunted by the ghostly idea, at present grown to such large proportions (*crescit eundo*), that to ascribe personality to the Deity is to limit and dwarf our conception of Him. "'Our Father' is a beautiful and helpful prayer. In God's name let him pray it who will." But his own attitude is better expressed by Faust: —

¹ *West-östlicher Divan, Buch des Paradieses, Huri.*

² *Gespräche mit Goethe, ii. den Februar, 1831.*

"I have no name to give it ;
The name is sound and smoke,
Obscuring Heaven's clear glow."

Possibly for this reason, and undoubtedly because he shared the vices as well as the virtues of the Hellenic mode of thinking, we find in Goethe no such profound sense of sin as is to be found in Shakespeare. If the harp of the Bard of Avon gives forth fresh strains under the hand of the German poet, as Bayard Taylor gracefully phrases it, this one of its thousand strings is with Goethe mute, or but faintly sounded. The remorse of Faust after the ruin of Margaret is, with the exception of a few scanty lines, left to be inferred, and the heinousness of the act owes its development to Goethe's commentators rather than to Goethe himself. If the sunlit heights of human hope and possible salvation are revealed to Goethe as they are not to Shakespeare, it is, partly at least, because Goethe occupies a vantage-ground that is given by a certain superficiality which Shakespeare's deeper penetration into the abyss of human sin and sin's despair make impossible to him.

Without elaborating this point any further, we are forced to hasten on to the last phase of Goethe's religious creed which we shall consider. It is also the phase which to me is the most interesting and helpful. The main contest that Goethe had with the religious creed of his time is expressed in his poem, "Gott und Welt." "What would a God be," he asks, "who merely propelled the universe from without, and let the All revolve in a circle about his finger?" A Deity afar off in the heavens, who has created the universe, endowed it with independent forces, and then withdrawn from it, merely interposing now and then by way of miracle, was a conception abhorrent to Goethe's soul. And with this feeling the thinking of our day is, to a degree, in sympathy. It is claimed that we are learning to combine the Latin view of the transcendence of God with the Greek view of his immanence. If God is God, and man is man, and sin is sin, then the Deity must be infinitely greater and other than the creation. Such was God to Goethe. In 1813, after a conversation with Rochlitz, the latter said: "Let us not omit to give God the honor, and acknowledge his moral government in the world." They had been walking up and down as they talked. At this Goethe suddenly stopped and said, solemnly: "Acknowledge it! who can help acknowledging it! But I, for my part, in silence." "In silence? why in silence?" asks Rochlitz. Goethe replied: "Who can express it,

save for himself? For others, who? And when one knows that one cannot utter it, it is not permissible." "Who dares to express Him? and who to profess, 'I believe in Him'? Who, feeling, dares to say, 'I believe Him not'?" There is in these words from the famous "creed" an echo of the old Hebrew prophets, and the old Hebrew reverence that forbade to name the name of Jehovah. For us, who in living and in teaching have the name of God so often on our lips, such utterances are not without their warning and their revelation. How perfectly Goethe conceived of the transcendence of Deity, with its accompanying truths of the divine and human personality and of human sinfulness, we have no space to inquire beyond what has already been said. That he conceived of it profoundly, the quotations given here, together with many other expressions, are a proof. At the same time, the chief strength and value of his thinking is not here. It is to be found rather in his conception of the indwelling God. Professor Allen, speaking of the recovery in the nineteenth century of the idea of the immanence of God, says: "It is no trifling or unimportant circumstance that the first, the clearest, the most emphatic expressions of this conception, occur not in theology but in literature.¹ And prominently, among others, he mentions Goethe. An indwelling Deity!—in this idea lay the serene calm and enlightenment that Spinoza had for Goethe.

How many of us have gone any farther than to think of the world as dependent on the sustaining will of God? How many of us feel that it is necessary to go any farther? Yet the question presses for an answer: In what sense is the world dependent on God? As the spirit to the body, so is God to the world! Thus said the Stoics. But what independent life has the body apart from the spirit? This is pantheism. It does not leave room for any personality beside the divine. Consistently or inconsistently, as it may be, Goethe held no such idea. He says distinctly to Eckermann that he believes in the existence of the individual.² This notion he carried out so far in his advocacy of self-development and self-culture that, in spite of the boundless disinterestedness which he claimed to be his highest desire, he has even been misunderstood as advocating a bald egotism. What, then, is Goethe's conception of indwelling Deity? When Eckermann wondered at the devotion of a hedge-sparrow to her captured

¹ "Theological Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century," *Princeton Review*, November, 1882, p. 279.

² *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. den 3, März, 1830.

young, braving danger and imprisonment in order to feed them, Goethe smiled and said: "If you believed in God you would not wonder. Did not God inspire the bird with this all-powerful love for its young, and did not similar impulses pervade all animate nature, the world could not continue in existence. But even so" (I repeat the quotation) "is the divine energy everywhere diffused, and the eternal love is everywhere active." God, from whom every motherhood on earth is named, — is the idea so startling that it cannot be accepted? Have we not hints of it in the old words, "In Him we live and move and have our being"? And, again, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not"? And yet again: "As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you"? In connection with the incident of the hedge-sparrow, Goethe quotes a passage from "Gott und Welt," thus giving an invaluable key to the interpretation of a poem which is regarded as showing his "speculative tendencies in a concentrated form." This is the passage: "It beseems Him to move the world from within, to cherish nature in himself, himself in nature, so that what lives and moves and is in Him may ever feel his spirit and his power." Eternal love, the sustenance of spirits (*der Geister Nahrung*), is celebrated in the second part of "Faust." But it is in the first part that the idea reaches its highest expression in a figure bold, strong, beautiful, the meaning of which dwindles and coarsens in translation. When Faust exclaims, "What a spectacle! but, alas, only a spectacle! how can I grasp thee, Nature illimitable?" he continues: —

"Euch, Brüste, wo? Ihr Quellen alles Lebens,
An denen Himmel und Erde hängt,
Dahin die welke Brust sich drängt —
Ihr quellt, ihr tränkt, und schmacht' ich so vergebens?"

(Ye breasts, where are ye? Ye fountain sources of all life, on which hang heaven and earth, to which the withered breast is pressed, ye flow, ye nourish, and do I thus yearn in vain?)

The motherhood of God! This is no pantheism. As the air to the lungs, as the mother's milk to the babe, so is the life of the Divine Spirit to the lives of our spirits. In point of theory, accurate; in its relation to life, broadening, deepening, illuminating, — such I find this conception. We have yet much to learn as to the "independent God-dependence" of Christianity. Again and again the veil of the temple must be rent in twain that we may

find ourselves permitted, with hesitating, reverent step, to enter the holy of holies.

"The All-enfolder, the All-upholder, holds and upholds He not thee, me, himself?"—how often in the study of Goethe have these words passed through my mind, freighted with an increasing wealth of meaning!

Not long ago I saw a curious and interesting sight. It was the stump of a great chestnut-tree which formerly stood in front of my home, the peculiarity of the stump being that a number of stones, some of them of considerable size, were embedded in it. Probably the starting, fibrous roots came in contact with the stones, and grew around them, in some cases so as almost to inclose them. In other cases, the roots, instead of hugging the stones, were led by the process of growth away from them, so that, when the stump was unearthed, the stones, though they were unearthed with it, were not a part of the tree, but fell away as soon as the earth was removed. As Goethe the immature changed to Goethe the completed man, the roots of his thinking spread, so that although, in the attempt to analyze his religious philosophy, many a stone may seem to have been unearthed, we may gladly acknowledge that the process of growth more than once prevented the flinty matter from becoming an integral part of the whole. Nevertheless, the most charitable interpretation cannot deny that, at the heart of his best and greatest thinking, are still embedded stones more than one. Of whom, indeed, cannot this be said? As I recall the chestnut-tree, lofty, blossom-crowned, reaching down white fingers through the fragrant moonlight, as though to impart its sky-gained treasures to less aspiring souls, I am still blessed with its abounding life and inspiration; and it is this, rather than the lifeless masses that the tree inclosed, which will always, in my mind, stand for the tree. So ends, as I read it, the lesson of Goethe's teaching.

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A NEGLECTED LIMITATION OF CRITICISM.

IN the concluding paragraph of his little book, "A Layman's Study of the English Bible," Professor Bowen makes this suggestive comment on certain prevalent tendencies of thought: "I know it is said by those who deprecate any such regard for the consequences of our opinions, that we have only to follow out loyally our own doubts or convictions, be they what they may, since the interests of truth are paramount. But they misconstrue their own adage. We hold as firmly as they do that the truth can do no harm; and it is just because the acceptance of their doctrine does and will do immeasurable harm . . . that we are firmly convinced their doctrine is not the truth." Involved in the comment is a principle which is general in its application. It is often assumed that, in the search for truth, investigation moves forward from starting-points clearly established, along lines so plainly marked that the certainty of results reached is assured beyond question by the course followed. It is well to be reminded that the order is not always so exact, and the point reached cannot, on this ground, be so confidently asserted. The navigator cannot always determine his position, even approximately, by chart and compass and chronometer and log, however perfect his instruments, or however careful his use of them. Sailing through still water, their guidance may be nearly accurate; but under changed conditions, where the water itself is in motion, they are less reliable. Their testimony must be supplemented and corrected by other observations. So, in the quest of new truth, changed conditions affect the methods employed and the degree of accuracy reached.

There is, at least, reason for questioning whether Biblical criticism does not too often neglect the presence of conditions in its work which open the way to errors, in even its precise and methodical examinations. There is reason for believing that methods which would lead to perfectly reliable results under certain conditions are sometimes treated as though they were equally infallible when the conditions are materially different. Those who have given themselves to critical study are apt to treat with considerable impatience any reluctance to accept their conclusions which does not justify itself through the use of their methods. To question those conclusions because of consequences they are supposed to involve is regarded as a mark of narrowness and prejudice. Many critics, even in sympathy with the evangelical faith,

complain, in a tone approaching bitterness, at the protests raised against some of their conclusions. Such protests, they say, are a hamper upon free investigation. The Bible must not be treated as a privileged book. If it be true, it has nothing to fear from the most searching investigation. If errors are mingled with the truth, they should be exposed. No one who loves truth should object to tests applied for such a purpose.

Claims like these fail to take due account of the varying conditions in which the work is to be done. Methods are modified, and must be modified, by the material given them to work upon. The perfect working of exact methods implies and requires full data. The analysis of the chemist cannot detect the presence of certain poisons in the stomach, after decomposition has set in; nor can the expert in the use of the microscope distinguish human blood corpuscles from those of animals, in bloodstains long exposed to the air. Tests which would be decisive where full material is furnished lose their decisiveness where only partial data are offered. Processes of investigation which within certain limits conduct to certainty, beyond those limits, though still valuable, fail of certainty.

This limitation is not wholly ignored by those who aggressively champion critical methods, but it is often neglected. Critical questions are discussed with no suggestion of modifications which this condition requires. It comes as an inference from this assumption of certainty that we are told to judge the difficulties in the Bible just as we judge those in any other book. But what invariable procedure is adopted with other books? An error in the writings of one author is interpreted as an error of ignorance; in another it is explained as an oversight. A misstatement in one is attributed to faulty sources of information, which in another is set down as willful misrepresentation. Men's writings are judged in the same way as their words and acts. An injury received is deemed unintentional or deliberate, not from anything in the act itself, but because of the person who did it. Such inferences seem to be made by reasoning in a circle. The error, on the face of it, betokens ignorance; but a belief in the very knowledge which seems to be wanting is used to interpret the statement itself. The injury naturally implies a malicious purpose; but a belief in the friendliness which seems disproved by the act is used to interpret the act, and to show it was not what it seemed to be. Such judgments are well-founded, though they seem to fly in the face of the facts. They are based on presumptive evidence:

they determine the true character of the act itself by considering what the author was likely to do.

Now, in the field covered by criticism, the major part of its vexed questions, and all of the most important, are of this sort. Their immediate concern is with the conduct and the testimony of the characters who figure on the pages of Scripture. In the very nature of the case, the conduct is only partially represented, and the testimony is fragmentary. The facts to which we are so persistently pointed are, in any view of the case, only a part of the facts, and that part is not an epitome of the whole, it is a fragment. In dealing with the questions which such a record calls up, rules of examination must be used indeed, but those rules are the laws of evidence. They differ in important respects from the rules of strictly scientific investigation, where all the facts, or all the essential facts, are accessible. Presumptions have no place in establishing scientific certainty; but where only probability or moral certainty is possible, they are a part, and may be the most important part, of the proof.

It will be helpful to notice certain well-known rules of legal procedure, for which the laws of evidence have been most fully developed.

It is to be noted that these rules recognize the impossibility, in certain cases, of reaching a judicial decision upon the conduct in question. Legal verdicts, in one class of cases, are avowedly confessions of ignorance. Doubt, instead of knowledge, determines them, and the laws of evidence decide where the benefit of the doubt shall be bestowed. The verdict, not guilty, means only, not proven guilty, in a multitude of cases. It does not mean that the accused is innocent, or even probably innocent; it means only that the evidence is deficient. The limit, however, beyond which this critical examination dares not decide upon conduct, is by no means the limit where individual judgment must be suspended. Considerations too subtle to be classified, and requiring qualities for their apprehension not possessed by all men alike, furnish the grounds upon which private judgments must be formed, and conduct toward the accused regulated.

Again, these laws of evidence do not require the same degree of certainty for different kinds of cases. A difference in this respect is explicitly recognized by legal authorities between civil and criminal cases. Considerations of expediency affect the decisions. It would work intolerable confusion to suspend judgment in every case where moral certainty is unattainable. Society

could not afford it. The litigants themselves could not afford it. The distinction explicitly recognized by authorities between civil and criminal cases is carried still further in practice. It is easier to convict of theft than of manslaughter and murder. The consequences of the decision affect indirectly the decision itself; they determine the extent of the investigation, and the degree of certainty demanded.

The character, also, of the parties involved is taken into consideration in determining a case. In the absence of indisputable proof of what the accused did, evidence is admitted which shows only what he was likely to do. In the impossibility of knowing whether the witnesses have spoken the exact truth about the facts in question, considerations showing whether they were likely to tell the truth have weight. This presumptive evidence has very great influence before a court and under legal rules. But rules, at best, only partially embody the principles on which they rest. In the usage of intelligent, upright individuals, the principle has fuller expression. When a grave charge of guilt is preferred against one whose life has been above reproach, those who have known him intimately resist the charge, unless proof is absolutely conclusive. Though they know nothing whatever about the alleged act, except what is contained in evidence supporting the charge, they strenuously assert their friend's innocence. Such an attitude is not necessarily a mark of partiality. It means, or may mean, that the presumption from the character of the accused is evidence against the accusation stronger than the positive evidence urged in support of it. That is the ground on which the friend opposes the detective: he has evidence, valid evidence, which the detective has not. The proof is partial on both sides; either may be mistaken; the danger is perhaps greater in the use of the presumption; but the use of it is not only permitted, — it is demanded. All that is best in the mutual confidence existing in society depends upon its use, and those who are loudest in declaring that they judge fellow-men as they see them, are those who are justifying their own cynical judgments by that boast.

These laws of evidence and rules of procedure apply to criticism as well. Biblical criticism, we are reminded, is a branch of historical criticism. Its methods have been used, and results universally accepted have been gained, in other fields of ancient history; now they must be applied to the Bible. Scripture must be tested precisely as other ancient records are tested, and when the same tests have been employed on the one as on the other, the

results must be loyally accepted. To withhold assent is disloyalty to the truth.

The claim is plausible, but it ignores a consideration which has a rightful place in every examination of this sort. Where absolute certainty is not reached, the approximation to it, accepted as satisfactory in one case, is not so accepted where graver issues are at stake. In the practical application of the most exact of the sciences even, such distinctions obtain. In computations where only integral numbers are involved, and results absolutely correct are possible, the procedure is the same for all cases. But this is wholly changed when values cannot be exactly expressed. When circulating decimals are involved, the number of places to which the decimal is carried varies with the importance of the results depending on the calculation. The process is affected by the consequences involved. So it is in historical criticism. The general acquiescence in the critics' verdict upon Grecian or Roman history does not necessarily signify a belief that the exact facts have been ascertained on all the points examined. It may mean only that the approximation is near enough to satisfy the interests involved. Those interests are relatively unimportant. But for the same reason that a degree of certainty accepted as sufficient in a civil case is not deemed sufficient in a capital offense, the results reached by tests which have been accepted in ancient secular history do not compel assent in the Bible. A more searching and more protracted examination may be demanded, and, upon some of the questions involved, not prejudice, but reason, may decide that the evidence already offered is not sufficient to warrant a critical verdict, and may hold the case open until further evidence is produced.

A more important element in the critical examination of Scripture is the presumption in favor of its truthfulness. The character of the writings and of the writers, as it is indicated through their work; the effects produced by those writings; and the confirmation of portions of their contents in the present experience of a multitude of witnesses to their value, — afford a presumption of truthfulness. That presumption must be taken as an element of the evidence determining the decision. It is admitted that evidence of this sort is often found to be misleading. It rests back frequently on grounds which are themselves only probabilities, and which, strongly probable as they seem when knowledge is partial, are found to be false when full knowledge is gained. For that reason, an aversion to this use of presumption is produced.

"Give us facts," men say, "and we will judge by them." But under this demand lies a confusion of cases which are different. The facts which might conduct to certainty are wanting, and can by no possibility be all recovered. The certainty which excludes all question would be very desirable if it could be gained, but it cannot. Presumptions must be used, and are used by every one who forms any conclusion whatever upon the questions involved. The alternative is simply between recognizing and ignoring them. In the one case, they may be made measurably just; in the other, they are well-nigh certain to be unreasonable.

The avowed use of such presumption in favor of the truthfulness of Scripture writers is not a decision in advance upon the question at issue. Often it is so represented. It is characterized as an assumption or a presupposition, and the attitude toward inquiry which it necessitates is branded as dogmatic or philosophical prepossession. Those who hold it are exhorted to lay aside their prejudice and consider simply the facts. The charge has probably a measure of justice. Prejudice undoubtedly exists, though no party has a monopoly of it. To those who recognize the necessity of presumptive evidence and insist upon its use, a convenient place is afforded for smuggling in their prejudices along with it; but the presumption itself is not prejudice. It is not a decision, but only a part of the evidence. To give it place is to introduce a new witness; it does not pack the jury.

Not a few, who see and own the necessity of using the character of the writings in determining the critical questions which arise, bring it to bear upon them at the wrong point. Thus one able critic says of the examination of the history of Israel: "At the end, the crucial test of all critical processes is that they allow us to do justice to all there is in the religion of Israel." But the content of Israel's religion is one of the matters in question in any critical examination of the history. An inference from Israel's religion to some point of Israel's history is legitimate during the examination, but it cannot be used as a test after the examination is concluded. To assume such a relation would be like withholding an important witness during a trial at court and testing the decision by his testimony given afterward. Others use the same considerations to shape postulates from which the inquiry is to start. But the necessity for such postulates disappears if the presumption is given the place which rightfully belongs to it. That is neither at the beginning nor at the end of the examination. It is an element to be used in the examination itself.

The objection will be suggested that such a comparison between the method of examining historical narratives and that used in judging current events is misleading. Time is a grand revealer. Truth which is obscured by passion and prejudice in current affairs reveals at least its outlines with certainty as events recede into the past. But the claim cannot be maintained. The same difficulties from partial knowledge are encountered in history as in every-day experience. In a review of Beyschlag's "*Life of Christ*," Professor Weiss says: "We must take care, it should be said at the outset, not to overestimate the value of this [scientific] work. One disposed to make his trust in Jesus, as the eternal Son of God and the world's Redeemer, dependent on the solution of a scientific problem, and so to base his faith on scientific conclusions, will soon find that he is leaning on a broken reed. For our knowledge is fragmentary, and must ever remain so." It is high critical authority which utters this warning. The only possible way in which criticism of the Gospels could become a ground for Christian trust to rest upon would be by furnishing proof of the truth of the record, at least in its essential parts. But this, we are told, it cannot do because that record is fragmentary. Fragmentary records may be either true or false. Not because of their character, but because they are fragmentary, criticism cannot decide with certainty upon them. The service which criticism has to render to faith is not by any means to prove the truth of Scripture; it has only the humbler task to show that the objections urged do not disprove it.

Among those who insist most unconditionally upon the absolute authority of scientific criticism in judging Scripture, a considerable number relieve their conclusions of any possibly serious consequences, in asserting that faith rests on a different ground. Faith is founded on experience, it is claimed. Thus Professor Weiss, in the article above referred to, says: "Our faith rests upon the apostolic preaching, and upon our personal experience of the redeeming, sanctifying, and joy-giving power of this message of salvation." In his "*Life of Christ*," he says of the claim of the apostolic preaching to bring a message from God: "In the last analysis, however, there is no proof forthcoming for the justification of this claim other than their special experience of the truth of their proclamation, the renewal and strengthening of the religio-ethical life gained on the ground of that, along with peace of soul, and assurance of future blessedness." Others assert, still more explicitly, that faith rests upon experience, and

cannot be touched by historical criticism. Such claims seem to relieve portions of Scripture from a responsibility which has been widely believed to rest upon them. These claims, whether well founded or not, are simple and consistent so long as they are content with their independent basis. But the attempt is made to use the faith, thus established, to vouch for the historic revelation in its essential truth. Thus, in another place, Professor Weiss says: "Every essentially erroneous view of the earthly life of Jesus would be incompatible with a true knowledge of the salvation which is in Christ; and in this sense the inspiration of the writers of the Gospels gives security for the real trustworthiness of their delineation of the life of Jesus." But, it may be asked, what facts of the record are certified by this knowledge of salvation? Is it claimed that the account of the resurrection, at least in its main features, is thereby substantiated? That fact is deemed essential to the maintenance of the Christian claim by many. Among that number, apparently, is the Apostle Paul, who declares: "If Christ hath not been raised, then is our preaching vain, . . . yea, and we are found false witnesses of God." But the only contribution which Christian experience can offer to the truth of that account is to furnish a presumption in its favor. To say, as some seem ready to say, "We know that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, because we have felt in our hearts the presence and working of the living Christ," is to use an argument with a missing link. In kind, it is like that which, in some localities, confirms the tradition of finding the true cross by showing a piece of its wood. The fact and the conclusion fail to connect. This account of the resurrection stands, if it stands at all, upon the testimony of the witnesses. Before that testimony can be accepted to vouch for this particular fact, its general trustworthiness must be established. Unless the *integrity* of the witnesses remains unimpaired by criticism, and it is possible to show that the admitted defects in their testimony are not such as to compromise their character for truthfulness; unless, too, their *ability* as witnesses, in certain distinguishable portions of their testimony, stands unshaken by conceded mistakes in other portions, it is idle to speak of them as trustworthy. Their trustworthiness may, indeed, fail to establish all of the incidents which they relate; it may not guarantee minute accuracy in all the details of statements which are reliable: but unless, out of the account, it is possible to show that certain particulars are not vitiated by imperfections affecting other parts, and unless it is possible to state

approximately certain limits within which confidence may be placed, it is a waste of words to speak of the trustworthiness of the narrative. The theologian may conceivably be essentially right in his conclusion, while none of the steps by which he seemed to reach that conclusion will bear examination; but the witness has no such freedom of movement. If he gives a true impression, he must be reliable in certain ascertainable particulars. If the picture presented through his statement is in any true sense a likeness, while some features are confessedly distorted, other features, and those prominent ones, must be faithfully represented. Furthermore, the trustworthiness of a witness is not established by independent proof of the truth of many things which he declares. The witness whom we believe as far as another and a reliable witness has given the same testimony, we do not believe at all. Until confidence in the statements has led up to confidence in the witness, and we believe his testimony because he himself vouches for it, he is not accepted as trustworthy. Until integrity and ability both are established, — the purpose to tell the truth, and the means of knowing what the truth is, — authority is wanting.

When, then, it is attempted to establish the trustworthiness of the Scriptures independently through the witness of the Spirit, either in the individual or the church, the attempt must fail. Such witness yields only a presumption of trustworthiness. It is impossible to reach a decision by considering simply the evidence, or a part of the evidence, on one side. The counter-evidence must be considered and met. Inspiration, in the sense of the term accepted by criticism, can at most vouch only for the integrity of the writers. The whole question is still open until the other qualification of trustworthy testimony can be vindicated. That can be done only as the difficulties which critical inquiry has found are met and overcome.

The claim that faith rests upon experience, and is independent of the results of Biblical criticism, inevitably affects those results. This it does in part by its tendency to cut short the examination of vexed questions. The degree of certainty which men are satisfied with, and the pains they are ready to take to reach it, depends in large part on the consequences involved. As these diminish in importance, effort grows less.

But a more important effect is in the change thus introduced into the evidence itself. If faith rests upon experience, and is independent of testimony, then the presumption in favor of that

testimony is lessened. If the Evangelists felt that they were writing down merely interesting memoirs of their Lord, instead of words and deeds on which their faith rested, the presumption of accuracy is diminished. If these records were received as such memoirs in the early church, the presumption of their thorough testing by means of information then accessible, but no longer possessed, is lessened. So, too, under this claim, the presumption of truth in the main features of the record of the life of Jesus, through the results which have followed where the Bible has gone, is considerably diminished. These considerations do not bear upon the truth of the claim itself; they are to be noted because they show why the claim and the arguments used in support of it have been so strenuously opposed.

To call attention to these conditions in the problems of criticism, which are believed to deserve a degree of consideration not now given, is not to charge a fatal weakness upon critical conclusions. Criticism's appeal to facts and its patient, exhaustive study of them have taught belief lessons which are wholesome, though often painful. If it has itself too largely lost sight of the rights of presumptive evidence, it has pointed out the danger and the evils of letting the presumption become mere assumption. It has won valuable and enduring results. None can doubt that a large work still lies before it. That work, however, it will wisely do only as the limits of its province are kept clearly in view.

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SLAVERY AS IT APPEARED TO A NORTHERN MAN IN 1844.

ON the 1st of May, 1844, I landed at Savannah, having sailed thither from Boston in a first-class freighting ship, the ownership of which was divided equally between a friend and parishioner of mine in Portsmouth, N. H., and Mr. C. of Savannah. Mr. C. took me at once to his house, where I saw for several days the sunny side of slavery, and basked in its sunshine, served more sedulously than I could have imagined prior to experience, having my shutters closed for me after I went to bed, and opening my eyes in the morning on a stalwart negro awaiting my orders. Mr. C. was a bachelor, a rich merchant, president of the Georgia

State Bank, and elder of a Presbyterian church. His house, in one aspect, was the centre of the kind of hospitality which we republicans, in our ignorance, call princely, but which has a freedom, breadth, and generosity very much more than princely; and in another aspect it was a magnificent negro boarding-house. The census of his black family I did not take; but they looked a host as I caught sight of them in passing the basement windows. Their number, and that of the friends whom they fed, might be estimated from one fact. A large ham of the richest quality and flavor appeared, with soup, fish, roast, and game, on the dinner-table every day; a few slices from it, perhaps, at the other meals. Mr. C. told me that three hundred and sixty-five such hams were boiled in his kitchen every year, and of course, when he had no guests, the negroes must have had almost the whole of the daily ham at their own disposal, and ham is to the negro what ambrosia was at the table of the gods. Mr. C.'s table was served with the utmost elegance, and with a profusion of good things. He gave, on my account, a dinner party, — as handsome an entertainment of the kind as I ever saw. He told me that he knew no more than I did what was to be on the table. He owned a steward and majordomo, who must have been of kindred genius with Smith, whom many of my readers knew and some of them must have employed, who on one occasion offered to furnish a Harvard Commencement dinner gratuitously if the college would give him the degree, which would not have been unmerited or unearned, of Master of Arts. Mr. C. told me that he never gave specific directions for his table, and that, when he was to have company at dinner, he simply told Scipio how many guests he was going to have, and whom, and Scipio adapted the dinner to the number and quality of the guests. Mr. C. prized this man so highly that he once sent him to Saratoga for his health. But, in eulogizing him, he added a trait which we at the North should hardly regard as characteristic of a faithful servant. Said he: "I give Scipio every month a certain sum for my table, and if, before the month is out, he tells me that he has spent it all, I give him more. I have no doubt that he keeps for himself a part of what I give him; for I have found that he has property of his own for which I can account in no other way."

Now this trait was, as I ascertained, recognized generally by slaveholders. The slaves, however faithful in other respects, would steal when they could; and, in looking into the records of slavery and oppression from the earliest ages till now, I have

learned that, in all time, stealing has been and is the uniform habit of enslaved and oppressed races. Those who know that they are deprived of what is rightfully theirs feel authorized to assess damages by some arithmetic of their own, and to levy them whenever and wherever they can.

Here was slavery at its very best, and there were probably hundreds of families where it existed in like fashion; and if the negroes were to be regarded as working cattle, they could not have been better off. They were well lodged and fed, and could have been worked no harder than was necessary for exercise and digestion.

But there had taken place at Savannah, several years before my visit, a transaction which showed, in its worst aspects, the proslavery infatuation of the people. A man whom I will not name, from one of our good New England towns which I will not name, was an auctioneer, and held a slave auction every Saturday. He had belonged at the North to a Unitarian society, and essayed to establish one in Savannah. He was, I will not say respectable, but respected, and was in perfectly good standing. I was told that, had he been professionally a slave-trader, he would not have been respectable; but as slave-selling was a mere incident in his profession, and was not on his own account, but on that of his clients, his standing was not injuriously affected. For this society of his, it was deemed expedient in Boston to send a minister who would be acceptable at the South. The choice fell on Rev. Mr. Motte, afterward of the South Congregational Church in this city, a native of South Carolina, a man of elegant culture, with the manners of a Southern gentleman, — a type now extinct as the dodo, really very charming, such a blending of dignity and grace as can hardly be formed except where one is conscious of an absolutely superior position as regards a permanently lower order of beings, and bears that consciousness meekly. He was not an abolitionist, and had then no alliance or sympathy with the anti-slavery party at the North. But having inherited a family of slaves, he had emancipated them, because he was unwilling to burden his conscience with so fearful a responsibility as the ownership of fellow-men. He was sent to the Savannah society as a man specially fitted for its service. But his act of emancipation was there regarded as an unpardonable sin. He was repudiated indignantly by the members of the society, and was treated with so much insolence, not without peril of personal violence, that he was compelled to retreat in hot haste.

From Savannah I went to Macon, where I spent a Sunday and attended a Presbyterian church. There were many negroes in the gallery, the women arrayed in the gayest colors and a profusion of cheap finery. There were black communicants, who were, of course, served at separate tables. The minister prayed very fervently that the servants, as he called them, not having access at first hand to the Bible, might diligently inquire of their masters as to its contents, and govern themselves accordingly. The terms of the prayer were evidently chosen for the receptivity of the human audience rather than for the ear of Heaven, and led me to suppose that the minister was more solicitous to define his own position than to implore a benediction on his colored brethren. I at once suspected that he was a Northern man. I found on inquiry that he had recently come from western Massachusetts.

I spent a fortnight at New Orleans. There I visited a large slave-market, where I could obtain a comprehensive view of some of the worst, the most hideous and soul-sickening, aspects of slavery. A large proportion of those on sale were manifestly intensely anxious as to their fate. Supposing that my friends and I were there on business, several of them asked us to purchase them, probably thinking that we did not look as if we would be hard masters. I confess that I never in my life felt so flattered as to my personal appearance as I was by the earnestness with which, on the score of my good looks, two or three of those poor creatures begged that they might become my property. There were in the market all shades of color, — some who had less of black blood than would have made them octoroons, — several young women who would have passed for white, and who were held at a very high price.

Rev. Mr. Clapp, for many years the only Protestant clergyman who dared to stay in the city during the yellow-fever seasons, owned his sexton, though with that exception he had never owned any human being. He told me that he saw this poor, broken-down old man in the market, in great distress for fear of being sold where he would be overworked and maltreated, and so strong an appeal was made to his compassion that he paid the paltry price, and utilized the man for the light work about his church.

I was in New Orleans while Dr. Palfrey was looking after his human property, and no one who was not on the spot can estimate the energy and perseverance with which he prosecuted his claim. He was a man who would have defied all the powers of earth and hell in pursuit of what he deemed right, and who never failed to

have Heaven on his side. A man less strenuous in his purpose would have succumbed. He, as one of three brothers, inherited his share of a family of slaves. His brothers proposed to let him have his entire heritage in money, and to keep the slaves. When he declined this, the attempt was made to interpose legal obstacles in the way of emancipation, and the case was even brought before the legislature; but he fought his ground inch by inch, and he told me that he had resolved not to leave the spot alive till he could bring his quota of black property with him to the North. He prevailed. He was suffered to choose his share of the property, and he chose those whom he supposed to have the lowest market value, and to be therefore most likely to suffer wrong as slaves; so that he had more than a third part, more than forty in number, all of whom he brought to the North, and cared for till they were in positions in which they could earn their own living. To all his friends it seemed a nobly philanthropic transaction; he regarded it simply as a painful duty laid upon him by the Divine Providence, and inevitably incumbent on him.

During this tour I saw nothing of plantation slavery. In hotels and good families, there could have been very little of overwork; for it took twice as many blacks as it would white people for every kind of work or service. I had opportunities of making inquiries in every direction, from persons who knew whereof they affirmed, and whose testimony I had ample reason to believe. The conclusion which I reached was, that on principle, in habit, and even on grounds of self-interest, the greater part of the slave-owners were humane in the treatment of their slaves, — kind, indulgent, not over-exacting, and sincerely interested in the physical well-being of their dependents. But I had ample and reiterated testimony of the existence of three classes of slaves, together making a large aggregate, who were liable, without protection, to undue exaction, hardship, and cruelty. There were, first, the slaves under the sole management of hired overseers, who everywhere had a bad name; secondly, the slaves of immigrants from the North, who were often of the sort of men that might leave their country for their country's good, who, when not otherwise bad, were greedy of gain, and who, even with kind intentions, almost always required of their slaves more and harder work than the negroes, really less strong than white men, were able to do; and, thirdly, the slaves of poor owners who had but one or two negroes, that were almost always overworked, underfed, and badly

treated. These were cases which, as to anything short of atrocious crime, neither law, nor public opinion, nor influence from without, could reach. With these exceptions, which, however, included a pretty large percentage of the black population, I believe that, so far as physical comfort was concerned, the slaves were better off and less the objects of compassion than the poor of our Northern States; and I think it by no means improbable that there is at this moment a larger amount of want, wrong-suffering, and misery among the colored population of the Southern States than existed among them fifty years ago. But I believe in a better future, and an ultimate condition of equal opportunity and privilege with the whites, for the colored race in the absence of slavery, while under the ban of slavery the race had no future brighter or better than its present.

But I brought away from the South the strong impression that the white population had the worst of slavery, and that emancipation was much more desirable for them than for the negroes. Let me, then, give a sketch of what I saw of the effect of slavery upon the white people.

One of the most striking features of the slave population was the very large proportion of it that indicated a mixture of races. This fact, which it is enough to name, tells its own sad story of depravity.

To a Northern man nothing was more fully manifest than the shiftlessness of the Southerners. The slave States, both Eastern and Western, had been settled, on an average, about as early as the Eastern and Western free States, respectively; but there seemed a century's difference between the condition of the North and that of the South, as to all that constitutes advanced civilization. Savannah was dependent on the North for all kinds of fine mechanical work, whether of manufacture or repair. I at that time wore a diamond ring, in which the stone fell from its setting. The resetting was an affair of few minutes and small cost, as I found at Cincinnati; but I carried the ring to every jeweler in Savannah, and they all offered to send it to New York. It was finer work than they knew how to do. I learned, too, that even nice furniture was sent to New York when it needed repairs. In point of fact, the classes of men which at the North furnished skillful artisans deemed handiwork beneath them.

The case was the same as to the kinds of men that ought to have been leaders in public improvements, in the establishment of lines of communication, and in the development of the resources

of the country, other than simply agricultural, which, in many quarters where they were the richest, remained unexplored and unimagined. Such men regarded it as beneath their dignity to be anything but planters and politicians. The consequence was that, of such improvements as had in the lapse of time been made in the free States, there was in the slave States an absolute dearth, or, at best, beginnings so awkward and ill-contrived as to seem a burlesque of what they were meant to be. On the Atlantic seaboard and far into the interior there were then at the North well-constructed and well-equipped lines of railroad, and the Alleghanies were already crossed by rail on a series of inclined planes, which took not only passengers, but loaded canal-boats without breaking bulk, over the steepest heights that steam-power anywhere in the world had begun to climb. The contrast in this respect between the two sections of the country may, on the Southern side, be illustrated from the notes of my journey from Savannah to New Orleans.

The railroad from Savannah to Macon, two hundred miles in length, was traversed in twelve hours. On the way there was not a single village, and there were but few houses in sight. There was not a single station-house or railroad building of any kind. About once in ten miles the train stopped for wood and water, the pumping apparatus being of the rudest description. By the pump was a little pile of pine wood, the sticks charred at each end, showing that fire had been employed to facilitate or supersede the labor of chopping. At these stopping-places there was generally a small drinking-shop, at which the mails were opened and changed, and in which passengers probably sheltered themselves in bad weather when waiting for a train. At one of these places was a shanty in which we breakfasted. We dined under a new house that stood on piles. The earth was our dining-room floor. The dinner would have been decent but for the sand that was sifted through the cracks in the floor above, with every footfall.

From Macon to Griffin, sixty miles, I went by rail in six hours. The rail was a series of flat strips of iron fastened by spikes to a wooden rail, and, of course, liable to spring into what were called snakes' heads. The myth was (and, had there been enterprise enough to import Japanese runners, it need not have been a myth), that a man ran in advance of the train to nail down the snakes' heads. The tank that fed the boiler leaked so badly that we had to take in water every five miles. This defect had the compensating advantage of so thoroughly watering the track as to pre-

vent any annoyance from dust. The passenger cars could have been derived from no anterior type, but must have been evolved from the brain of some native architect. When I entered the car I found myself in a long, rudely built, unglazed wagon, with a huge spittoon in the centre, with ample standing-room, and, as I at first supposed, with no seats. But I at length ascertained that there ran round the entire periphery of the car a shelf, little more than a hand's breadth in width, covered with blue baize, and that my fellow-passengers were making believe that it was a seat. I followed their example; but standing would have been much more comfortable.

Griffin was a city of twenty or thirty houses and shops. I stopped an hour or two at a very primitive tavern called the "City Hall." In Griffin I examined for the first time a church of a style of which I afterward saw many in Georgia and Alabama, indeed, everywhere except in the large towns. It looked like a barn *minus* the hayloft. It had no glazed windows. The apertures for air and light were commanded by wooden shutters that opened from the inside.

From Griffin to Chehaw, Alabama, I had a stage-coach journey of one hundred and fifteen miles, accomplished in twenty hours, through a sparsely settled country, passing a house, generally a log house, perhaps every half mile. These houses, oftener than not, were destitute of glazed windows, with wooden shutters to exclude the rain, which, when closed, must have excluded light also, unless there were straggling day-beams that found their way through the unplastered chinks between the logs. These houses made my night journey very picturesque. Candles were little used; oil still less; but pine knots were burned freely, and a house illuminated by them, as they shone with intense brilliancy through doors and windows, and numberless apertures in the rough log walls, with similar lights in surrounding negro cabins, had the effect of magnificent fireworks got up for show. But how the United States mail lived through such a fiery dispensation was to me incomprehensible. The mailbag was opened every four or five miles, in front of the door of one of these houses, the postmaster examining it with a blazing torch in one hand, a torch, too, that scattered sparks that might easily have turned the entire correspondence into ashes.

At Chehaw we took rail for Montgomery, a distance of forty miles, accomplished in four hours and a half. Here I encountered what I found to be a characteristic of Southern travel. Two

o'clock was the nominal hour for starting, and the passengers were all on hand then, ready for starting, but the engineer had overslept himself in an after-dinner nap, so that we did not start till three. I subsequently had ample experience of the ignoring of the time element, especially by steamboats. It was not even expected that they would start at the advertised time. Thus for my voyage up the Mississippi, I went on board my steamer in the evening, thirty-six hours after the time advertised for starting, and slept that night on board, alongside of the pier.

From Montgomery, after waiting two days for a boat reported as due on my arrival, I took passage on the Alabama River to Mobile, the passage occupying three entire days, the boat being tied up for the two intervening nights to a tree, on account of sandbanks, through which there had not been enterprise enough even to procure an appropriation from Congress — never difficult in behalf of a Southern river — to cut a safe channel.

From Mobile I went by steamer to the eastern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, thence by a railroad of five miles to New Orleans, the road having been built through a noisome and loathsome swamp, laden with miasmatic capacity sufficient to poison the air for miles around, which only a slave-ridden community could have left uncleared, uncleansed, and undrained at the very back door of a rich and great commercial city.

In New Orleans, which was then at the height of its prosperity, it was perfectly evident that the large business interests were principally in the hands of Northern men. They had also taken into their hands the cause of popular education. An excellent public school system had been established. A Massachusetts man was the superintendent of schools, and the school board consisted almost wholly of Northern men, one of my college classmates having borne a specially active part in the service. At a later time I found that St. Louis had been indebted to immigrants from New England for the organization, management, and endowment of educational institutions of every grade.

The portions of New Orleans occupied by the remaining Spanish and French population, which was confined chiefly to one section of the city, showed tokens only of thriftlessness and decay, — of poverty staved off and impending rather than already felt in its keenness. They retained the habits of indolence engendered by hereditary slaveholding, without partaking in the renovating influences of Northern immigration and enterprise. I suppose that it was in accordance with a Spanish predilection rather than

as the direct result of slavery, yet still in harmony with the non-progressive character of a slaveholding population, that on a Sunday morning, on a church door, there appeared a huge placard, advertising for the afternoon a bullfight at Algiers, on the opposite side of the river.

In my voyage up the Ohio on that same journey I had an object-lesson forced upon my sight which would have furnished the best possible text for an antislavery lecture. On the Kentucky side of the river the clearings were rare, straggling, and ill-looking, with mere shanties for dwellings, and the villages small, mean, and poor. On the Ohio side we were constantly passing neat, well-fenced, well-cultivated farms, with comfortable dwelling-houses, and the villages had a prosperous air; while Cincinnati, in her fiftieth year, was already a great city, and as not then defaced by coal-smoke, more beautiful than it is now; and Covington, opposite to it on the Kentucky side, though about its coeval, seemed a century behind it.

The mention of Kentucky reminds me of another object-lesson that came to me several years later, on a journey to the Mammoth Cave, a large part of the way by stage-coach. I saw numerous droves of swine on their way from remote birthplaces to Louisville for a market. It was the custom to start them lean from their native homes and to fatten them on the way. There were, all along the road, fields of Indian corn and of other grain, which were destined to be harvested by traveling pigs. A drove was turned into a field, stayed there till it had consumed the grain, stalks and all, and was then driven a few miles farther to another field secured in advance for its special service. This relieved the farmer of the trouble of reaping; but it indicated for the proprietors of the swine a lazy, dawdling way of life, such as could by no possibility have become prevalent or seemed tolerable in a working white population. Probably the establishment of railroad lines has made this method obsolete; but at any rate emancipation would have put an end to it.

On my way home from the South and West in 1844, I made my first visit to Washington, now second in beauty to no city in the world. It was then a mere quagmire, with public buildings, respectable houses, and shanties, dotted down, as it seemed, promiscuously, though really on broad streets, now magnificently broad, that had been surveyed and laid out, but were for the most part without sidewalk or pavement, and with no token of enterprise or of prospective improvement. It had then been the seat

of government for forty-four years. Had a like district for the national government been ceded by Pennsylvania, New York, or any other non-slaveholding State, in less than a quarter of a century there would have sprung up a city of which the nation might have been proud; and it is certain that since the abolition of slavery Washington has made in every five years a greater advancement in everything that indicates good taste, prosperity, and enterprise than in any twenty years of its previous existence.

John Tyler was then President. I called on him, and I cannot forget that in my brief half-hour I heard from him what I am sure that I should not have heard from a Northern gentleman of his standing. His manners were both courteous and kind, and he did not swear to me or at me; but there was present a flippant young man, the editor of an ephemeral Boston newspaper, whom he must have instinctively perceived to be of a profane turn of mind, and in talking with him he transcended the outside limits of reverent speech. The President is expected, indeed, socially, to become all things to all men; but the line should be drawn somewhere, and we might not unreasonably demand that it should be so drawn as to exclude oath and imprecation. I think that a Northern President, if not of blameless life, would have known enough to keep his lips clean in his own reception-room in mixed society; but swearing at slaves, I suppose, seemed natural, and this miserable habit would have been of spontaneous growth in the relation between owner and bondman.

I have told my story of slavery. Give me leave to tell in a very few words what I saw of its close; for I was in at the death. In January and February of 1864, immediately after the emancipation of the slaves, I spent six weeks at St. Louis, and saw abundant tokens, not only of joy, but of good promise, among the colored people. A great number of negroes all over the city were learning to read. At a barber's shop which I frequented, the journeymen and apprentices, in their intervals of leisure, were some of them teachers, some of them learners, and primers and spelling-books were lying about. I heard accounts of similar doings all over the city; for there the colored people, I think, had not by law, certainly they had not in fact, been forbidden to read, so that teachers of their own race were not wanting. As I was officiating at a church which had morning and evening services, on Sunday afternoons I went the round of the colored churches and Sunday-schools, and in every one of them the hymn, —

"My country, 't is of thee,
Sweet land of liberty,"

was sung with the most fervent glow of fresh emotion, so that good Dr. Smith, had he listened, would have felt more glorified than at any moment when, in going round the world, he heard his hymn sung in every climate and land. In all these services there was mention made in sermon, address, and prayer of the new gift of freedom, with overflowing gratitude, and with a profound sense of obligation no less than of privilege. There seemed, also, to pervade the community a friendly feeling toward the emancipated blacks, — a feeling which, I cannot but believe, would have been universal, growing, and predominant, had it not been for the lamentable error of giving the negroes the right of suffrage, and thus endowing them with a power, in several of the States a controlling power, which it was impossible that the then existing generation could use intelligently, and which really made them the passive tools of unprincipled and unscrupulous demagogues.

While I was at St. Louis I saw a man who was probably the last fugitive slave arrested as such. He was a man who had suffered greatly from a series of oppressive masters, and had cast himself on the charity of Rev. Dr. Eliot, who employed him as a servant, taking care to obtain a license for so doing from the provost-marshal. One day Dr. Eliot and his wife, returning from a drive, learned that this man had been seized, and with no little wanton violence carried off in an express wagon. One of the domestics remembered the number of the wagon. The Doctor virtually registered a vow before heaven that he would not sleep till that negro should be again under his roof. He learned from the driver of the wagon that the man had been lodged in the city jail. He obtained from the provost-marshal an order for the negro's immediate release, and took the man home. But this was not enough. Though the gospel which he preached forbade him to avenge himself, he did not regard the prohibition as applicable to any cause of righteousness and humanity. He therefore obtained of the provost-marshal a warrant for the arrest of the kidnapper, the man's late master, and had him routed from his bed at the Planter's Hotel, to spend the rest of the night in the cell which the negro had vacated. As may well be supposed, the negro became, body, mind, heart, and soul, by his own free gift, Dr. Eliot's property. He served as the Doctor's sexton, became a communicant in his church, married respectably, maintained himself comfortably till he succumbed to the infirmities of age, and was tenderly cared for in his last days by him to whom he owed his own self as to all that had made his life worth living.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

A. P. Peabody.

THE INDWELLING CHRIST.

By one of those developing and revealing processes which betray the hand of God, the underlying principle of what has been known as New Theology is emerging. It is the immanence of Christ. It is this which underlies the recent broader and deeper conceptions of the universality of Christianity, the significance of the Incarnation, the extent of the Atonement, Continued Probation, Infant Salvation, — in a word, whatever is properly contained in the term "New Theology."

It is not necessary to show how this fundamental truth has given birth to, and incorporated itself in, all these enlargements of Christian doctrine. Now that it has emerged, it is plain enough to detect its presence and workings. I think all who have been in sympathy with the spirit and motive of this movement in theology must feel a grateful satisfaction that the truth which has been the leaven of it all proves to be of such profound and inexhaustive significance, and withal not new but old, for the New Testament is replete with it.

Starting from one of these New Testament expressions of the truth, it will be my attempt to offer a very direct application of it to the question of individual relationship to Christ. In the Epistle to the Colossians Paul speaks of the word or revelation of God, of which he is a minister, as a *mystery* kept secret through all preceding ages and generations, but now made known. This mystery is, Christ in you the hope of glory. I think I do not misinterpret the import of his words if I state it thus: Christ has always been in men, but with this difference: before the era of his incarnation, He was in them as a mystery; with the incarnation, this mystery became a manifestation. It is true there are passages in the writings of the Apostle which seem to annul this interpretation. But I think the antagonism is apparent, not real. If he teaches that men are "by nature children of wrath," he also teaches that they "do by nature the things contained in the law." This teaching, in another and less inspiring form, has been generally accepted.

All Christian teachers recognize that there is a something divine in man, that this something was there before the coming of Christ, that it is there to-day. Most of them choose to call it a divine principle, giving birth to unselfish deeds and noble thoughts, — a "spark" of the Divine Nature. The truth is dawning upon us

that instead of a divine principle this is a Divine Person, and that that Person is Christ. It has always puzzled theologians to account for the deeds of virtue and honor which light up the pagan world. What is their source, and what their explanation? Some have so far outraged truth as to call them *splendida vitia*, — beautiful but deceptive flowers growing out of a corrupt soil, entirely destitute of worth or holiness, because not springing from a regenerate principle within. Others have estimated them over-highly, and held them up to show to what heights the purely human can attain. The one explanation is as far from the truth as the other. Was God absent from the human heart before the Christian revelation? Was there ever a noble deed or a noble idea that was not God-inspired? No! A divine mystery underlay all that was noble, true, and beautiful in Greek and Roman, as well as Hebrew. That mystery was "Christ in them the hope of glory." He was the justice of Aristides, the wisdom of Plato, the heroism of Leonidas. If not, what was the source of that justice, heroism, wisdom? Surely it was not purely human. And if the divine was interblended, was it not the presence of the yet unveiled Christ, the Immanuel, the eternal Son, the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, — then a mystery, now a manifestation? I know no other explanation of the prologue of John's Gospel — speaking as it does of the world being made through Him, of his coming to his *own*, of his being the Light that lighteth every man coming into the world — than that He who was among men before, as a spiritual illumination, now came among them in the flesh, the "mystery" becoming a "manifestation." Those who were "of the truth," who had confessed the spiritual Christ within them, recognized the entire correspondence of this faint image in their hearts with the moral lineaments of Jesus, and joyfully hailed Him as Lord. I know of no other key than this to the Gospel of St. John, as I know of no other to the Epistles of St. Paul.

But this view, it will be said, belittles the historic nature of Christianity. I think not. Because Christ was present as a "mystery" before He was present as a "manifestation," is there any reason why the manifestation should be undervalued? No! The manifestation explains the mystery. It is better than the mystery. Indeed, the mystery adds significance and power to the manifestation. The central fact of Christianity, Christ has come in the flesh, would have no meaning if there were no Christ to come in the flesh.

(1.) God's revelation to Israel was a revelation through Christ, albeit through Christ as a mystery. Even in the wilderness "they drank of that spiritual Rock that followed them; and that Rock was Christ." The patriarchs entered the kingdom of God through the "narrow door," although over it they could not discern the words, "I am the way."

(2.) If Christ was in the world before He came in the flesh, then surely He is present among men and *in* men now, and in all men of whatever race or religion. Let us not shun the full extent of the truth. Yes, Christ is in the heathen heart. Dim, indeed, is his image; faint, indeed, is the whisper of his voice. But He is there. How else can we explain the recognition which the gospel meets as it falls from the lips of the missionary?—"Ah, yes, that is *my* Saviour that you have told me of. I know it!" Is not this the mystery coming forth to claim the manifestation?

(3.) But apply this truth to the men and women about us. Suppose the pulpit, instead of haranguing men upon their alienation from Christ, denying the unregenerate all contact with Him, should address them on this wise: "Friends, Christ is *in* you. Yes, unbeliever, I include you also. I will even address you directly and say, Christ is in you. Do you doubt me? If I had said, 'There is some *good* in you,' would you have doubted me? No; you would have replied: 'It is true; bad as I am, there is somewhere in my heart a principle of goodness. I know it. If I had not violated it, I should not be what I am.' Will you question it—dare you question it—if I say that that good is Christ? Well, I do say it. That goodness within you is not yours, it does not belong to you. And yet it is entwined in your very consciousness. What is it? 'Christ in you the hope of glory.' Are you saved by it, then? No. Christ is in you and yet you are not saved! Why? Because it makes a heaven-wide difference whether He is there as Ruler or Remonstrator; whether He is there as an accepted Light, the Guide of life, or as one breaking fitfully through the darkness; whether this Light is overcoming the darkness, or the darkness the Light; whether Christ the mystery, being received, leads to Christ the manifestation confessed."

What impression must it make upon a man, who has been taught to believe that he is "out of Christ," to realize that, nevertheless, Christ is in him, a sacred indwelling presence; that he has it in his power to violate and banish Him, or reverence and

accept Him! Only by asserting this organic relation of every man to Christ can we convince men of their obligations to Jesus. Only by attributing every outflow of moral goodness to its source in Christ can we give Him his true power and influence in the human heart. It is time we had done with accounting for the sweet and gracious lives, or the brave and unselfish deeds, of some of the men and women who are not Christians, as the exalted products of human attainment. If they can be as gentle, as pure, and as true without Christ as we are with Him, then is our faith vain. But it is *not* without Christ. Is there any radiant human perfection in any life? — it is Christ-begotten. There is a word which ought to be said to every one not a Christian, who feels that nevertheless there are in him the germs of righteousness and love which are redeeming his life. It is this: "Do you imagine, vain mortal, that the goodness within you is your own? that it is your 'better self'? It is a selfish delusion. All righteousness is of God. You have no 'better self' apart from Him."

It is this presence of Christ which we see in each other's lives, this pure radiance which illumines the good, and even gleams fitfully at times from those not yet wholly evil, that gives to human life all its worth and beauty.

"And every virtue we possess,
And every virtue won,
And every thought of holiness,
Is His and His alone."

Nor does this lessen responsibility or do away with endeavor. For whether this shall be a dying hope, a retreating Presence or a growing one, becoming a foretaste and earnest of the glory which shall be revealed and of a perfect union, depends absolutely upon will and conduct. And with our attitude toward the indwelling Christ is intimately involved our attitude toward the historic Christ. The two blend and are lost in one another. It is the same Christ who constitutes the inward mystery and the historic manifestation. If we are of the Truth we shall hear his voice.

There is one other conclusion which seems to me to ensue upon any large application of the doctrine of the immanence of Christ. It must affect our idea of conscience. Theology has unwisely left the entire consideration of conscience to philosophy, and adopted too readily its determinations. And what is the general idea of conscience thus obtained? That of an impersonal automaton mechanically pronouncing upon questions of right and wrong. And if the more devout minds have ventured to call it

the voice of God, it has been as a voice dis severed from all immediate contact with the Speaker, — words of warning spoken into the soul at its creation as into a phonograph, to become audible as occasion requires. An immanent Christ requires the personality of conscience. I use conscience, in distinction from the moral judgment, as that which detects the (undefined) presence of good, and impels toward it. The Holy Spirit is a Person ; and unless we would commit the error of allotting to the nature of man what is in reality God in man, we must, it seems to me, reach the conclusion that conscience is also the Spirit of Holiness manifesting itself, not in its inspired supernatural activity, but in the necessarily restricted sphere of the natural man. What becomes of conscience in the perfect spiritual man? The Holy Spirit is his conscience. What is the every-day, so to speak, activity of the Holy Spirit in the unregenerate? Is it not the warnings and pleadings of conscience? And is the influence of the Holy Spirit ever separate from the presence of Christ? Not that I would seek to identify conscience with the indwelling Christ, but to attribute the monitions of conscience to Him, thus giving them a personal character. For the indwelling Christ is more than conscience. He is that mystery of Righteousness in the human heart who manifests himself in all the motions of goodness and godliness.

John W. Buckham.

SALEM, MASS.

EDITORIAL.

THE POSITIVE SIDE OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

It is inevitable, in the reëxamination of any subject and the change of view which such reëxamination usually involves, that emphasis should be laid at first upon the negative or destructive side. False and narrow views must be exposed and corrected, before the truth can be seen in its clearer light and its larger outlines. Biblical criticism meets this necessity. The rigid and mechanical theories of the origin and the office of Scripture, to which Protestantism was driven in its conflict with Roman Catholicism, stand directly in the path of historical and critical study, and must be removed before progress can be made. This destructive work, however, necessary as it may be, must cause pain and anxiety, not only to those who learn of its conclusions, but also to those who proclaim them. No serious man can evade the question, — If you admit that there are defects in the Bible, will you not destroy its power to shape the faith and mould the characters of men? The process of criticism has now gone far enough to make it possible to suggest, at least, an answer to this question.

It is not too much to claim that criticism has not yet touched directly any questions which relate immediately to the spiritual life. Such questions as the existence and personality of God, the immortality of the soul, man's need of redemption and God's purpose to redeem him, the presence of God's Spirit in the world, his control over human history and his indwelling in human hearts, do not come within the range of Biblical criticism, except incidentally and inferentially. When one says, — Unless we hold to a certain theory of inspiration and of the nature of Scripture, we must surrender our religious hopes, he draws an inference which is without foundation. The most that can fairly be said of the most extreme views which are seriously entertained concerning the Scriptures is that they diminish the force of one line of evidence for these doctrines. This is manifest from the fact that not a few have held these views and yet have retained their faith in the essentials of Biblical religion.

But it may be confidently affirmed, further, that the views which are now gaining ground among open-minded and serious critics are tending to confirm the conviction that the Scriptures are the vehicle of a divine enlightenment and revelation. This is, in part, the direct result of the negative work which has been done. The views of God and of man to which recent studies in philosophy and science and history have led make it extremely difficult to believe that God has ever held a strictly pedagogical relation with men, — that by a direct and infallible communication, He has taught science or history or metaphysics. A doctrine of the origin of the Bible which affirms or implies this meets with very serious difficulties. Now modern Biblical criticism thinks that it has

found abundant evidence in the Scriptures themselves, and in the history of their composition and compilation, that this theory is not well-founded, but that Biblical writers learned facts as other writers learn them, and reported them with the same liabilities to partial and inexact information. Faith gains, thus, a certain relief; it is exalted and spiritualized. The attention is turned from small things to great things, — from the letter to the spirit.

And when the attention is thus turned from the smaller and more formal features of the Bible to those which are larger and more spiritual, the critical and historical study of the Scriptures aids in the appreciation of these really significant and vital characteristics. There are certain things in Scripture which are not found anywhere else, — at least not found so clearly apprehended, and so fully and confidently affirmed. These are so familiar that it is necessary only to note some of them by way of illustration.

There is in the minds of Biblical writers a sense of the presence of God, — a confidence in a divine enlightenment and leading, such as is rarely if ever found in any other literature. Even those writings which are most closely related with Scripture, seldom, if ever, contain this characteristic. In general, a pretty plain line of distinction runs between Biblical writings and other Jewish and Christian writings. The prophets and apostles certainly believed that they were taught of God, and spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It must be admitted, indeed, that this does not characterize all Biblical writings, and that it is more prominent in the Old Testament than in the New Testament; but it is a phenomenon of Scripture which demands attention and explanation. Moreover, it involves a mental condition which, when it appears elsewhere, is almost always associated with extravagance and fanaticism. A peculiarity of Scripture is that this confidence in divine communications is associated with great sobriety and humility. The combination of intense feeling and good sense is rare. Especially is this true in the realm of religious feeling and action. Most men who dream dreams and see visions are vain and rash and impractical. But this is not the case with the prophets and apostles of Biblical history. They were humble and wise. They were statesmen, good counselors, able administrators. They never fell into that fanatical conception of religion which makes it a purely transcendental experience and obscures the common duties of life. They recognize, also, the limitations of those revelations which they hold are vouchsafed them. Their awakened fancy does not run riot. They do not speculate or ruminate. They simply speak the word which, as they think, has been given them, and leave it to do its appointed work. This remarkable combination of enthusiasm and confidence with wisdom and moderation has always commanded respect for the Scriptures, and suggests a divine control of its writers. And the more critical study of the Bible, and the more careful comparison of its contents with other literature,

deepens this respect, and reinforces the conviction that it did not originate as other literature originates. Other wise men have been timid, doubtful of their conclusions. Other confident men have been rash, imperious, impracticable. This goodly company of men, living in different ages under diverse forms of social, intellectual, and religious development, spoke with a wisdom to which other men did not attain, and with this unique confidence that their wise words came from the fountain of eternal wisdom and truth.

This argument is even more convincing when we examine in detail the fundamental ideas of Scripture. How did men in these early ages come to apprehend the doctrine of the unity and the perfection of God? Granted that this doctrine was a growth which did not appear fully developed in the Hebrew mind in the earliest history, and that the philosophers and prophets of other nations sometimes caught glimpses of it too, the fact still remains that in Biblical history this great thought gained control over men's minds, and shaped all the ideas of life and duty which the Scriptures contain. To affirm that other people apprehended the same doctrine with more or less clearness does not diminish the evidence that divine instruction was given the Hebrew people and their prophets, for the proof that the great truths of the Bible were taught by God does not depend upon proving that He was the God of the Jews only, — still, historical and critical studies are impressing men with a deeper sense of the singular majesty and beauty and moral and spiritual inspiration there is in the Biblical idea of God, the Almighty Creator and Ruler of the worlds, holy and just, and at the same time the friend of men, their Shepherd, their Father, their Redeemer.

Much the same may be said of the Biblical idea of man, — of his origin and his destiny, of his sinful state and need of redemption. The most difficult problem set before man is to know himself. Even Socrates failed in his effort to solve it. The problem of sin and redemption has hardly been apprehended, never mastered, by any writers but those of the Bible and others who have laid hold upon their thoughts. Nothing has ever been added to the teachings of Scripture upon these themes. Yet while other men have not discovered these truths, they have recognized them as just and reasonable when they have been taught them. Doubtless this is what Coleridge means when he says that the Bible finds him. It interprets to man his own condition and need.

So of the Biblical conception of the outcome of human life and history. The Bible's view of the world is sober and comprehensive. It recognizes the evils which beset human society and the dangers which threaten human history; but, at the same time, it is a book of hope and not of despair. It is, in almost all its parts, a prophetic book, — not so much in predicting specific things, as in its confidence — even in the darkest times — that God rules, that righteousness is mightier than sin and light more potent than darkness. The history of the world goes far

towards confirming this outlook and proving that these men, who always believed in the power of righteousness and truth, were right, and that they had, therefore, a deeper insight into the power and purposes of God than other men have gained.

But this evidence, that we have in the Bible a record of God's approach to men, concentrates about the story of the life of Jesus Christ, the report of his teachings and of the impression which his life and teachings made upon those who were associated with Him. Nor does this evidence depend upon the literal accuracy of the records, or the infallibility of the writers. Tradition may not have preserved his exact words, the memory of his disciples may have failed sometimes, his life may have been interpreted and idealized, and the doctrinal inferences drawn by the apostles may need to be tested in the light of reason and calm reflection; but this much is plain, that Jesus Christ made such an impression upon men that He gave them such a revelation of truth and such an inspiration of life as no other man has ever given. The wisdom of the ages is in the words attributed to Him; the hope of the world is in the doctrine which He taught and in the life which He lived and which He sacrificed. This is the conclusion of the most stringent criticism quite as much as it is of the simplest faith.

Criticism, then, simply brings into clearer recognition these marvelous features of Scripture and concentrates attention upon them. It proves that men with human limitations and infirmities and ignorance, living at periods in the world's history which were comparatively dark, were conscious of seeing a great light, and that that light, when tested by all modern appliances, proves to be genuine and wonderful, — the best and clearest light the world has ever seen. It shows that the important thing about Scripture is the Scripture itself, and not the times and circumstances of its composition, and that the great doctrines of Scripture are so great and so wonderful that they are quite independent of any minor inaccuracies which may be combined with the writers' apprehension or statement of them.

THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL ON LABOR.

IN previous letters on civil and political questions Leo XIII. had touched upon the economic situation. He now addresses himself directly and elaborately to the labor question, "in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement." The style of the epistle is generally clear, though the movement labors under the ecclesiastical reasoning with which the subject is burdened. It is easier for a modern to accept the conclusions of the argument than the reasoning upon which they rest. There is an air of remoteness about some parts of the discussion in singular contrast with the practicality which distinguishes the aim and general purpose of the

epistle. The worldliness of the theme does not preclude the reminder that God "has given us this world as a place of exile."

The Encyclical opens, after the salutation, with the following view of the present condition of labor: —

"All agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen's guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that workmen have been given over, isolated and defenseless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the church, is, nevertheless, under a different form but with the same guilt, still practiced by grasping and avaricious men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself."

After this statement the Encyclical passes at once to a vigorous attack upon socialism as a proposed remedy, in connection with which the inviolability of private property is as vigorously maintained; then enters upon a somewhat detailed direction as to the proper mutual conduct of the rich and poor under the inevitable inequalities of social condition; then discusses with great care the function of the state in the way of relief; and closes with a plea for coöperation between employers and workmen, and for the formation of workmen's associations for protection and development, after the manner of the ancient guilds.

Whatever agreement there may be, according to the statement quoted above, about the necessity of a speedy remedy for the want and wretchedness of the very poor, few will accept the reason so prominently suggested in the decline of workmen's guilds. The fact that these went to pieces before modern industrialism showed their utter insufficiency to meet the new situation. Had they remained, they could not have protected their members from the "callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition." The tremendous material forces which the last century brought into play set at naught all existing methods of social protection. Could we conceive of their discovery and application independently of the great religious and political revolutions which preceded, which are doubtless referred to in the sentence, "Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion," — could we conceive of modern material progress under the régime of the church of the Middle Age, we could only think of the church as powerless to control its order or modify its conditions. The startling phenomena of industrialism are apparent to all, but it requires the greatest philosophical

insight to determine their course or to estimate their force. This insight we think is lacking in the Encyclical at the start. The appreciation of the present misery is evident, and the sympathetic attitude toward the poor is honorably declared, but the measure of the present economic problem is lost through a narrow historic approach.

And in like manner the concentration of production, which is referred to as giving the few such power over the many, is in no clear way related to the development of that intense individualism which has been the characteristic of modern industrial life. On the contrary, the epistle goes on to reason about individual natural rights, as if individualism when stimulated and developed would not show its results first in "unrestrained competition" and then in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few.

The authority of the Encyclical lies in its unqualified assertion of the doctrine of private property; its wisdom lies in its concessions respecting the present economic and social function of the state.

The argument for the fullest possession of private property, especially in the land, deals chiefly in abstractions, and therefore has the old dogmatic ring. The priority of the individual and of the family, with the consequent authority of the head of the family, to the state, is given as the ground of natural above acquired rights. We think that many would reach the conclusion of the right of private property by some other mode of reasoning. And that many others still, while rejecting communism, would allow a far greater assumption of power by the state in respect to things for which there is a common demand. Certainly the legislation of Germany and of England for the last ten years, while anti-communistic, has been and still is decidedly socialistic. State ownership and state control are making large infringements upon "individual rights."

And really the Encyclical concedes the principle of a more socialistic use of the state in the powers which it concedes to the state in relieving the present distress. The dogmatic authority of the papacy holds good while the subject is kept in the abstract; when it comes into the concrete the Pope reasons like any other man of modern times. The state should be expected to give to the workmen their Sabbaths, to shorten their hours of labor, to protect women and children against excessive toil, and to secure a fair wage for the work rendered. All this is precisely what the State is doing. And the Encyclical, as it advocates one measure after another in the line of state interference, reads like any one of the better socialistic journals of Great Britain. If it may be laid down as a general principle "that the workman ought to have leisure and rest in proportion to the wear and tear of his strength," and that the state ought to secure the application of this principle, why may it not go further and help the workman to make the right use of his leisure and rest?

Why not public libraries, and public parks, and public baths, and the various "improvements" which the modern state is called upon to furnish in the interest of the workman?

One can but read the Encyclical on Labor with interest and satisfaction. Its influence will be felt toward the freedom and elevation of the working classes. Its tone is seldom condemnatory, and it makes little account of past grievances. Something must be allowed to the perspective in which the Church of Rome sees all modern issues. It is much that in practical matters "His Holiness," as a recent journalist remarks, "has ranged himself unmistakably on the side of the new Political Economy."

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

THE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TRACEABLE IN ISAIAH XL.-LXVI.

"THE deported Jews had been in Babylon little more than a generation," says Stade, "when the premonitory signs of those mighty revolutions in the relations of the peoples and states of Asia began to show themselves, revolutions which should make possible the return and the reestablishment of a humble state."¹ During the troubled period which followed the downfall of Syria, about 600 B. C., Teispes, a Persian, conquered the country of Elam and laid there the foundations of a powerful monarchy. This monarchy reached its real greatness in Cyrus, who had been looked upon as a Persian king in the strict sense, until the discovery of his own record of the conquest of Babylon, and of one or two other inscriptions, has shown that his kingdom was ancient Elam. Cyrus conquered Persia and Media, and they became his base of operations in his wars of conquest into the heart of Asia Minor.

This is the movement which was destined to exercise so great an influence upon the fortunes of the Jewish exiles in Babylon. They were utterly unconscious of its significance, which unconsciousness is the less surprising, however, inasmuch as the Greek states of Europe, as Stade has pointed out,² failed to realize that Cyrus was paving the way for the great invasion of Europe which, but for the unique valor displayed at Salamis and Platea, might have changed the history of Europe.

It is easy for us to see how inevitably Babylon must have been from the first the ultimate goal of Cyrus's conquests, however careful he may have been to keep his intentions in the dark. One whose military genius was so great, who had such a true conception of the right way to hold together a vast empire, could not pass by the greatest kingdom of the time.

The most wonderful of all the prophecies of the Bible is closely connected with the career of this remarkable general. The second part of Isaiah was only half understood, so long as it seemed to be purely a religious treatise without any historical relations. More and more clearly the historical basis is coming into view, with the result of giving us the larger and fuller meaning of those wonderful chapters. There is now a

¹ *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii. 68.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 69.

general agreement among Biblical scholars as to the historical circumstances with which this series of prophecies is connected; even those few who still maintain the Isaianic authorship agree that the prophecies are based upon the fall of Babylon, the prophet living, as Delitzsch said formerly when he believed that Isaiah was the author, "a pneumatic life among the exiles." Placing these prophecies in their right historical setting has been very helpful in a right understanding of them. But as yet nothing has been done toward assigning the various prophecies which make up the book to the particular event with which they were connected. It is true that until quite recently our knowledge of the history of Cyrus and Babylon was so slight, and, as it will appear, so erroneous, that there was comparatively little data to work upon. The cuneiform inscriptions, however, are illuminating this history so powerfully that we may hope for future research with more definite results. As yet Biblical critics have scarcely gone further than to say that the series of prophecies have their historical basis in the fall of Babylon.

It would be quite unusual to have so elaborate a series of prophecies based on a single historical event. It has long been my belief that the different addresses which make up this fine collection were delivered at intervals as the course of history gradually unfolded itself toward the actual restoration of captive Israel. With our present knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign every address to the particular appropriate historical event which called it out, but I deem it quite easy to show the general correspondence between the movement of events and the prophet's words. The prophecy is a unit so far as treating of one great period in the history of the nation is concerned; but there are as many leading parts as there were great events which gave the prophet occasion to preach.

No sympathetic Bible student can for one moment question the high spiritual tone of this prophecy, which Cheyne appropriately calls the "Gospel before the Gospel."¹ This book more than any other is rich in Messianic thought. A large part of these prophecies had a very inadequate fulfillment in Jewish history, and could only have their perfect fulfillment in Messianic days past and to come. The spiritual and Messianic element gains rather than loses from a right understanding of the historical setting. The forty years' wandering in the wilderness is certainly as valuable for spiritual guidance as "Pilgrim's Progress." No part of prophecy applies any less to Christ, if it had its first more or less imperfect application to some one in the prophet's own time. In a single paper it is impossible to touch every part of this great book. We take a single line, — the historical setting of the various parts, — and can treat this only inadequately. These statements are tentative largely, aiming to be suggestive rather than dogmatic.

Chapter xl. is the first, chronologically, of the series of discourses. What was the historical situation when it was delivered? Driver says: "The precise moment at which the prophecy opens cannot be determined; but it must, in any case, have been prior to 538, and, as xli. 25 implies a date subsequent to the union of the Medes with the Persians in 549, it will be limited to the interval between these years, during which Cyrus was pursuing his career of conquest in the north and northwest of Asia."² Matthew Arnold, whose fine literary and critical insight made him a

¹ *Prophecies of Isaiah*, Am. ed., i. 243.

² *Isaiah: his Life and Times*, p. 137.

sympathetic student of this prophet, says simply : " In the year 541 B. c. [Cyrus] turned upon Babylon. Against their enslaver and oppressor, the Jewish exiles in Babylon saw uplifted the irresistible sword of God's instrument. Assyria had fallen, Babylon was falling ; and in this supreme hour is heard the voice of God's prophets."¹ Stade says, — though partly erroneously, as I hope to show, — " The discourses which may with certainty be ascribed to the deutero-Isaiah belong collectively to the time which expired between the downfall of Cræsus and Cyrus's attack upon the latter, in that time of the struggle of the Persians against the Greek States of Asia Minor."² This would make the whole series fall before 547, a date which is clearly too early.

The Hebrew prophet was distinctly a man of his times. He understood clearly the movements of his day, and interpreted them for his duller brethren. God sometimes raised him to a Pisgah to take a view of the near future, and he was therefore always the first to see the consequences of a new political movement while it was yet in the bud. Amos, from the south of Judah, saw the danger hovering over Israel from beyond the river Euphrates, when the infatuated Israelites were exulting in their great power. Isaiah sees the dire consequences of Hezekiah's league with Merodach-Baladan, when Hezekiah himself could only see the hope of greater glory. By analogy, therefore, we should expect the great prophet of the exile to declare the impending restoration as soon as the course of events clearly foreshadowed it, but before it was obvious to the slow perception of the mass of the people. *A priori*, therefore, we should expect that the first of these prophecies was delivered some time before Cyrus marched against Babylon, probably not long after 549. So Driver says : " The prophet's eye marks him [Cyrus] in the distance as the coming deliverer of his nation ; he stimulates the flagging courage of his people by pointing to his successes, and declaring that he is God's appointed agent."³ The other indications are scanty, but they point to the same conclusion. At the time the opening prophecy was delivered, the mass of the Jewish people did not realize the significance of Cyrus's movements. The prophet (chap. xl.), after declaring in a wonderfully graphic way that the restoration of Israel was near, argues that there is nothing so strange in his good tidings, inasmuch as Jehovah's power is so great, his counsel so wise, and his knowledge so profound. But Israel was thoroughly discouraged, not seeing any prospect of release, because in the land of exile, they seemed to be out of Jehovah's reach. The prophet thus rebukes and encourages : " Why sayest thou, O Jacob, and speakest, O Israel ? My way is hidden from Jehovah, and my cause has passed away from my God " (xl. 27).

The prophet speaks thus of Jehovah's power over men : " He who bringeth men of might to nothing, who maketh the judges of the earth as chaos ; yea, they were never planted," etc. (xl. 23 *seq.*). The most natural interpretation of this passage is to refer it to the quick overthrow of the various states of Asia Minor by Cyrus, who, in the mind of the prophet, was Jehovah's instrument.

In chapter xli. the reference to the effect of Cyrus's sweeping victories is very marked. Remembering again Cyrus's relations to Jehovah, we shall easily understand the challenge : " Come silently unto me, O

¹ *Isaiah*, xl.-lxvi., p. 36.

³ *Isaiah : his Life and Times*, p. 137.

² *Geschichte*, ii. p. 72.

countries; and let the peoples gather fresh force: let them approach, then let them speak. Who hath stirred up from the sunrising the man whom Righteousness calleth to follow him; and giveth up before him peoples, and maketh him trample upon kings? He pursueth them, passeth on in safety: the road with his feet he doth not tread" (verses 1-3). This picture seems clearly to point to a rapid career of conquest still going on, one kingdom after another falling before the invader. Then the prophet depicts the terror spread by these conquests: "The countries have seen it and are afraid: the ends of the earth shudder: they draw near and come: every one helpeth his neighbor, and saith to his fellow, 'Be strong'" (verses 5, 6).

In marked contrast to this is the effect to be produced on Israel. They were not to fear like those nations who trusted in gods made by the carpenter and smith, for Jehovah would aid them and support them in time of danger (verses 8-20).

These considerations point to the conclusion I suggested. They are not sufficient to make a mathematical demonstration that these words are to be assigned to a particular year, though they make it probable that the prophet declared the tidings of release some considerable time before the fulfillment.

Let us now turn to another question vitally connected with our argument. More than any other writer of the Bible this prophet dwells upon the omnipotence and omniscience of God. Israel would do well to rest his faith on the Creator and Upholder of the Universe. But another test of Jehovah's power was offered, namely, his foreknowledge. Again and again the prophet appeals to the fulfillment of prophecies uttered by Jehovah as evidence of Jehovah's superiority to the heathen gods. The "former things" were declared, before they came to pass, to show that Jehovah brought them to pass. What are these "*former things*"? The first use of the term is in chapter xli. 22, in the challenge to the idol gods: "Let them bring forth, and show us what shall happen: let them show the former things, what they be, that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them." This means, says Cheyne, "predict, if ye can, the things which are to take place before certain other events."¹ The force of the challenge would then be: "Tell us something that is going to happen soon, and if it come to pass, we shall have some faith in your predictions for more remote times." Like Elijah's sarcasm, the challenge tells plainly the powerlessness and ignorance of the idols. In contrast with this is Jehovah's accurate predictive power. "I the first said to Zion, Behold, behold it; and I gave to Jerusalem one that bringeth good tidings" (xli. 27). This test is evidently based on the standard of true prophecy given in Deuteronomy xviii.: "If thou say in thine heart, How shall we know the word which Jehovah hath not spoken? if the prophet speaketh in the name of Jehovah, and the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which Jehovah hath not spoken, but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously: thou shalt not be afraid of it."

It seems clear that the prophecy of Jehovah quoted above refers to the return from exile made possible by the conquests of Cyrus. Is it possible that even between the first prophecy (chap. xli.) and the second (chap. xli.) there was so great an interval that the prophet could already appeal to the beginning of the fulfillment? This is certainly not a necessary conclusion. Analogous to the challenge to the idols, we might sup-

¹ *Prophecies of Isaiah, in loc.*

pose Jehovah to say: "Here is a clear prediction of mine. I did not borrow it from any one, but was the first to utter it. It will soon be seen whether it is true or false, and then my knowledge of the future will be known."

Again, in chapter xlii. 9, we read: "Behold, the former things are come to pass, and new things do I declare: before they spring forth I tell you of them." By the "former things" Delitzsch here understands the coming of Cyrus, and the downfall of nations connected with his coming. The "new things," he says, are the coming of Jehovah's servant, the restoration of Israel, and the conversion of the heathen. This is certainly very plausible, and, if it is true, we must suppose that a short time had intervened between these prophecies. In chapter xl. there is no definite mention of Cyrus; but we must not build too much upon such an omission, inasmuch as the writing of a prophecy probably followed its oral delivery, and specific references might be omitted in the written abstract.

Passing over several of the references to predictions, we take up the one in chapter xlviii.: "The former things long ago I announced. Because I knew that thou wast hard, and an iron band thy neck, and thy forehead brass, therefore I announced it to thee long since, before it came to pass I showed it thee: lest thou shouldst say, Mine idol hath wrought them. Thou hast heard it, see it all complete. I declare to thee new things from this time. Before to-day thou heardst them not, lest thou shouldst say, Behold, I knew them" (verses 3-7).

At first sight it might seem as if the "long ago" in this passage would refer to the predictions of the fall of Babylon made by the earlier prophets. But the expression is qualified "before it came to pass," so that it only means relatively "long since," that is, before the people found it out naturally. As I shall hope to show later, this chapter was probably written just after the capture of Babylon, and the "long ago" could be ten years ago, and still refer to the first glad tidings: "Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people, saith your God" (xl. 1).

Chapters xliii. and xlv. bring us apparently to a somewhat more advanced stage of the history. The hopes of the return are held out definitely and positively from a nearer point of view. Jehovah will give other nations — Egypt and Ethiopia — as a ransom for Israel (xliii. 3). We know that Cyrus had been planning a campaign against Egypt, and it is now generally agreed that one of the motives which prompted his restoration of the Jews was to make a wall against Egypt. In view of this fact, the prophet's reference to Egypt is particularly interesting. Yet it is a prophetic, not a historical reference. The campaign against Egypt was never carried out. It is possible, however, that the prophet's words were based on Cyrus's design.

The prophet declares plainly that God's hand is in all these historical movements, that no one else has had any part in bringing them about. Carrying out the purpose of the satire on the idol gods (xlv. 9-20), the prophet passes on to Jehovah's supreme greatness, his superior power over all other gods, so called. "I am Jehovah, that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone; that frustrateth the tokens of the liars, and maketh diviners mad; that turneth wise men backward, and maketh their knowledge foolish; that confirmeth the word of his servant, and performeth the counsel of his messengers" (xlv. 24-26).

Have we not here a contest between true prophecy and false, between

Jehovah on the one hand and the idol gods on the other? The astrologers and wizards who flocked about every ancient Oriental court had their say about the prospects of Babylon. Like Ahab's prophets in Micaiah's time, they declared that their king was safe from Cyrus. There were many Jews, never very devout Jehovah-worshippers, who were so weaned from their national religion as to be quite as ready to accept the oracles from the heathen as the message from Jehovah. Their counsel was in direct opposition to that of our prophet, as this passage shows. Both could not be true. Events had progressed to the point that the Babylonians were concerned about their safety. It was a time no longer when a far-sighted prophet was required to see the final aim of Cyrus's campaigns. The people of Babylon had become as negligent of their religious rites as other people do; but in the face of the great danger, there was that renewed activity in the idol market which gave the Hebrew prophet a basis for his keen satire. According to the oracles, these rapidly multiplied gods were to avert the great calamity. But the Jewish preacher declared that the falsity of all such hopes, the delusiveness of all such claims, would soon appear.

With the more immediate prospect of relief, the prophet carries further his picture of the restoration. He thinks of the present dreary condition of the ruined city, lonely and solitary, then of her happy future: "She shall be inhabited; and the cities of Judah, they shall be built; the temple, its foundation shall be laid" (xlv. 28).

With the enthusiastic preaching of the evangelical prophet, and the progress of the conqueror's armies, many of the Jews came to believe in the early downfall of Babylon. In chapter xlv. Jehovah said more definitely than before that Cyrus was his instrument, his anointed one, the executor of his will, and that Jehovah was so aiding him in his career as to make success certain. Moreover, he declared that his motive in directing the conqueror's movements against Babylon was the return of the chosen race, whose punishment had been sufficient. But Israel was not satisfied with Jehovah's plans, so the prophet rebukes sharply the presumption of the faithless people: "Woe unto him that striveth with his maker; a potsherd among potsherds of the earth: shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands? Woe unto him that saith unto a father, What begetteth thou? or to a woman, With what travailest thou?" (xlv. 9, 10).

Israel's criticism of providential arrangements cannot mean, as Cheyne supposes, the long delay of Cyrus's movement; but, as Ewald said, the objection was, that the deliverer was not an Israelite. There is no appropriateness in the figures if they are referred to the tardiness of Providence; they are very striking if referred to the seemingly unsuitable instrument whom God ordained. We can better understand the feeling of the Jews in view of the latest discoveries about Cyrus, which show that he was a tolerant polytheist, not an enthusiastic monotheist, as was formerly held.

This passage shows that the time of doubting Babylon's early fall was past. The doom of the city was clear, but the people were slow to see, in a heathen, Jehovah's anointed, a Messiah. May not the scene of this chapter be something like the following? The prophet, addressing an assembly of the exiles, declares that Cyrus will conquer Babylon, and that he will do it as Jehovah's anointed. Some one in his audience objects to that term. He can see clearly enough now that the King of Elam

and of Persia will soon be King of Babylon, too; but he cannot be God's Messiah: Jehovah could not place any heathen polytheist in such a position as that. In answer to this, the prophet utters the rebuke I have quoted above.

The climax is near. The weak Nabonidos, as we now know from the monuments, brings gods from all parts of the kingdom to Babylon. Other shrines are robbed to save the capital. Caravans of weary animals come into the city loaded down with images. But it is no use; the chief gods are meeting the fate of the Philistine Dagon before the ark of Jehovah: "Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth; their idols are upon the beasts, and upon the cattle; the things that ye carried about are made a load, a burden to the weary beast. They stoop, they bow down together; they could not deliver the burden, but themselves go into captivity" (xlv. 1, 2). The nearness of Babylon's doom is indicated a little further on: "I bring near my righteousness, it shall not be far off, and my salvation shall not tarry" (verse 13).

Chapter xlvii. is the last predictive utterance of the destruction of the city. When those words were spoken, we may well believe that the fall was imminent. But we must turn aside for a moment to read the true record of Babylon's fall. The familiar story of Herodotus that Cyrus entered the city through the river bed, the equally familiar one of the carnage in which Belshazzar was slain, are inconsistent with the recent discoveries from the monuments. It appears from Cyrus's records that he had done some sharp fighting with the Babylonians in Accad, in the north. In the seventeenth year of Nabonidos, Cyrus marched against the Babylonian army from the southeast. Here I quote the inscription, from Sayce's translation: "In the month Tammuz (June) Cyrus gave battle to the army of Accad in the town of Rutum. The men of Accad broke into revolt. On the fourteenth day (of the month) the garrison of Sippara was taken without fighting. Nabonidos flies. On the sixteenth day, Gobryas, the governor of Gutium, and the army of Cyrus, entered Babylon without fighting. On the third day of Marchesvan (October) Cyrus entered Babylon. He grants peace to the city, to the whole of Babylon, Cyrus proclaims peace." The statement here made, that Babylon opened her gates to the conquerors after her army had been defeated in the field, is reiterated again and again. It is scarcely credible that Cyrus should omit from his record such a clever piece of generalship as the diverting of the waters from their channel, if it had really occurred at this time. As Sayce suggests, it is probably misplaced from a later siege under Darius.

I have stated this point fully, that we may guard against picturing any dramatic catastrophe in the fall of the great city. The conquest was assured before the army came before its massive walls. It may be with reference to the preliminary battles in the field that the prophet utters the stirring song over the downfall of the city: "Come down, and sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babylon: sit on the ground without a throne, O daughter of the Chaldeans" (xlvii.). Chapter xlviii. is, says Cheyne, a résumé of the ideas stated in the preceding discourses. It seems to me much more likely that it is a retrospect after the conquerors had entered the city. The prophet's utterance is something like the vulgar phrase, "I told you so." He points to the complete fulfillment of all that had been predicted. He declares again, and for the last time, that Jehovah had been the real cause of Cyrus's success, and closes with

that appeal which the fall of the city alone could make possible: "Go ye forth of Babylon, flee ye from the Chaldeans: utter it even to the end of the earth, say ye, Jehovah hath redeemed his servant Jacob" (xlviii.).

This is an appropriate ending to the first book, or series of prophecies, giving at the end a suggestion of the theme of what follows. In this place Rückert's division certainly is correct. With the opening of chapter xlix. the scene changes, — new conditions present themselves. We have now heard the last of Cyrus and his conquests. Babylon's struggles are things of the past. This change opens new hopes and new dangers to Israel. The time has now come for action. The day of bondage is past. What use shall the released captives make of the liberty which is now given? To these problems the prophet addresses himself.

This second book is, as Ewald says,¹ of not much later date. It seems to follow pretty closely the closing words of the preceding section. The change in tone is due not so much to the lapse of time as to the new conditions brought about by the change in government. The same great Bible scholar suggests that Cyrus, at least at the beginning, did not fulfill the great expectations raised by Israel's prophet.² The permission to return was not issued as promptly as might have been expected. From his own account, we know that it was four months after the capture of the city before Cyrus made his appearance in Babylon. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that God's prophet should turn to Israel and try to arouse them to the task now lying before them.

The prophet declares his mission, — it is to Gentiles as well as Jews. The signal will be given by Jehovah, and the dispersed Jews will throng the roads to Zion from every corner of the world. In the mean time Zion herself, not perceiving the movement, sits and laments: "Jehovah hath forsaken me, and the Lord hath forgotten me." Then the streams of exiles begin to pour in. In the Captivity the blessing of numbers pronounced upon the patriarchs had been fulfilling itself. Zion, the mother of the people, thinks it impossible that all these people who are thronging the roads, which in the prophet's mind converge towards Jerusalem, are her children. "Then shalt thou [Zion] say in thine heart, Who hath begotten me these? and who hath brought up these?" (verse 21).

The prophet has passed ahead of events here in his vivid pictures of encouragement for Israel. He comes back to stern reality. The people object that there is as yet no sign of a decree permitting the exiles to return. The prophet answers by a vigorous and striking assertion of Jehovah's close relations with Israel. What has Cyrus to do with my people? Can he keep them here? Did I ever separate Israel from myself permanently, by a writing of divorcement, or a bill of sale? The return does not depend upon Cyrus, it depends upon Jehovah; Cyrus cannot withhold the decree of release, which is ordered by Jehovah (l. 1).

After all, the people were not very anxious to leave Babylon when the opportunity came. Whether chapters li. and lii. were spoken after Cyrus's decree (Ezra i.), or before, is not easy to determine, but it is evident that it reflects the circumstances connected with it. Jerusalem

¹ *Prophecies*, iv. 254.

² *Ibid.*, p. 292.

was in ruins, the walls were heaps of rubbish; the Temple had been burned, the palaces and most of the houses were masses of débris. The scattered population was half heathen. The land was a wilderness, the fields long neglected. In the country of their exile these keen business-men were engaged in various industries, many of which were very profitable. They were established in homes with their families. The liberal policy of the new government, the established order, the hope of prosperity, made such strong inducements to remain in Babylon, that we need not be surprised to learn from the later history that only a small part of the Jews accepted Cyrus's offer. These chapters are designed to awaken the patriotism of the people by pointing out the glory of the restored Zion.

Chapter liii., which words would fail me to characterize adequately, does not reveal any historical progress; but whether written by our prophet, or, as Ewald supposes, an earlier piece, quoted here, it fits into the historical position most appropriately. St. Paul, in 1st Corinthians, rebukes the people for their sins, and then, saying, "but lo, I show you a more excellent way," writes the sublime discourse on charity. Is it not with some such spirit that his Old Testament predecessor appeals to an erring people, pointing out first the certainty of the restoration, and then making a climax by picturing in impassioned strains the suffering by which this return to Zion is made possible? Does not such an interpretation give us the surest basis for our belief that this chapter has its perfect fulfillment only in the Lamb of God whose sufferings make possible our entrance into the heavenly Zion?

We must pass on rapidly now to a point of interest in chapter lvi. This chapter certainly reads as if the decree had been issued and preparations were being made for the journey Zionward. The prophet encourages proselytes to go back with the Jews, assuring them that they should not be separated from God's people. Many Hebrew slaves in the Chaldean court had become eunuchs. The prophet, rising above the Deuteronomic law, assures them that they shall have a place in Jehovah's house. The attention to minute details tells us that the course of events has been moving, not only in the prophet's mind, but in actual history.

Rückert's division, making a book end with chapter lvii., seems to me without good reason. The most marked change begins with chapter lx. A large part of chapters lvii.-lix. Ewald supposes to be only quoted by this prophet, some of it being much earlier. It is quite apart from my purpose to go into a discussion of that point. I will pass on to the third section of the book beginning with chapter lx.

There again we find a clear advance in the thought. As Driver says: "After chapter lix. his thought not only leaves behind it the fall of Babylon, but ceases to revert with the same frequency as before to the release and return of the Jews: the vision of Zion restored absorbs more constantly his attention; he paints its glories in colors of surpassing brilliancy."¹ Details of the work of restoring the city are taken up. Strangers will aid the Jews in building up their walls. Wood shall be brought from Lebanon, as in Solomon's day, to use for the rebuilding of the sanctuary. "They shall build the old wastes, they shall raise up the former desolations, and they shall repair the waste cities, and desolations of many generations" (lxi. 4).

Chapter lxii. sounds as if it might have been a song to the returning

¹ *Isaiah: his Life and Times*, p. 159.

exiles: "I have set watchmen upon thy walls, O Jerusalem: they shall never hold their peace day nor night." "Go through, go through the gates. Behold, Jehovah hath proclaimed unto the end of the earth, Say ye to the daughter of Zion, Behold, thy salvation cometh" (verses 6, 10, 11).

Ewald says, "lxiii. 7-lxvi. is a later and very dissimilar addition, written after history had further developed itself, and after opinions upon the former work had been already widely given."¹ Whether this passage is by another hand or not, it cannot be doubted that it reveals later conditions, though not necessarily extending beyond this prophet's lifetime.

The scene changes to Jerusalem. Is it possible that the great prophet, whose name has not come down to us, is really buried in the list of returning exiles preserved in the Book of Ezra? At any rate, his point of view is the Holy City. He represents the people in a reverie when the sight of their desolate and ruined city bursts upon them. Their confession of the sins which were the cause of all this ruin is most touching. The people feel the enormous task that awaits them; they realize the hostility of the peoples about them. They pray longingly for such another divine intervention as that which overwhelmed the Egyptians in the sea. "Oh that thou wouldst rend the heavens, that thou wouldst come down" (lxiv. 1). "Our holy and our beautiful house, where our fathers praised thee, is burned with fire; and all our pleasant things are laid waste. Wilt thou refrain thyself for these things, O Jehovah? Wilt thou hold thy peace, and afflict us very sore?" (verses 11, 12).

It is most interesting to speculate whether chapter lxv. may not have a reference to well-known history. The Samaritans came to Jerusalem and offered to aid in rebuilding the Temple, making the offer, as I think, from sincere motives (Ezra iv. 12). Their offer was peremptorily refused by Zerubbabel and Joshua. In the following passage can the prophet be rebuking the Jewish narrowness, as St. Paul rebuked St. Peter's? "I am inquired of by them that asked not for me; I am found of them that sought me not; I said, Behold me, behold me, unto a nation that was not called by my name. I have spread out my hands all the day unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that is not good, after their own thoughts, which say, Stand by thyself, come not near to me, for I am holier than thou" (lxv. 1-5).

There follows a severe scourging of those Jews who refused to join their brethren, and the sure promise that the reoccupation of Judah was not temporary, but to continue permanently in prosperity and peace (verses 19-25).

In chapter lvi. 1-4, the people are rebuked for failing to complete the Temple, probably because they stopped with the erection of an altar; they are denounced for the unholy sacrifices which they offer. Does not this spring from the trying scenes in Jerusalem in the early days of the return?

But there was much disappointment at the insignificance of the restored state. The history of Ezra's and Nehemiah's times confirms the lament of the people that great expectations had brought forth such scanty realizations. The prophet, who always recognized the needs of the people and ministered to them, preaches patience. "Shall a land be born in one day? Shall a nation be brought forth at once? Shall I bring to the

¹ *Prophets*, iv. 255.

birth, and not cause to bring forth?" (lxvi. 8, 9). The prophet then gives fresh encouragement to the disheartened people, and ends his book by rising to a beautiful Messianic strain, in which he declares that the Israelites now scattered over the whole world shall again come to Zion, borne by the very ones who have so long been their oppressors.

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SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

I.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY IN THREE PARTS.¹

PART III. PAUPERISM.

TOPIC IV. THE MODERN STATE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE POOR.

THE transfer of the greater functions of charity from the church to some other agency had become necessary at about the date of the development of the modern state.

The charitable institutions and orders of the church were growing more and more corrupt through the vast accumulation of wealth, and the method of the church was becoming more and more demoralizing in its general effect upon society.

Reformation might have been possible, but the reformation which actually came divided the church into various sects, and hopelessly destroyed that unity which was necessary to efficiency and economy of charitable administration.

The state meanwhile had become so far Christianized that it was able to assume with measurable fitness the new and more delicate function of charity, though the transition from church to state was not effected without some violence and much distress.

(For a clear understanding of this period of transition, special study must be made of the decline of the monastic orders, and also of the poor laws of the modern states, especially of England.)

The question at once arises, which should be fairly met, Why Pauperism is a greater problem under the modern or Christianized state, than under the ancient civilization.

One answer is that Christianity, acting through the state, has undertaken to do for the "unfit," that is, the unable, what primitive society and to a degree the pagan civilizations had allowed nature to do with them. Nature, if unaided, acts rigidly upon the principle of the survival of the fittest. Christianity comes in to protect, nourish, and even perpetuate the weak and unable. To such degree has this care been extended that the charge has been made, "that we have reason to suspect that the unfit are becoming specialized into a new parasitic variety of the human species, possessing different habits and different instincts to those which influence the rest of mankind."

¹ For statement of the different parts of the course, and their relation to each other, see *Andover Review*, January, 1889, or February, 1891.

A second answer is that Christianity, in breaking up the forms of organized greed and cruelty, like slavery, set free a vast amount of "unfit" material. "There is a close association between the growth of freedom and the growth of pauperism. It is scarcely too much to say that the latter is the price we pay for the former." Toynbee's "Industrial Revolution," p. 96.

A third and partial answer is that Christianity has gradually diverted human energy from the arts of war to the arts of peace, and in so doing has introduced new sources of pauperism. Industrialism is not all a gain. It creates a social residuum as well as a surplus of wealth. It enriches society faster than it can develop and maintain proper channels of distribution. Hence the spectacle of an industrial proletariat shading down into pauperism.

1. THE RELATIVE PLACE OF THE FUNCTION OF CHARITY IN THE MODERN STATE.

Statistics are less accessible and less reliable at this point of administration than at any other. Methods of classification vary so much under different governments that few comparative statements can be made. The statistics of the British government are the most complete in respect to charitable administration.

There are in Great Britain a little over a million of paupers, maintained at an annual cost of \$40,000,000. The annual charge for the army is \$90,000,000, for the navy \$60,000,000, for the department of law and justice \$30,000,000, for education \$30,000,000.

The reports of the United States census are as yet entirely incomplete in the registration of paupers. Recourse must be had to state reports, or to the reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections. A few state reports may be quoted to illustrate the amount of charitable administration in the United States.

Michigan: maintains about 45,000 paupers, outdoor and indoor, at an annual cost of \$650,000; in addition to the maintenance of 2,500 insane at a cost of \$500,000.

Ohio: paupers, outdoor and indoor, 54,000; cost, \$1,100,000; insane, 6,000; cost \$800,000.

New York: the whole cost for the dependent and defective classes (this includes criminals) exceeds \$12,000,000.

Massachusetts: paupers, outdoor and indoor, 62,000; cost, \$2,000,000; insane, 6,800; cost, \$900,000.

In Germany the charitable function of the state is associated with the system of industrial insurance, of which a careful study should be made in contrast with the poor laws of England. "Bismarck and State Socialism," Dawson, pp. 109-127.

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY.

The original theory rested upon the doctrine of the natural right of all in the land. The theory has been abandoned, but it underlies the poor-law system of England.

"It is an admitted maxim of social policy that the first charge on land must always be the maintenance of the people reared upon it. This is the principle of the English poor law. Society exists for the preservation of property, but subject to the condition that the abundance of the few shall only be enjoyed by first making provision for the necessities of the many."

—Nicholls, *Hist. of English Poor Law*, Intro., p. 2.

Another theory, to which only an incidental value attaches, is that of the self-defense of society. Babbage states it as follows:—

“Whenever, for the purposes of government, we arrive in any state of society at a class so miserable as to be in want of the common necessities of life, a new principle comes into action. The usual restraints, which are sufficient for the well-fed, are often useless in checking the demands of hungry stomachs. Hence . . . it may be expedient, in a merely economical point of view, to supply gratuitously the wants of even able-bodied persons, if it can be done without creating crowds of additional applicants.”

The true theory upon which the state has begun to act, in distinction from that of natural rights in the soil or of the self-defense of society, is the theory of the social conscience:—

“Every society, upon arriving at a certain stage of civilization, finds it positively necessary for its own sake—that is to say, for the satisfaction of its own humanity, and for the due performance of the purposes for which societies exist—to provide that no person, no matter what has been his life, or what may be the consequences, shall perish for want of the bare necessities of existence.”—Fowle, “The Poor Law,” p. 10.

3. THE SUBJECTS OF THE CHARITY OF THE STATE.

Who ought to be supported at the public charge? The question relates to the number and character of those supported, and to the manner of their support. And the answer concerns the poor, who are yet able to pay taxes, as well as the very poor who are helped.

The following principle of administration was adopted by the Commission on the Amendment of the Poor Law of England (1839):—

“The fundamental principle with respect to the legal relief of the poor is that the condition of the pauper ought to be, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent laborer. The equity and expediency of this principle are equally obvious. Unless the condition of the pauper is, on the whole, less eligible than that of the independent laborer, the law destroys the strongest motives to good conduct, steady industry, providence, and frugality among the laboring classes, and induces persons of idleness to throw themselves upon the poor-rates for support. But if the independent laborer sees that a recourse to the poor-rates will, while it protects him against destitution, place him in a less eligible position than that to which he can attain by his own industry, he is left to the undisturbed influence of all those motives which prompt mankind to exertion, forethought, and self-denial. On the other hand, the pauper has no just ground of complaint, if at the same time that his physical wants are amply provided for, his condition should be less eligible than that of the poorest class of those who contribute to his support.”

To the same end is the following extract from an address by Mrs. Lowell before the Conference of Charities and Corrections (1890):—

“Public relief is money paid by the bulk of the community (every community is, of course, composed mainly of those who are working hard to obtain a livelihood) to certain members of the community, not, however, paid voluntarily or spontaneously by those interested in the individuals receiving it, but paid by public officers from money raised by taxation. The only justification for the expenditure of public money (money raised by taxation) is that it is necessary for the public good. That certain persons need certain things is no reason for supplying them with those things from the public funds. Before this can be rightly done, it is necessary to prove that it is good for the community at large that it should be done.

“It is always necessary, also, in considering the expenditure of public funds, to give up the notion that these funds come from an indefinitely large central source of supply which can be drawn upon constantly without affecting any one.

There is no such central source of supply. Every dollar raised by taxation comes out of the pocket of some individual, usually a poor individual, and makes him so much the poorer; and therefore the question is between the man who earned the dollar by hard work, and needs it to buy himself and his family a day's food, and the man who, however worthy and suffering, did not earn it, but wants it to be given him to buy himself and his family a day's food. If the man who earned it wishes to divide it with the other man, it is usually a desirable thing that he should do so, and at any rate it is more or less his own business; but that the law, by the hand of a public officer, should take it from him and hand it over to the other man, seems to be an act of tyranny and injustice, which, if carried far enough, and repeated often enough, leads to a condition of things where there is not sufficient produced for everybody, and therefore all suffer, — the men who earn the dollars as well as those who do not earn them.

"It is good for the community that no one should be allowed to starve; therefore, it is a legitimate thing that the public money should be used to prevent such a possibility, and this justifies the giving of public relief in extreme cases of distress, when starvation is imminent. Where, however, shall be found the proof that starvation is imminent? Only by putting such conditions upon the giving of public relief that, presumably, persons not in danger of starvation will not consent to receive it. The less that is given the better for every one, the giver and the receiver; and therefore the conditions must be hard, though never degrading. On the contrary, they must be elevating, and this is by no means incompatible with severity."

In the application of these principles to state aid, the subject of indoor (or institutional) or outdoor aid becomes a matter of much difference of opinion. On the one hand, it is urged that the institutional test is the only clear test of poverty; on the other hand, it is urged that one chief end of charity should be to preserve the self-respect of the recipient. The present tendency is away from outdoor relief in order to systematize charity, and reduce it to the greatest practicable economy; and yet outdoor relief is practiced in all states, and is strongly advocated by some administrators as a necessary and proper mode of relief.

See Professor Fawcett on "Pauperism, Causes and Remedies," General Booth's "In Darkest England," and also discussions in recent annual reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections.

The classes in society, with respect to which there is no question as to the full duty of the state, are: —

(1.) The insane, of which class there is a marked increase in all countries. The report of the State Board of Massachusetts for 1889 gives an increase of sixty per cent., compared with the report for 1879, while the population of the State had increased but twenty-five per cent.

(2.) The incurably sick, the feeble in body or mind, and the aged.

(3.) Orphans, and the children of destitute or depraved parents.

The children of the state constitute a proper subject of special study, including the parental and the protective relation of the state toward them, child labor, and the school life of the child.

The authorities to be consulted are chiefly the poor laws, factory laws, and school laws of the different States, and of the governments of Great Britain, France, and Germany.

4. THE AGENCIES OF THE STATE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITY.

These are of two kinds: —

(1.) Administrative, including the state or county or town boards, and all under the direct appointment of the state, as the superintendents of institutions.

(2.) Advisory, or in some cases supervisory boards. These are virtually commissions, with more or less power, and are to be found in fifteen States of the Union. These commissions usually have the right of inspection and examination of all public, and in some cases of private, institutions, the right to call for reports, and the right to advise new and special legislation.

To these agencies under the direct control of the State should be added those which may be classed as auxiliaries, like the Board of Associated Charities in the various cities. See Gurteen's "Handbook of Charity."

The study of the working machinery of any more advanced State, like Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, or Michigan, is advised; and also familiarity with the administration of local institutions,—insane asylums, almshouses, reformatories, and homes or cottages for children.

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

II.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THIS is often called the Industrial Age. It might, with equal propriety, be called the Age of Cities.

According to Bulletin No. 52, of the Census of 1890, the proportion of our total population dwelling in cities of 8,000 or more inhabitants was, 3.35 per cent. in 1790; 3.97 in 1800; 4.93 in 1810; 4.93 in 1820; 6.72 in 1830; 8.52 in 1840; 12.49 in 1850; 16.13 in 1860; 20.93 in 1870; 22.57 in 1880; 29.12 in 1890! This is an increase from one thirtieth to nearly one third of the population, and represents a total of 18,235,670 in 1890 as against 131,472 in 1790. It will be noticed that the increase has been mostly during the last half century. During the fifty years preceding 1840 the urban percentage had risen only to 8.52, or but a little more than doubled, while in 1890 the percentage of 1840 had more than trebled.

But this does not tell the whole story. In the North Atlantic Division the urban percentage is 51.58, or more than half; in the North Central Division it is 25.90; in the Western Division it is 29.74; in the South Central 10.45, and in the South Atlantic Division 16.04.

Even in the great agricultural section of the country the urban population is vastly more important than at the beginning of the century, and the most congested divisions are those which contain five sixths of the entire population, that is, the North Atlantic and North Central divisions. The growth of the urban population has been out of all proportion to the growth of the total population. During the last decade, in the North Atlantic Division, the urban population increased 43.53 per cent., while the total increased but 19.95 per cent., and about the same proportion obtains in the North Central Division. In the South Central and South Atlantic divisions the urban population increased 58.88 per cent., while the total increased but 20.07. In the case of single States the proportion of urban population is even more striking. In Massachusetts it is 69.90; Rhode Island, 78.89; Connecticut, 50.58; New York, 59.50; Pennsylvania, 40.93; Illinois, 38.77.

A very similar state of things prevails in Europe. Brückner, in "Mayer's Statistisches Archiv," in an exhaustive article upon the "Evolution of the City Population in the German Empire," works upon the basis

of the German census of 1885 (that of December 1, 1890, not yet being accessible). He reminds us that in 1801 London, now upwards of five, had not reached her first million (864,000), while Berlin, now toward two, had but 173,440; and that while the total population of Germany wanted considerable of doubling between 1816-1885, the great cities increased more than fourfold. Here, too, as in the United States, the increase has been greatest in recent years; the increase from 1861-1885, as compared with that for 1816-1861, being as five to three.

Defining "great cities" as those of more than 100,000 inhabitants, it appears that they have increased 100 per cent. in the twenty-four years between 1861-1885, while the total population of the Empire increased but twenty per cent., which means, of course, that, if the cities were excluded, no gain of the country population would appear, probably a loss. These same great cities formed with their suburbs but 8.56 per cent. of the population in 1867, as against 12.74 per cent. in 1885. Again, while the population of the Empire increased annually in the five years before 1885 seven tenths of one per cent., that of the great cities increased two and seven tenths per cent., or three times as fast. Districts of less than 2,000 exhibit a small annual loss. Of the total increase within the Empire from 1867 to 1885, twenty-five per cent. was absorbed by cities of over 100,000; twenty-one per cent. by cities between 20,000 and 100,000; twenty-five per cent. by cities between 5,000 and 20,000; fourteen per cent. by cities between 2,000 and 5,000; and the remaining thirteen per cent. belonged to country districts, although the latter in 1867 contained sixty-five per cent. of the total population. Expressed differently, the country districts gained thirteen where they should have gained sixty. Their birth rate being higher than the urban birth rate, they lost to the city forty-seven out of every hundred. The German census of December 1, 1890, shows an even greater growth of city population.

The figures for England, taken from the "Statesman's Year Book," show a similar state of things. In England fifty-six per cent. of the population live in towns of over 10,000 inhabitants, and their rate of growth in the ten years preceding 1881 — the last figures available — was nineteen per cent., while the rural population increased only seven per cent. London, with its suburbs, increased twenty-two per cent. In Scotland forty-three per cent. of the population lived in cities of over 10,000. The urban increase for the same decade was seventeen per cent., while the rural population *decreased* about four per cent. The English census, just completed, is said to evidence the same depopulation of the country districts.

According to Rauchberg,¹ the urban population of France in 1886, upon a minimum of 2,000 inhabitants, comprised thirty-six per cent. of the population, as against twenty-four in 1846; leaving to the rural districts sixty-four, as against seventy-six in 1846. Here, as in Germany, the attractive power of the city seems to be in direct ratio to its size. In the twenty-five years from 1861 to 1886, cities with a population between 10,000 and 15,000 increased thirty-three per cent. The proportion rises gradually to fifty-one per cent. in cities between 50,000 and 100,000. There seems to be a law of social as well as of material gravitation.

It seems hardly necessary to state that this modern growth of cities is not an *internal* growth, that is, not at all owing to a surplus of births

¹ *Archiv für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, Zweite Jahrgang, Zweites Heft.

over deaths. It is mainly external, by accretions, immigration from rural districts. This fact is easily accepted and indisputable, but let us dwell upon it. In the five years from 1880 to 1885 the annual surplus of births over deaths in Germany was about one per cent., while the annual increase of city populations was nearly two and a half times as great. Again, according to the census of 1875 there were in Berlin 231,135 persons who had moved into the city during the three years preceding. In 1885, out of every 1,000 inhabitants in Berlin, 576 were born outside the city; in Hanover the proportion was 612; in Frankfort-on-the-Main, 651; in Leipsic, 644. The best showing was made by Aix-la-Chapelle, namely 383. In short, from one third to two thirds of the population came from outside the city. Out of every 1,000 persons in Paris in 1885, 647 were born elsewhere. Professor A. B. Hart of Harvard University states¹ that of the 362,000 inhabitants of Boston in 1885, only 135,000 were born in the city itself. In Washington one third of the whites, resident, were born outside the city. If one will follow the census bulletins of 1890, dealing with population by counties, the same gain of the cities at the expense of the rural districts is everywhere noticeable. To quote from "The Nation:" "From Schoodic Lake on the eastern borders of Maine to Decatur, Ala., is about 1,300 miles as the crow flies. It would be possible in going from one of these points to another to travel nine miles in every ten through counties, the population of each of which, outside the bounds of their cities, has decreased in the interval between the tenth and eleventh censuses." The general rule is that purely agricultural counties have lost population, and counties with the largest towns have gained most. In Maine, Franklin has lost 1,127; Hancock, 817; Oxford, 2,041; Waldo, 4,704; Knox, 1,390; Lincoln, 2,825. In Connecticut the gains vary from two per cent. in Litchfield to thirty-three in New Haven and Fairfield counties. In Vermont eight out of the fourteen counties have lost, and the State has gained but four tenths of one per cent.

We conclude, then, that the astonishing development of the city population in modern times is largely at the expense of the rural districts. The birth rate in the country is high, the death rate is low, and the surplus population seeks the cities. Let us see, now, whether we can determine how much of the growth of a city results from an excess of births over deaths within the city. Within the city the birth rate and death rate vary together. According to Brückner's tables of German cities, a purely manufacturing city, Chemnitz, had, in 1885, the highest birth rate, forty-five per thousand; Berlin had thirty-eight; Frankfort, the richest city in Germany, had the lowest, twenty-nine per thousand. The death rate, too, was highest in Chemnitz, thirty-three per thousand, and lowest in Frankfort, nineteen per thousand. Oldendorff² supports the inference that the birth rate and death rate are both highest among the poor. He states that in Erfurt, among the working classes, thirty per cent. of the children die within the first year, among the middle classes only seventeen per cent., and among the upper classes only nine per cent. Further, the infant mortality is much larger in cities than in the rural districts, and varies with the city population. In Saxony the infant mortality was forty per cent. among the urban population against thirty-three among the rural population. In Prussia the ratio was twenty-five

¹ *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January, 1890.

² *Archiv. für s. G. und S.*, B. i., H. i.

to twenty-one. In the German Empire the mortality among infants during the first year is twenty-eight per cent. in the great cities, twenty-four in cities of medium size, and twenty-two in the rural districts.

It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the immigrants from the country are usually in the early prime of life, and that marriages and births are much more frequent among any given number of immigrants than among the same number of natives of the city, many of whom would be children and aged persons. Immigrants from the country contribute much more than their own numbers to the growth of the city population. So much more that it may be accepted as a general law, that any city population, if left to itself, would die out within four generations. This, and not the growth of cities from the outside, seems to me the most startling phenomenon of city life. This is the theme of a recent brilliant German work of George Hansen.¹ Though statistics are unfortunately imperfect, or non-existent, they support his contention that a great city is a bottomless whirlpool upon whose surface objects may play, for a moment, but into whose depths they must ultimately be drawn and disappear. Hansen relates that a friend inquired of him one day in Munich, "Have you ever seen a person born in Munich? I have already made inquiries, and no one has seen such a one; I do not think there are any." In fact, in 1880 thirty-seven per cent. of the inhabitants of Munich were born there, but about twenty-five per cent. were children under five years of age, leaving only twelve persons in every hundred over five years of age who were natives of Munich! Hansen builds upon very complete Bavarian statistics of 1871 and 1880, which fortunately cover the relation of urban to rural populations. These showed that only sixty-one per cent. of the inhabitants of Bavarian cities were born in them. A special census of the city of Leipsic in 1875 disclosed the fact that, from the age of fifteen upward, the immigrants surpassed the native born, which is probably to be accepted as a general law, though the external growth of Leipsic has been extraordinary. In 1875 only 363 out of every thousand were born in the city. The following table tells its own story:—

Age.	Percentage of Total.	
	Born in Leipsic.	Elsewhere.
0-5	24.36	2.19
5-10	15.48	3.62
10-15	12.24	4.92
15-20	10.75	14.24
20-25	8.10	19.20
25-30	6.10	13.71
30-35	4.90	9.76

Expressed differently: from birth to ninety years the relative percentage of those born in Leipsic sinks gradually from eighty-six per cent. to seven per cent., while the percentage of those born elsewhere rises from thirteen to ninety-two per cent. As seventy-six per cent. of those over fourteen years of age were not Leipsic born, if all possible deductions be made for transients of all kinds, it is safe to say that the population of Leipsic consisted half of natives and half of immigrants. As the latter is a constantly running stream, it follows, to quote Hansen, "that the native city population is entirely displaced every two generations through the immigration from without." With this conclusion the Bavarian statistics are in complete accord. In Munich, during the five years

¹ *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen, München, 1889.*

following 1870, the births were 37,549, the deaths 37,320, while the population actually increased 23,331, of course entirely at the expense of the open country. Remembering the fact already noted, that the immigrants contribute most to the marriage rate and birth rate, and least to the death rate, it is safe to say that the city of Munich, if left to itself, would have lost population rapidly: as has been said of mediæval Frankfort: "Without the continuous stream of foreign settlers, its very existence would have been impossible." Goethe, in his "Conversations," says: "Our country people secure us from total decay and destruction. The rural population may be regarded as a magazine from which the forces of declining mankind are always recruited and refreshed. But just go into our great towns and you will feel a great difference." Charles Booth, "Labor and Life in East London," vol. i. p. 502, says: "The London-born workman feels that it is not the immigrant but the native, who goes to the wall." Again, page 533, after characterizing dock labor as a "sort of a buffer between ordinary productive industry and the poorhouse," Mr. Booth says: "Such labor is chiefly recruited from the ranks of Londoners, for seventy in every hundred were born in London against fifty-two for the whole adult male population of East London and Hackney, or forty-six for the whole of London. The vast majority of the dock laborers from outside are practically Londoners, having lived for over ten years in London." Again, in speaking of a somewhat similar class, the stevedores, he says: "There are about 8,600 stevedores proper engaged in the port of London, . . . and of these about seventy-five per cent. are estimated to be Londoners by birth. . . . In the main, casual dock labor is a London employment, and countrymen only filter into it in small numbers after many years of residence in the metropolis." Mr. Booth shows further that the proportion of countrymen in any trade increases in proportion to the skill and strength required. "There is no doubt of the inferiority of London labor, as indeed that of any capital city."

In his second volume Mr. Booth shows even more clearly that the "submerged tenth" in London is practically London born. Hansen, dividing the population into three classes, — the agricultural, the middle class, the town laborers, — concludes that "only the first class, the agricultural, possesses permanent vitality; from its overflow the city population is formed, displaced, and renewed." "Of the town population a small fraction, of both middle and laboring classes, returns to the agricultural condition, the greater fraction dies out, the remainder, in its progress toward decay, forms the class of unskilled labor and the proletariat." Hansen obtains an effective proof of this law by a study of the religious composition — between Catholic and Protestant — of the German cities and rural districts, showing that the equilibrium point in the proportion of Catholics to Protestants within a city is reached when such proportion exactly coincides with the proportion in the rural districts from which it draws its inhabitants.

Now, I am far from saying that this general law, that a city is an inland lake fed by constant streams, but without an outlet, is without exceptions or without modifications in different cities, and particularly in new countries, but I have no question that it is a general law. Quatrefages says "M. Boudin could not find a pure-blooded Parisian whose ancestry could be traced for more than three generations."

Here is not the place to dwell at length upon the causes of the inordinate growth of cities in modern times. They are briefly: —

(1.) The establishment of great manufacturing industries that make it advantageous both for the manufacturer and the men to be in large towns.

(2.) The development of the railroad and transportation system, which makes it necessary for industries to have the best shipping and distributing facilities, that is, to be at railroad centres.

(3.) The quickening of general intelligence, and the unfolding of a complex civilization which can only be enjoyed in the whirl of town life.

(4.) The neglect of rural population by economists and governments, placing upon them undue burdens, and practically excluding them from government.

(5.) An equal neglect on the part of social reformers and the churches to do anything to quicken and make interesting rural life.

(6.) The fact that in our enormous material development the great prizes are only to be won at great centres, to which one hundred go, though only one can succeed. Men are by nature gamblers.

D. Collin Wells.

BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

DIE HEILIGE SCHRIFT DES ALTEN TESTAMENTES. In Verbindung mit Professor Baethgen in Greifswald, Professor Guthe in Leipzig, Professor Kamphausen in Bonn, Professor Kittel in Breslau, Lic. Marti in Basel, Professor Rothstein in Halle, Professor Ruetschi in Bern, Professor Ryssel in Zürich, Professor Siegfried in Jena, Professor Socin in Leipzig, übersetzt und herausgegeben von E. KAUTZSCH, Professor der Theologie in Halle. Parts I.-III., pp. 1-240 (Gen. i.-Josh. xv.). Freiburg i. B.: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1890-1891. Subscription price, 9 Mrk.

This is the beginning of a new translation of the Old Testament by a company of German scholars whose names give good promise for the thoroughness of the work. The principles which they have laid down for themselves are substantially the same which have guided Weizsäcker in his admirable version of the New Testament, and Kautzsch and Socin in their "Genesis." As these principles have been sufficiently exposed in notices of the volumes just named,¹ it is not necessary to give an extended account of them here. Professor Kautzsch and his associates aim to interpret the Old Testament in the light of modern scholarship, in a version which shall do for our day what Luther did with such unexampled success for his own, — make the prophets talk German. The basis of the translation is, of course, the Massoretic text; but although sufficiently conservative in this particular, the translators do not feel bound to follow it against better readings preserved, for example, in the Septuagint; nor to pretend to understand it where it is wholly unintelligible. All departures from the Hebrew text are indicated in the translation by an unobtrusive sign, and will be recorded in an appendix. The place of unintelligible words is filled by . . . ; the sense suggested by the context is pointed out in footnotes. In the Pentateuch and Historical Books, the components which are discovered by the critical analysis are desig-

¹ *Andover Review*, vol. x. pp. 651-653; 653, 654.

nated by signatures in the margin. In this department of criticism, also, a wise reserve is apparent in the use of these signs. No attempt is made to represent the minuter and more controverted features of the analysis, especially in the separation of *E* from *J*, and of the different strata of *P*. In the historical books and prophets, dates will be given in the margin, as far as they can be fixed with any confidence. The results of Assyrian research, which has put the chronology of the eighth and seventh centuries on a solid basis, will, of course, be fully recognized.

Such a translation must serve in many ways a useful purpose. It exhibits better than can be done in any other way the actual state of the interpretation of the Old Testament, and becomes thus a landmark of progress. Comparison with the version of De Wette, the last real revision of which was made about fifty years ago, enables us to estimate what has been achieved in the half century; while at the same time it shows us how much remains to be done for the understanding of the Old Testament. To the Old Testament student and the minister, it will be a very useful addition to his exegetical apparatus; to the student of history it will supply the urgent need of a version which represents the present state of learning in criticism and interpretation. There must be many American scholars to whom such a translation will be welcome.

A somewhat careful examination of the parts which have thus far appeared confirms the high opinion of the work which we were ready to form from the prospectus. The scholars who have been engaged upon it have attained in a high degree the objects at which they aimed. The interpretation is sober and cautious, rather than novel and ingenious, fairly representing the consensus of scholars where such an agreement exists, and following the more prudent opinion in cases of doubt. In matters of criticism the same sobriety is observable. The German is clear and readable. The book is well printed, and published at a price which puts it within the reach of everybody. We wish for it the widest circulation, not only in Germany but in the lands of the English tongue. And we hope that the good example may stir up some of our own scholars to do a like work for us. For, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the Revised Version, it cannot fill the place of such a translation as this.

George F. Moore.

DIE GENESIS, mit äusserer Unterscheidung der Quellschriften, übersetzt von E. KAUTZSCH, Professor zu Halle a. S., und A. SOGIN, Professor zu Leipzig. Zweite vielfach verbesserte Auflage. Freiburg i. B. 1891. Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

The first edition of this work was noticed in the "Andover Review" for December, 1888 (vol. x. 653 f.). It is a spirited and faithful translation of Genesis into modern German, in which the different elements of which the book is composed are distinguished by different kinds of type, thus presenting at a glance the results of the critical analysis. That it met and satisfied a real need is sufficiently attested by the fact that a second edition was necessary in little more than two years after its first appearance. As the stereotype evil does not afflict German scholarship as it does that of England and America, the authors had thus the opportunity and occasion to revise their work in the light of the criticisms which came to them from all quarters, and of their own second judg-

ment. Evidence of the thoroughness of this revision are visible on almost every page, especially in the translation. A number of the bolder renderings have given place to less striking expressions, or to the more generally accepted interpretation. If the new edition has thus a somewhat less pronounced individuality than its predecessor, it is doubtless better suited to serve as a basis for academic lectures. In the analysis the changes are less noticeable, though they are by no means lacking. In regard to some of them, opinions will differ as to whether the first or the second thought was the better; but on the whole the improvement is to be recognized. I take pleasure in calling attention again to the work, and in commending it to all who are interested in Old Testament studies.

George F. Moore.

THE BOOK OF SUN-DIALS. Collected by Mrs. ALFRED GATTY. Edited by H. K. F. EDEN and ELEANOR LLOYD. 3d edition. London: George Bell & Sons. 1890.

To the modern reader Mrs. Gatty is perhaps best known through her gifted daughter, Juliana Horatia Ewing, whose exquisite charm and grace have moved us all. But many of the generation now in the midway of life, upon hearing whose daughter she was whose tales so touched and delighted them, welcomed her with the joy of recognition, and the pleasure of finding the charm of the mother added to by the graces of the daughter. Many of such readers carry pleasant memories of the "Parables from Nature," or "Proverbs Illustrated," the first of which was republished in this country by D. Appleton & Co. in 1861.

From the present edition of 1890 it does not appear when Mrs. Gatty's volume on sun-dials was originally published. Her daughter, Miss H. K. F. Gatty, now Mrs. Eden, writes the preface to the second edition in 1888, which is reproduced without apparent additions. Mrs. Gatty's interest in the subject began in her early childhood, we are told, from the stone dial over the porch entrance of her father's church near Richmond, Yorkshire. Her father, the Rev. A. J. Scott, D. D., was "the friend and chaplain of Lord Nelson, who died in his arms at Trafalgar." From 1816 to 1840 he was Vicar of Catterick, and it was from her early love for the dial of Catterick Church, with its motto of "Fugit Hora, ora," that the delightful book before us grew.

The introduction is an admirable essay upon ancient methods of measuring time, from the dial of Ahaz and the Egyptian pillars to the better known examples of the Middle Age. England is rich in sun-dials; they were the ornaments of a nobleman's seat, and the useful centre of the market-place. In 1631 the Company of Clockmakers was incorporated, and given jurisdiction over dials as well as clocks and watches. They were directed to "search for and break up all bad and deceitful works."

But, interesting as the introduction is, the curious reader will hasten to the body of the work, where, with the addenda, nearly nine hundred dials are described and their mottoes given. The flight of time has always been a fruitful theme to poet and moralist; "Fugit hora sic est vita" is the burden of many a motto.

"As these hours doth pass away,
So doth the life of men decay."

This simplest conception of the relation of time and life seems to expand with the idea of improving the hours.

"I am a shade ; a shadow, too, art thou.
I mark the time ; say, Gossip, dost thou see ?"

"Lose no time," a large dial of a Lancashire church admonishes.

"Swift runs y^e time
This diall face doth show
Ye houres are fewe
That ye shall pass belowe"

is to be found in Yorkshire. This shire seems particularly rich in quaint and suggestive inscriptions, or else has been particularly well searched by Mrs. Gatty, whose early home it was.

Some of the French mottoes are ingenious and clever, while most of them seem to have a baldness of statement which takes from them the charm of the English archaic simplicity. "*Cette Montre par son ombre montre que comme l'ombre passent nos jours*" is one of the best.

Turning from "*Mox Nox*" and other distinctly mortuary verse, we come to the more cheerful dial inscriptions. "*Si sol deficit, nemo me respicit*," is the plain statement in the cloisters of Chambery, which is lifted into poetry as the idea advances. "I mark none but sunny hours," an old English dial declares.

"Let others tell of storms and showers,
I'll only count your sunny hours."

"The hours, unless the hours be bright,
It is not mine to mark :
I am the prophet of the light,
Dumb when the Sun is dark."

Many members of this family of bright hours are scattered through the collection.

The warning flight of time has been fully treated by dialists ; the sun, too, has had full justice done it, but the truthfulness of the dial has been little celebrated. There are two or three dials, one of 1680 and one of 1722, with a motto from Virgil, *Georg. I.* 463, "*Solem quis dicere falsum audeat ?*" and an Italian one,—

"The maker may err,
The iron may err,
I never err,"

but this idea has not been much used in inscriptions. No English collection would be complete without the curious puns they delight in.

"We must die all"

has quite a following, including "We shall — 1693" and

"Time tide
Doth waite
Therefore
Make haste
We shall —" (*scil. DIAL, i. e. die-all*),

which is to be found in Newcastle. Among the "*Notes on Remarkable Dials*," and the Introduction to the Addenda, much curious and interesting information is to be found in regard to early Norman or even Saxon dials, as well as those of later date. The famous Seven Dials stone,

which it seems were really only six, is carefully described. Very interesting, also, are the dials belonging to famous people — Sir Walter Scott's "Watch weel," and Miss Harriet Martineau's, with "Come, light, visit me!" a motto of her own which had Wordsworth's approval. Many sun-dials have been recently erected in England, apparently. Within two years since the second edition of this book was published, the editors say they have added sixty mottoes to the collection. Many of them owe their existence to the interest created by the book. Some of the new inscriptions are excellent, while others, as Lady Burdett Coutts's in St. Pancras Gardens, are too literary in form. The same objection applies in a lesser degree to Whittier's charming motto for Dr. Henry J. Bowditch's dial: —

"With warning hand I mark Time's rapid flight
From life's glad morning to its solemn night:
Yet, through the dear God's love, I also show
There's light above me by the shade below."

This is the only American dial given, and perhaps until recently was the only one to be mentioned. A fine dial has lately been set in the old stone wall which marked the northern boundary of the grounds of Santa Barbara Mission in California. The highway passes the church now, and runs through a break in the wall, so that the dial is in plain sight of all the passers-by. It is a single stone, thirty inches square, of a fine gray color, with the dialing and numerals deeply cut and gilded. In the angle which the diverging lines above the iron gnomon make is the motto,

"Lux Dei vitæ viam monstrat;
Sed umbra horam atque fidem docet."

It is a pretty sight to see the picturesque native Californians stopping to read the Latin, in their softened Spanish accent, with evident comprehension.

The book closes with a valuable treatise on the construction of dials, by W. Richardson, which gives it a practical as well as a literary value. We cannot have old dials, but surely many a town and village can boast of a mathematical student who would delight in constructing one. And in our hurried American life the shadow should teach its old lessons, not only of redeeming the time, but of steadfastness and peace.

The book which opens so pleasant a field of study is handsomely printed, with good woodcuts as illustrations, and furnished with a full index. The mottoes are arranged in alphabetical order, the only possible way of classification, perhaps, where the sense is so various. Altogether, it should receive a hearty welcome upon this side of the Atlantic as well as in the mother country.

Caroline Hazard.

PEACE DALE, R. I.

A Concise Cyclopædia of Religious Knowledge. Biblical, Biographical, Theological, Historical, and Practical. Edited by *Elias Benjamin Sanford*, M. A. New York: Charles Webster & Company. 1890. Pp. 985. — This large, handsomely bound, and clearly printed book (although not on paper of the finest quality) seems to be a fairly accurate statement of most religious matters of present general interest. It

would be better if the editor had recast it more thoroughly in his own mind, and studied to bring out more distinctly the characteristics and salient points, and also if, in some matters, he had taken more account of the latest discussions and results. For instance, he still puts down Buddhists as one third of mankind, neglecting Dr. Legge's exposition of the cause of this error, the correction of which reduces them a good deal below one tenth. After all the clatter of the last few years over Indulgences, perhaps the author thought it judicious to leave out the subject altogether. But in his few lines on Tetzel he perpetuates the stupid popular misapprehensions of the real causes of offense given by this venal and impudent friar. He borrows a good deal (avowedly) from Cassell, as well as from Benham and various others, but in borrowing his articles about Americans should not have been so careless as to make Dr. Edward Robinson a professor in *Andover* during his last twenty-five years, — an inexcusable error.

The book shows a temperate and impartial spirit throughout. The article on the Church of England, for instance, allows the author unimpeded opportunity for his endeavors to detach her from her Roman filiation through a grotesquely impossible establishment of Trophimus as Bishop of Arles, who is even found likely to have given his apostolic father, returning from Spain, a flying excursion over to Britain, to communicate self-subsistence to a Church of Britain which has about as close identity with the English Church as our Union with the Iroquois Confederacy. The same author's fierce assault upon Calvinism shows of how little worth such people's boast of comprehensiveness is to be accounted. As Goldwin Smith says, Calvinists and Puritans were "liegemen of the truth," and therefore odious to all sacerdotal magicians. For though this would be a calumnious designation of the Anglo-Catholic party, it is not a calumnious designation of some of its extremists. On the other hand, the article on the Jesuits is so colorless that it gives no true idea of this not unfrequently beneficent and steadily malignant society, from either a friendly or a hostile point of view. In the article on Japan (a very good one) the author takes no account of the ill-warranted charges against the Jesuits of having plotted to subvert the national independence. He does no better justice to Port Royal than to her enemies.

The brief article on Hades, in a few lines, is absolutely perfect, and delicately discriminating. We note a few errors of detail that have caught our eye, some of them derived from more celebrated encyclopedias. Cardinals are not exclusively eligible to the papacy, though no other than a cardinal has been chosen for five hundred years. The Archbishop of Baltimore is not a primate, though largely so treated, and popularly so styled. When not a cardinal, he must sit, in a general council, with common archbishops. Bishop Alonzo Potter figures as Alonzo Porter. The few lines on Anglicans are not erroneous because simply unintelligible. St. Peter's is called a cathedral, which it is not, St. John Lateran being the cathedral of Rome. It is, as Stanley says, essentially "a gigantic private chapel" of the popes. Yet even Catholics often call it, loosely, a cathedral. Roman Catholics do not draw "a hard-and-fast," but an exceedingly elusive line between doctrine and discipline. Savonarola was not burnt, but strangled and his body burnt. The author should have mentioned that in 1569 his memory was solemnly rehabilitated by Rome. The statement that the Dominicans and Franciscans, even after their definite constitution, were originally laymen, appears

irreconcilable with the declaration of Wetzer and Welte, that Innocent III. deprived all monastic brethren out of holy orders of choir privileges. Canons and minor canons, in the Roman communion, need not be farther on in holy orders than subdeacons, if, indeed, minor canons need be beyond minor orders. But to require of a popular cyclopædia, in articles respecting this vast system, the astonishing accuracy of Professor F. H. Foster in the *Christian Literature Dictionary*, would be unreasonable. For all practical purposes, this work of Mr. Sanford is all that is needed by those who are likely to use it. Its account of Protestant, especially American, churches and societies, is full and authoritative. Individual names are admitted and excluded not quite as we should have dealt with them, which is as much as to say that the editor has followed his own point of view, and not ours. To quote Napoleon Bonaparte, with variation, there are a great many saints and only a limited number of pages to divide among them.

American Religious Leaders. *Charles Grandison Finney*. By G. Frederick Wright, D. D., LL. D., Professor in Oberlin Theological Seminary, Ohio. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 1891. Pp. vi, 329. — A very effective presentation of the life of this great man of God, and, from the point of view of a disciple, of his theology. In our own judgment, the latter is presented at a length out of proportion to its actual abiding value in the whole circle of Christian truth. Powerful as it is, and in some of its aspects majestic, it is still provincial. Nay, as a particular phase of New England theology, it is the provinciality of a provinciality. We may be wrong in esteeming it hardly capable of catholic enlargement, but so it now seems to us. Mr. Finney himself was not wholly unconscious of this. We remember once hearing a remarkable sermon of his, from his Oberlin pulpit, in which he declared that all the forms of the New School theology, as contrasted with the Old, had a great, an indispensable critical value, but were by no means worth as much constructively. He rated the spiritual life of the New School churches as being then, in 1846, decidedly lower than that of the Old School, and ascribed it to their having attributed too much of a positive value to that whose value was mainly negative. Though, in his formal theology, he was, as to our natural state, little above the level of Pelagianism, we have heard him, when preaching from his heart and not from his note-book, not only acknowledge the fact of Original Sin, but call it, though hesitatingly, and recommended his hearers to call it, by its true name. And though he soon reverted to a comfortable persuasion of the sufficiency of his system, yet his endeavors to secure a pronounced Princetonian for his successor in the pulpit seem to show a recognition that the days of its specific importance were past. And, indeed, the full and admiring exposition of it by his biographer cannot save this scholastic framework of doctrine — necessarily scholastic, as being meant to meet scholasticism — from wearing rather a belated look in the world. Nevertheless, it accomplished its providential end of breaking down the barriers that had kept tens of thousands of strong minds and characters out of the kingdom of God. And to hear him, year after year, lay down the obligations under which the glorious character of the Creator laid his creatures to Him, would leave the hearer forever inexcusable for giving way to any of the plausibilities of unbelief. And though the more gracious aspects were kept too much in the shade, yet, as Dr. Campbell said, when he did preach the gospel, it was like the windings of the river of the water of life.

President Finney's coadjustment of justification and sanctification by no means secured such a stable equilibrium as the biographer infers. He never established himself firmly enough in the right line of doctrinal succession from the reformers. Holding, rather with the practical instinct of a revivalist than from any Biblical or rational necessity, to the absolute immutableness of the state entered upon at death, he exaggerated this so far as to deny — what to admit is something which even now horrifies a whole General Assembly — that purification from imperfections in the way of rational discipline is possible to the children of God after death, while he would not believe with the Westminster divines, and with a great part of modern Roman Catholicism, in any sudden or magical purification at death. The consequence was, that much of his preaching left the impression that eternity, for every believer, hung on his being, in the last second, in a state of sinless perfection. He was helped to this by his doctrine of the simplicity of moral action, so pungently and perfectly described by Dr. Henry B. Smith as "the complete triumph of system over consciousness." The consequence was, that a great deal of Oberlin piety had nothing like the restfulness of evangelical confidence, but was uneasy and agonizingly introspective. Mr. Finney used to seek an imperfect corrective in works breathing a profound but not over-healthy pietism, like the "Life of Madame Guyon." But after the withdrawal of the rich and deep but morbid and sentimental religion of President Mahan, and the coming in of various independent influences, this tone of things appears to have gradually changed for the better. However reactionary Oberlin may be, — and in our judgment she is lamentably so in some vital questions of the present, — there seems no reason for believing that her strong and practical Christian life contains now any discernible traces of this unprotestant element. We do not exactly see, by the way, what basis Mr. Finney's theology gives the biographer for interjecting a sneer, characteristic of his own particular school, at "the so-called Christian consciousness," — a sneer worthy of a Cardinal Caraffa, — but perhaps, if we examined it with sufficient care, we should discover it. President Finney, apart from the great truths wrought out in his own experience, took up the traditional opinions, and defended them with the usual Rabbinical arguments, good, bad, and indifferent. But, not being a Rabbi, but a prophet, he soon hurried over such things.

When Mr. Finney's mental energy began to decline, his lack of regular training became increasingly evident. Most of the sermons of his last years were lamentably "slack-twisted." But very few of other men's best efforts equaled, intellectually and spiritually, this detritus of age.

President Finney was too much like John Knox not to have a good deal of the spiritual tyrant in him. Although he loved, and after a fashion honored, John Morgan, who, above all his colleagues, breathed the spirit of historical theology and Christian scholarship, yet he ever and anon would snub him after the good old fashion of Luther and Melancthon. This afforded huge glee to little souls, but great grief to the judicious. But there are few men so great as this Christian Elijah whose character can be portrayed with fewer abatements. We have no claim to comprehensive acquaintance with American ministers, but we know of no one who, taking intellect, character, and spiritual power together, appears to us his equal, except his mighty superior, Jonathan Edwards, towards whom he was pervaded with so profound and filial a reverence.

Charles C. Starbuck.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By JOHN FISKE. In Two Volumes. Boston and New York : Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. Vol. I. Pp. xxi, 344. Vol. II. Pp. xii, 305. \$4.00 a set.

The gradual genesis of Mr. Fiske's works on the Revolutionary period is given at full in the preface. The "Critical Period of American History" is the third volume of this work, the narrative being continuous. Mr. Fiske hopes some day to give a manageable history of the United States, from 1492 to 1865. Meanwhile he has rightly judged that he might as well publish fragments as let them lie by him in manuscript.

Mr. Fiske does not know how to explain the general interest exhibited in a plain narrative of events already familiar. Some reasons, however, may be alleged. The narrative, while perfectly plain, and not seeking after startling effects or mysterious explanations, is so penetrated with a genuine sense of the genetic connections of things, that it takes on a teleological luminousness which cannot fail to be fascinating. The book is neither a presentation of events without causes, nor of causes without events, but of events that are causes and causes that become wide-reaching results. Then the author's individual judgment of men and facts is so thoroughly independent that he is not afraid to sympathize heartily with the *communis sensus* of the nation, and to write as "kindly man among his kind," which cannot fail to please us of the commonalty, so that we find it even agreeable to have our particular misapprehensions rectified, and our judgments rendered more enlightened and charitable. Moreover, the underlying enthusiasm takes the place of rhetorical elaboration, and is felt all the more for the matter-of-fact style of the narrative. Then the characterizations of men are superb, and the past is always related in the sense of the present and the future. It is not strange, therefore, if we of the people are greatly taken with Mr. Fiske's histories, as even we are able to spell out their merits.

Mr. Fiske portrays vividly the perpetual disputes of the eighteenth century between the colonies and the home government, engendering the fixed opinion in official circles at home that the Americans were queer, turbulent, and factious, whereas they were simply English freemen thrown locally out of the possibility of using the Parliament, and therefore obliged to find their political organs nearer by. It was not an intrinsic hatred of their liberties, but an inveterately conventional apprehension of the rights of the subject as hardly capable of transfer abroad, a way of thinking incapable of recognizing new forms of old nobility, which made the Lords of Trade eager for a colonial union which should depress the legislatures and exalt the crown. Franklin was equally eager for the union, but for a very different end. "The vast sweep of his intelligence," his wider intercourse with men, and his dual character as a native of Massachusetts and a citizen of Pennsylvania, made him the first Federalist. It shows how deep he went, that his project of 1754 contemplated that immediate federal control over the individual citizen, for federal ends, which could not be made endurable to our localism until impending disintegration forced us into it in 1789.

The author remarks that it shows the superior political advancement of the colonies at that time, kept alert as they were by danger, and having so many truly representative organs of their public life, that the only motive weighing much in England against the proposal to tax them was the fear that they might not like to part with their money. The

dignified protest of Massachusetts against taxation of the unrepresented was derided as "the raving of a parcel of wild enthusiasts." The non-representative character of the unreformed House of Commons made it mainly the organ of the aristocracy, and this had come under a singular subservience to the king. George did not devise the vexatious measures, but, having adopted them, he made them his own, so that the Revolution was a revolt against him personally, in quite as full a sense in fact as the Declaration of Independence expresses it in form. Mr. Fiske thinks that Americans, in their good-nature, have exaggerated his stupidity, and not laid due stress on the intensity of his vindictiveness and the depth of his insincerity. The nobility of Chatham made him frantic, and so he proceeded to do everything that Chatham abhorred. He even threw away Cuba and the Philippines because Pitt had acquired them, and turned Prussia into an enemy because Pitt had made her a friend. It was left for his grand-daughter, by her resolute refusal to make war on Germany in the interest of Denmark, to undo this last mischief, and to prepare the way for the unification of Teutonic and Protestant Europe, which has been emphasized by the solemn entry of her daughter's son into her capital.

Mr. Fiske, highly appreciating Mr. Lecky's dignity and candor, shows, by the quiet presentation of some of the intimate thoughts of our leaders, how far these, as well as the people, were from a ready acceptance of the necessity of separation. Occasional flashes of earlier prevision would be quite consistent with such an habitual feeling. The author is not sure but that, even after Saratoga, Chatham, had he lived, might have secured a dual unity of the Empire, virtual independence without so long an alienation. As it is, the triple unity of America, England, and Germany is a hope of the future, though not without anticipations in the present.

The Boston Tea-party is shown in a light which even enhances the popular enthusiasm over it. It was not until even the majestic legality of Samuel Adams had exhausted itself in the effort to find a quiet way out, that the one remaining way of force was resorted to, just so far as supreme necessity required, and no farther. And, says the author, it shows the mildness of New England civilization, that the careless shooting of half a dozen citizens evoked a horror that could find no other name for it than Massacre, while yet it could not be stirred to condemn the offending soldiers, who at least supposed themselves to be obeying orders. Concord and Lexington and Bunker Hill are described with as much vividness as Macaulay could give, and in a very much purer taste.

The author explains the misapprehended myth of the Mecklenburg declaration of independence, which for a while actually presented Jefferson as a plagiarist. The Mecklenburgers simply declared that royal authority should be treated as *de facto* suspended for the time being.

The frank loyalty with which Maryland entered into the union, though the proprietary government was deeply rooted in the affections of her people, and the stalwart excellence of the Maryland troops, are both noted.

The First and Second Blow at the Centre introduce the history of the war. The descriptions of the battles must be good, because even so dismally untactical a head as that of the present writer can see into them. They are helped by fourteen military maps.

The incompetency and mischievous meddlesomeness into which the

Continental Congress soon sank, after the grandeur of its first efforts, and after the draining out of its great men to other uses, is fully represented, as well as its wretched bad faith towards Burgoyne's army. It could not continue worthy of respect, with such a mere shadow of authority. God gave us a King of Men, and therefore we were held together. The infinite mischief wrought by local and ecclesiastical jealousies of the different colonies, within and without the army, is also made plain.

The blame of the substitution of that pompous nonentity, Gates, for Schuyler, is shown to rest more heavily on New England than we had been aware. Schuyler's "family was one of the most distinguished in New York, and an inherited zeal for the public service thrilled in every drop of his blood. No more upright or disinterested man could be found in America, and for bravery and generosity he was like the paladin of some mediæval romance. In spite of these fine qualities he was bitterly hated by the New England men, who formed a considerable portion of his army." He was a New Yorker and of Dutch descent, and upheld the right of New York to the "Hampshire Grants," and that was enough. Nevertheless, he could not be prevented from setting the trap for Burgoyne which Arnold sprung. General Gates, however, did something. During the crisis of the decisive battle he engaged in a hot wrangle with a sick British officer over the merits of the Revolution, which, drily observes the author, appears to have been his contribution to the crowning victory. It is curious that the two native Englishmen that rose to high rank on our side, Gates and Lee, both turned out mischievous, intriguing incompetencies.

The author interweaves into the romance all the processes which deperaved the brave and generous but unprincipled character of Benedict Arnold into his final treason, with a fullness and delicacy that are quite Shakespearean. His verdict on him is compassionate, as he shows good reasons why it should be, but it is essentially confirmatory of the infamy that must forever weigh upon his name.

Mr. Fiske's development of Washington's strategy is above our competency of criticism, but he shows how little he deserves to be known merely as "the American Fabius," how thoroughly competent he was, after long waiting, to deliver the most masterly and crushing blows. Cornwallis told Washington that, wonderful as was the skill with which he had suddenly hurled an army four hundred miles, from the Hudson to the James, with such precision and such deadly effect, his achievements in New Jersey could not be surpassed even by that. Washington's caution was simply his self-control over the audacity of his courage.

After the fall of Burgoyne "it was generally believed, both in England and on the continent of Europe, that the loss of the American colonies would entail the ruin of the British Empire. Only a few wise political economists, 'literary men,' like Adam Smith and Josiah Tucker, were far-seeing enough to escape this prodigious fallacy; even Chatham was misled by it. It was not understood that English America and English Britain were bound together by commercial and social ties so strong that no question of political union or severance could permanently affect them. It was not foreseen that within a century the dealings of Great Britain with the independent United States would far exceed her dealings with the rest of the world. On the contrary, it was believed that, if political independence were conceded to the Americans, the whole

stream of transatlantic commerce would somehow be diverted to other parts of Europe; that the British naval power would forthwith decay; and that England would sink from her imperial position into such a mere insular nation as that over which Henry VIII. had ruled. So greatly did men overrate political conditions; so far were they from appreciating those economic conditions which are so much more deep-seated and essential."

The great importance of the Armed Neutrality, and the permanent advance made in it towards humanizing war on the sea, is shown at full. The author justly remarks that this great act ought to outweigh a good many of the crimes of Catherine II.

Of the results of Yorktown the author says: "The advent of Lord Rockingham's ministry meant not merely the independence of the United States; it meant the downfall of the only serious danger with which English liberty has been threatened since the expulsion of the Stuarts. The personal government which George III. had sought to establish, with its wholesale corruption, its shameless violations of public law, and its attacks upon freedom of speech and of the press, became irredeemably discredited, and tottered to its fall; while the great England of William III., of Walpole, of Chatham, of the younger Pitt, of Peel, and of Gladstone was set free to pursue its noble career. Such was the priceless boon which the younger nation, by its sturdy insistence upon the principles of political justice, conferred upon the elder. The decisive battle of freedom in England as well as in America, and in that vast colonial world for which Chatham had prophesied the dominion of the future, had now been fought and won. And foremost in accomplishing this glorious work had been the lofty genius of Washington, and the steadfast valor of the men who had suffered with him at Valley Forge, and whom he had led to victory at Yorktown."

The character of Chatham, on pages 17-22 of vol. ii., deserves to be known as one of the noblest passages of English literature. We cannot ask that it be transcribed into the reading-books of such pale neutralities as our public schools are coming to be. But it ought to be learnt by heart by every pupil of our private and Protestant schools, that they may be taught to give thanks to God for the man through whose grandeur of conception and of execution He has secured the lead in all the world, and for the free development of all the world, to the men of the Teutonic race and of the Protestant religion.

The portrait of Washington prefixed to the first volume, and believed to be now engraved for the first time, adds greatly to its interest. It is less conventionalized, more human, than the ordinary likenesses. The publishers call attention to the style of binding as peculiarly flexible and firm.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

